Ambassador generally as to the line he was to take in endeavoring to prevent Russian intervention in the Austro-Servian dispute. Count Berchtold's recognition of the gravity of the situation which had arisen sufficiently appears from the opening paragraphs of this dispatch, which read as follows:

In resolving to proceed firmly against Servia, we are fully aware that a conflict with Russia may result from the existing Servian differences. Yet, in determining our attitude toward Servia, we could not allow ourselves to be influenced by this possibility, because fundamental considerations of our home policy have forced us to put an end to a situation which enables Servia, under Russia's promise of immunity, to threaten this empire constantly and to do so unpunished and unpunishable.

In case Russia should consider that the moment for an accounting with the Central European Powers has come, and therefore a priori be resolved to make war, the following instructions would appear to be useless. 112

Count Berchtold proceeds to set forth the motives and intentions of Austria, emphasizing the point that Austria is not acting from selfish motives, and giving the general assurance that

although we have no ambitions for territorial expansion and do not intend to infringe upon the integrity of Servia, as you already have pointed out, still we are determined to go to any length to ensure the acceptance of our demands. 113

The dispatch concludes with the further assurance that "our action against Servia, whatever form it may take, is altogether conservative and has no object except the necessary maintenance of our position in Europe." 113 This dispatch was not intended for textual communication to the Russian Government, but merely for the general guidance of the Ambassador and subject to his discretion as to the time and manner in which the ideas therein contained should be availed of in his communications with the Russian Government. The dispatch reads on this point: **** it is left to your discretion to make proper use of it at the right time and in a suitable manner in your conference with M. Sazonof and the Prime Minister. 113

112 Austrian Red Book, No. 26, July 25, 1914, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary, in St. Petersburg. (Italics the author's.)

113 Austrian Red Book, No. 26, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary, in St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.

The diplomatic correspondence does not definitely show the time and manner in

Apparently the Austrian Ambassador did not see any suitable opportunity to carry out his instructions until the afternoon of the next day, the 26th, when, according to the account of M. Paléologue, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, he was sent for by the Russian Foreign Minister in order "to come to a 'frank and loyal explanation.' "" 114 Count Szapary then told Mr. Sazonof that he had the impression that Austria's attitude was misunderstood in Russia, and thought to be aggressive, whereas in fact Austria's object was "self-preservation and self-defense against a hostile propaganda threatening the integrity of the monarchy, carried on by word, writing and deed." 115

Mr. Sazonof agreed that this purpose was legitimate, but criticized the form of the Austrian note. Count Szapary's report of the conversation then proceeds:

He had studied the note since its presentation, he observed, and would like to peruse it once more with me, if I had time to do so.

I responded that I was at his disposal, but was neither authorized to discuss the wording of the note nor to give an interpretation of it.. His remarks, however, would be of greatest interest. The minister then analyzed all the points of our note and this time found that seven of the ten clauses were, on the whole, acceptable. He took exception only to the two clauses dealing with the coöperation of Austria-Hungarian officials in Servia and to the clause concerning the dismissal of officers and officials to be designated by us. Those clauses he qualified as unacceptable in their present form.115

The Russian Foreign Minister telegraphed an account of this interview, to which he referred as "a long and friendly conversation," to the which these assurances were conveyed to the Russian Foreign Minister. In his dispatch to Count Berchtold, of July 29, 1914 (Austrian Red Book, No. 47), Count Szapary refers to these assurances as having already been given. And in a dispatch of the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 26, 1914, the Chargé reports the German Ambassador to France as having referred to them on that date. Presumably therefore, they were given at the interview of Count Szapary with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the afternoon of July 26, which is discussed in the text. They were repeated in various forms during the course of the negotiations, and great importance was attached to them by Germany and Austria.

114 French Yellow Book, No. 54, M. Paléologue, French Ambassador to St. Petersburg, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 26, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 194.

115 Austrian Red Book, No. 31, July 27, 1914, Count Szapary, in St. Petersburg, to Count Berchtold.

Russian Ambassador at Vienna 116 with instructions to acquaint Count Berchtold with the substance thereof, and to request him to instruct the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg to continue the conversations with a view to finding a formula which would "prove acceptable to Servia, while giving satisfaction with respect to the chief of her demands." 117 At the same time, as we have seen, Mr. Sazonof appealed to Berlin for support for his proposal at Vienna.118

The Russian Ambassador carried out his instructions on July 28th, as appears from a telegram of that date from Count Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Count Berchtold rehearses his conversation with the Russian Ambassador, and the latter's proposition, and then proceeds:

I replied that I could not agree to such a proposal. Nobody in Austria116 Russian Orange Book, No. 25, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, July 26, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, January, 1915, p. 20. There would seem to be no doubt from the similarity of the two accounts that the conversation referred to in Mr. Sazonof's telegram of July 26th is the same as that reported by the Austrian Ambassador in his telegram of July 27th (Austrian Red Book, No. 31), although it will be noted that Count Szapary's dispatch dated the 27th begins "Have just had a long interview with Mr. Sazonof." The conversation appears to have taken place “on the afternoon of July 26th” (German White Paper, German memorandum, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 375) which would easily account for one of the telegrams reporting it being dated the 27th.

