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be justified or not" (p. v). All the conventions then adopted were published in English ten years ago in the appendix to the present reviewer's translation of Meili. They are also fully discussed in the compendious new edition of Burge's Colonial and Foreign Law, not to mention many articles in legal periodicals here and in England.
ARTHUR K. KUHN.
The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution. (University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, II, Nos. 2 and 3.) By Paul Chrisler Phillips, Assistant Professor of History in the University of Montana. Urbana: University of Illinois. 1913. pp. 247. $1.25.
As a field of historical investigation, the diplomacy of the American Revolution is by no means virgin soil, nor has the question of the West been neglected in the study of the negotiations leading to the treaty of 1783. Dr. Phillips nevertheless suspected that intensive methods might discover fertile areas unexhausted by previous harvests. He has subjected the printed and manuscript materials of England, France, and the United States to a minute and critical re-examination; and, except in the highly improbable contingency of a considerable mass of new materials coming to light in the future, the finality of his study is not likely to be questioned. This is the chief contribution of the book; it proves unmistakably that the field has been exploited to the very margin of utility.
To some extent the book is a rehabilitation of Vergennes. No less than fifteen times we are told, in some form, that Vergennes had no desire to restrict the western limit of the colonies, or their navigation of the Mississippi. In the end, however, the insistence of Spain, and misapprehension of the importance which the Americans attached to those questions, caused him to support the Spanish demands. To quote from the preface, "Vergennes himself did not regard his policy towards the West as unfriendly to his ally, or as inconsistent with the terms of the treaty of alliance, and, at no time, did he attempt to conceal his views. The evidence shows beyond doubt that he was conceding to the United States all he thought they had a right to claim." The author thinks, on the whole, that we lost rather than gained when Jay and Adams browbeat the venerable Franklin into approving the separate negotiation with England. This, he thinks, was exactly what Shelburne wanted, and what he was quite ready to pay for, the price being Canada, until the Americans made the mistake of offering it on their own account.
Quoting again from the preface, "The greatness of Franklin as a diplomat appears in a new light when it is understood that, but for the obstinacy of Jay and Adams, he would have obtained for his country the richest parts of Canada." The evidence supporting this conclusion, however, is merely the desire of Shelburne to detach the Americans from France, and Oswald's informal remark to Franklin that he thought "the affairs of Canada would be settled to [your] satisfaction."
This review has an ungracious tone, despite the reviewer's appreciation of the obvious thoroughness of Dr. Phillips's work-for no one can doubt his thoroughness and painstaking care. That the law of diminishing returns was superior to such efforts has been his misfortune rather than the fault of his industry.
EUGENE C. BARKER.
Le doppie imposte in diritto internazionale. Gabriele Salviole. Naples: Luigi Pierro & Figlio. 1914. pp. iv, 93. Price Lire 2.
The question of double taxation in international law is considered in this pamphlet. It is one which may conceivably have considerable practical importance as part of a general scheme of equitable taxation, but the doubt arises at the outset whether international law is capable of furnishing any rule or guidance in the matter, and this doubt is not altogether dispelled.
It is mainly in relation to succession taxes and income taxes that the possibility of double taxation arises, and it frequently no doubt has its origin in the diverse points of view of the several nations in reference to the particular impost in question,-is it real or personal; does it attach to the property taxed or to the taxable person?
It would certainly be desirable to find some fair criterion which would be acceptable to all civilized nations. Until the present, practice has been hopelessly inconsistent, governed indeed by two factors only, the practicability of reaching any particular kind of property for taxation, and, where intelligent foresight has exercised its full influence, the danger of driving capital out of the country.
The comparative importance of the bond of domicile and of citizenship, the locality of the property or the capital from which it is derived, and of the juridical relations of its owner, all enter into the question.
The taxation of real property is almost universally governed by locality, and the author's own opinion seems to be in favor of applying the same criterion in general to personalty, but he admits that recent legis
lation has not shown ground to hope for the adoption of such a rule generally.
As a matter of fact, with the recent increase in governmental expenses, the search for taxable property has become even more strenuous than before, and any government hesitates to relinquish its right to levy on property of any kind that can in fact be reached.
The most notable example of this kind of self-denying law in recent times is perhaps the New York Transfer Tax Law of 1911, by which the taxation on death of any property of non-residents excepting tangible property was abandoned. It may be noted that the author refers only to the earlier law of New York, and does not seem to be aware of the reform.
The case against double taxation seems in equity to be much stronger so far as it refers to succession taxes than for example to income taxes. But it is true that in many cases of so-called double taxation the element of oppression is hardly present, and this also the author incidentally notes.
