Any comparative anatomist, worthy of the name, can read in the structure of an animal the kind of life

it was designed to fulfil. The physiologist also can infer its habitat from the knowledge of the provisions necessary to supply its different wants, and so localise it at once, as well as classify it in relation to the rest of the animal kingdom. He would also, as a rational matter of course, conclude that there was once a first of its kind, which, also as a matter of course, must have been organised pretty much like the specimen under examination. In the same manner we reason concerning ourselves, from our bodily formation as well as mental constitution, and take it for granted that the first man was the same kind of being as ourselves. If, therefore, we would learn anything definite concerning the first man, we had better study our own wants and the provisions made to meet them. If we are not content to know ourselves as merely nati consumere fruges-born to eat, drink, and die-we shall desire to learn what is the design of our existence, since that existence itself is a proof of design implying special adaptations to ourselves. Now, when we have arrived at a proof of design, we have also come to meet a Power with a will sufficient to account for the existence concerning which we are enquiring, that is to say, an Almighty Designer; for reason assures us that any power less than Almighty could not produce a living creature like man and provide for its wants. With respect to man, we have, therefore, to consider the inherent wants of his spirit as well as his body, and if

possible to determine his relation to his Maker, not only on the ground of his demand as a creature to be especially provided for, in consequence of his peculiar bodily adaptations, but also as to his spiritual nature, with its hopes and its fears in relation to an everanticipated future, and its capacity to know, to rejoice, to suffer, in a manner unknown to any other creature on earth. Design implies a beginning and an end or purpose; therefore, if human nature as a whole evince design, its origin involves whatever in that nature remains to be fulfilled in the history of any individual as derived from the first man.

The dispositions of a living creature, as well as its form, are included in our ideas of that creature. Every living thing belongs to a kind of which there was once a first of that kind, and that one had a place prepared for it, not only as to locality in space, but also as to its dispositions in relation to creatures of other kinds. There was, then, a first man and a place prepared for that man, considered both as a kind of living creature and as requiring a local habitation suited to his bodily and mental constitution, with every provision for his nature. And what is true of the first man's nature is true of everyone descended from him. With respect to other animated beings, if we know their structure and instincts, we find no difficulty in assigning them to their class and order. To what class, order, genus and species of Animalia does man, then, belong? Duly to answer this question, we must consider the matter somewhat at large.

Homines sumus, and our own consciousness is necessarily chief witness in the evidence we seek to establish our position; but in meditating on humanity as a kind of existence, object, and subject, the being that thinks and the being thought of are united. This fact alone in a marked manner distinguishes man from all other animate creatures known to us; for of no other can we affirm that it is capable of reflecting on its own peculiarities, or of inferring anything concerning itself by making its own consciousness either a subject or object of thought. We cannot say that even the most sagacious of mere animals thinks, in any rational sense of the term. Therefore, the fact that man thinks of his origin and end is a fact to be included in our idea of man, and in our consideration of his existence and his destiny.

In endeavouring to determine man's place in the created order of living existences in this world, we must first ascertain what we can of his own individual nature in its completeness. We must know what he is before we can decide on his relationships, or how he stands with respect to other creatures also known to us. When we have ascertained what kind of being he is, both in body and mind, we may be able to discover what he was made for, and then perhaps account for his existence. But in order to arrive at just conclusions in this respect, we are required to consider both the best and the worst example of a human being, we can either remember or imagine. We must reason both from his lowest and his highest qualities, from all

we know of his excellence as well as his degradation; as a creature calculated to excite our love, honour, and admiration for his nobler endowments, or only to be dreaded, despised, and abhorred, for his acquired or inherent baseness. In estimating man, then, we have an element to deal with which never comes into the account when reviewing the characteristics of any of the lower animals. We have to do with the moral state of man's mind and will, since he is certainly, as a rule, able to understand the demand of some moral code, if not all the Ten Commandments, as binding upon him. Moreover, there is this peculiar mark upon man: he alone is capable of love and of hate, morally speaking, that is, in respect to what he believes to be good or bad. In short, we cannot completely know man without knowing both sides of his possibilities in relation to good and evil, morally considered.

The difficulty immediately before us is this: we want a perfect specimen of a man, and cannot find one. If there is not, and never was, such a creature, then man is an exceptional being, for specimens of all other creatures, perfect of their kind, are procurable. We cannot describe what we never saw- -a perfect Yet reason seems to say there must have been such an one at some time and somewhere. The question is, where and when was he, and what has become of him? The answer to that question is not propounded in any system of philosophy or science extant since the burning of the Alexandrian Library; and there is no tradition that the answer was ever given but in one

man.

book, and that is neither philosophic nor scientific, though certainly containing more truth about man's moral nature than ever appeared in any other book, that is to say, if the testimony of all the world's best minds be of any value on the subject.

A naturalist does not reason concerning the nature of any animal, but from a supposed perfect specimen; therefore, that we may reason as well as we can concerning the nature of man, we will do our best to obtain an idea at least of a man in all points as he should be. As this must be the divine idea of man, we might satisfy ourselves by assuming that we possess the authoritative description of that idea. But it is not our business to assume, but, as far as we may, to reason from what we know of human nature. Where, then, shall we turn for our ideal man?

Men of fine mould in body and mind are not such rarities that we cannot point to any who might pass for types of their race, such as it is. Yet it is not improbable that if the most ardent and amiable woman that ever metaphorically adored her husband or her lover, could be calm enough at heart to be influenced by her intellect in this matter, she would acknowledge that the man she loves is not without his faults. She loves a hero which she never sees, but still delights to believe in. She would, of course, very properly say she only loved him the better for his defects; she does not want an angel, but a man on a par with herself, to sympathise with her, and so forth. And he would return the compliment. Indeed, as man's consciousness in