As further fixing the time of the interview as the 26th, see British White Paper, No. 56, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, July 27th, SUPPLEMENT, October, 1914, p. 299 at 300; and British White Papers, Nos. 44, 45, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, July 27th, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, pp. 289–291.

117 Russian Orange Book, No. 25, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Vienna, July 26, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 20. It appears from Mr. Sazonof's telegram that he had made this suggestion to Count Szapary, and his instructions to the Russian Ambassador in fact take the form of directing him to bring the substance of his conversation with Count Szapary to Count Berchtold's attention. Textually this portion of his telegram reads:

"With this object in view it seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorized to enter into a private exchange of views in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of the 10th [23rd] July in consultation with me. This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable to Servia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner." (Russian Orange Book, No. 25, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 20.)

118 See supra, p. 436, and notes 108 and 109.

Hungary would understand or approve such a discussion of a note which we already had found unsatisfactory. Such a discussion appears all the more impossible since public opinion is already deeply and generally excited, as the Ambassador must be well aware. Moreover, we have declared war on Servia today.119

The Russian Ambassador, on the same date, reported the failure of his mission, in the following language:

Count Berchtold replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the AustroHungarian Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic measures which they had taken against Servia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.120

And so the direct conversations between Austria and Russia, from which so much had been hoped, failed of their purpose. True, they were resumed two days later, as a result apparently of German advice at Vienna,121 and it was then explained on the part of Austria that they had been broken off through a misunderstanding. 122 But by that time other and graver issues had arisen, and the resumed conversations were cut short by mobilization and war.

The circumstances under which the conversations were resumed will be dealt with in detail in a subsequent article. It is sufficient for present purposes to point out that on July 28th, Austria definitely declined to continue direct conversations with Russia with respect to the terms of the Austrian note to Servia and the Servian reply.

119 Austrian Red Book, No. 40, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary in St. Petersburg.

120 Russian Orange Book, No. 45, Russian Ambassador to Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 28, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 1915, p. 29 at 30. See also British White Paper, No. 74, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, July 28, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 310; No. 78, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, July 29, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 313.

121 German White Paper, German memorandum, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 378. 122 Austrian Red Book, No. 47, Count Szapary to Count Berchtold, July 29, 1914; No. 49, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary in St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914; No. 50, Count Berchtold to Count Szapary in St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914. French Yellow Book, No. 104, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, SUPPLEMENT, April, 1915, p. 247.

On the same day Austria formally declared war on Servia.123

Assuming in favor of the Allies that one hundred years of history have shown that there is an Eastern question, and that this question is admittedly a matter of common concern for the great Powers of Europe, and concluding from the diplomatic correspondence itself that AustroServian relations had been recognized by all parties since 1909 as forming a part of this common concern;

Assuming in favor of Germany and Austria that the circumstances surrounding the assassinations of Serajevo gave Austria a legitimate cause of complaint against Servia, and concluding from the ex parte evidence presented on behalf of Austria and included in the diplomatic correspondence that Servia ought to have offered spontaneously to start an investigation of Austria's allegations of complicity on the part of Servian officials in the assassinations;

It is submitted that the correspondence from the Austrian note of July 23rd to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia shows that Austria and Germany assumed at the outset a provocative and inadmissible attitude and consistently declined during this period to modify that attitude; that on the other hand the Powers of the Triple Ententeand particularly Great Britain-during the period in question, consistently sought to preserve the peace of Europe. Up to this point, therefore, it is submitted that the onus of bringing on the war rests unmistakably with Germany and Austria. If a justification of Austria and Germany is to be made out on the official documents, it must rest on the correspondence subsequent to July 28th, which will be considered in a subsequent article.

WILLIAM CULLEN DENNIS.

123 Austrian Red Book, No. 37, Count Berchtold to the Royal Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs at Belgrade; British White Paper, No. 73, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, July 28, 1914, SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1914, p. 310.