He enumerates the diverse circumstances under which the objectionable condition may arise, and touches on the various systems of legislation that affect it, but is neither very exhaustive in his treatment nor very satisfying in his tentative solution, and certainly suggests that the subject might repay a somewhat more extended examination, perhaps from a broader point of view than is afforded by private international law alone.
Die Besetzung von Veracruz (Zur Lehre von den völkerrechtlichen Selbsthilfeakten). By Dr. jur. Walther Schoenborn. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer. 1914. pp. 60.
On April 21, 1914, Admiral Fletcher, by command of the President of the United States, landed a force of marines at Vera Cruz, Mexico, and seized the Mexican customs office at that port. In the skirmish that took place with the Mexican troops, four Americans were killed and about twenty were wounded and the casualties on the Mexican side are estimated at one hundred. The next day, General Huerta, the de facto President of Mexico, handed the American Chargé d'affaires his passports. Dr. Schoenborn, in this interesting brochure, considers two questions: (1) To which category of the modes of redress known to international law does the forcible action of the United States belong? (2)
Does international law authorize the forcible action taken by the United
The action of the United States, in the opinion of Dr. Schoenborn, was not war. This action was directed against Huerta, not against the Mexican state. War is only possible between states, and the United States had refused to acknowledge Huerta as a representative of the Mexican state. Dr. Schoenborn admits that the military occupation by one state of the territory of another state without its consent is a grave violation of international law, and that in the present instance the rights of the state of Mexico were undoubtedly affected regardless of the controversy between the United States and Huerta. Still such acts of violence do not necessarily mean war. What determines their character as acts of war or means of redress short of war is the intention, the attitude of the nations involved. It is a case of war if either one puts that interpretation upon the acts of violence in question. In the present case, Dr. Schoenborn finds that neither nation took that position. As to the United States, the resolution of Congress of April 22, 1914, is conclusive, in which the employment of armed force by the President was sustained, but it was declared "that the United States disclaims any purpose to make war upon Mexico."
The author then examines generally the various modes of redress short of war recognized by international law (retorsion, reprisals, peaceful blockade, intervention) with a view to finding in the military occupation of Vera Cruz a form of redress short of war; but he fails to classify it further than to say that it was an act of self-help taking the form of military force.
Dr. Schoenborn finds that the action of the United States must be justified, if at all, not by the strict precepts of international law, but upon political grounds. He reviews the so-called "Wilson Doctrine." In its final analysis the conduct of the United States toward Mexico is a question of "Machtpolitik," which must be justified by its own fruits. alone. GEORGE C. BUTTE.
A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe.
This volume is called "The Diplomacy of the Age of Absolutism." It opens with European diplomatic history in 1648, beginning with France
under Louis XIV, with "his precocious avidity." Under the guidance of that master of the art of diplomacy, Cardinal Mazarin, who stood for "the superiority of centrally directed influence over ill-organized and sporadic resistance," the king became a, if not the, dominating power in Europe. The volume concludes with the diplomatic failure of France after her loss of Canada and India, and her unsuccessful attempt to prevent the partition of Poland and Turkey in 1772-74. It is not all. French diplomacy. The Dutch Republic, Spain, England, Scotland, Italy, Austria, Prussia, Poland and Russia are important factors, and their relations and the parts played by them are given extended and careful consideration. But in the great struggle for territorial expansion and political influence, France, in the beginning, took the leading part, and Louis XIV succeeded for a time in establishing French. ascendancy. This was accomplished largely through the practice of diplomacy. Even the wars were tragic passages in the diplomatic drama.
The map of Europe was materially changed during the period. Religion, politics, territorial expansion, commerce and ecclesiastical spoils were the dominating motives. Diplomatic agents represented the individual potentate. Their methods were often devious and not infrequently corrupt. But the ends to be attained were territorial expansion, colonial possessions and an extension of the sphere of political influence.
The beginnings of world politics, the struggle for commerce and trade, are set forth with interesting detail in the rise and decline of the great Powers. England's Navigation Act, passed in 1651, and in force for nearly two hundred years, gave to that country commercial supremacy -a position and power which she still holds and maintains. Speaking of this period the author says:
Two things in this conflict are worthy of remark. One is that the cause of the quarrel is different from those with which we have hitherto been concerned. It is no longer the personal rivalry of Bourbon and Hapsburg, the zealous antagonism of Protestant and Catholic, nor yet the recurrent conflict of territorial sovereignty with the imperial tradition; it is a contest for primacy in commerce. The other observation is that Europe is beginning to look beyond the narrow circle of the old em pire. We witness the beginnings of world politics, of the struggle for seapower, and the premonitions of colonial wars.
One of the most interesting periods is from 1697 to 1715. The Spanish monarchy was rich, both in its European possessions and its vast colonies in Africa, America, and the Oceanic Islands, all forming a mag