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American Republics. Dr. Büchi's enumeration of the important results of this first conference concludes with the words of Mr. Blaine at the closing session:

If this Congress had only one of its acts to be proud of, we should dare to call the world's attention to the reasoned, confiding, and solemn consecration, by the two vast continents, of the maintenance of peace, and of prosperity, the offspring of peace. We look upon this new Magna Charta which suppresses war and substitutes arbitration among American Republics in its place as the first result, and the most important one, of the International American Congress.

The Washington conference made no provision for the calling of a future conference, but in his annual message of December, 1899, President McKinley said, "it would seem expedient that the various Republics constituting the Union should be invited to hold, at an early date, another conference in the capital of one of the countries other than the United States, which has already enjoyed this honor." This suggestion led to the meeting in the City of Mexico of the second Pan American Conference, late in 1901. This is reviewed much as the first. Among the important results are recorded the obligatory arbitration treaty signed by the delegates of nine of the republics, the project for codifying international law, and the reorganization of the Bureau of American Republics. A resolution of this conference provided for the summoning of a third within five years.

The third Pan American Conference was called to meet at Rio de Janeiro in July, 1906. The official visit of Elihu Root, Secretary of State of the United States, to this conference had a very salutary effect on the attitude of the Latin American states toward the United States. In addition to matters considered by the two preceding conferences, one of the most important was that of the forcible collection of public debts, which between this and the preceding conference had assumed such a threatening aspect for the Latin American states. The Calvo Doctrine and the Drago Doctrine and the bearing of the Monroe Doctrine are all discussed. This conference passed a resolution declaring that the governing board of the International Bureau of American Republics should select the place where the fourth conference should be held, which should occur within five years.

Buenos Ayres was the place and July, 1910, the time selected for the last meeting. The International Bureau was again reorganized, this time taking the name which it now has, the Pan-American Union. Much is said of its influence and usefulness. Many matters of im

portance were considered under about the same headings as those already mentioned for preceding conferences.

Part three covers only fourteen pages and reviews the relations of the Central American states with each other, since their independence in 1821 and their formation of a federated republic in 1823. The greatest prominence is given to the Central American Peace Conference held in Washington in 1907, and the provision for the erection of a Central American Palace of Justice. A second Central American conference in Salvador in 1910, a third in Guatemala in 1911, and a fourth in Nicaragua in 1912 are briefly reviewed.

Part four covering the last dozen pages studies the policy of the United States with reference to the Pan-American movement. The great antagonisms between Latin America and Anglo Saxon America has had much to do with preventing the Pan-American movement hitherto resulting in very great positive good. Besides several minor causes of this antagonism, he mentions the Monroe Doctrine and the desire of the United States to exercise a hegemony over the Latin American states, which the latter seriously mistrust. The nearness of South America to Europe and the persistence of a Latin American ideal in contradistinction to the Pan-American ideal of the United States are other causes for the lack of harmonious coöperation.

Frequent citations to numerous official reports, public documents, and books in German, English, and French establish the reader's confidence in the truthfulness of the author's statements. Among the hundred or more authorities listed in the bibliography not a single title in Spanish or Portuguese appears. This strongly suggests that the author's linguistic equipment, while considerable, is yet not entirely adapted to the study he has undertaken.


Intervention and Colonization in Africa. By Norman Dwight Harris, Introduction by James T. Shotwell. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914. pp. xviii, 384. $2.00 net.

This study of European expansion and world politics is volume one of a proposed two-volume work on "World Diplomacy." It traces in detail the origin and development of the larger colonial expansion movements of European nations seeking territory and economic concessions in Africa, the efforts to secure strategic positions, the heroic

work in the conquest of natural obstacles, the penetration of the wilds to stop slave hunting and the slave trade and to establish peace and security, the enterprises and blunderings which furnish lessons of statecraft, and the evolution of adjustments in administration based on scientific study of peoples and conditions.

Following a general chapter on European expansion and world politics, the author in six chapters successively treats the Founding of the Congo Independent State, Transition to the Belgian Congo, German Colonization in Southwest Africa, British and German East Africa (and Uganda), French Colonial Expansion in West Africa (and the Sudan and Sahara), Nigerian Enterprise, and South African Expansion and Union. The remaining six chapters treat the Reoccupation of Northern Africa: Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Tripolitania, Egypt and the Sudan.

The book is illustrated by sixteen convenient maps, including one double-page colored map of Africa in 1914. It has a good bibliography of secondary sources, appendices giving a summary and statistics of finances and trade, and a good index.

It presents the various phases of a vast world movement which none of the great European Powers had seriously considered in 1870-a movement which received its incentive in the remarkable economic and political changes after 1870 and which had hardly begun before 1880. Into this movement to push domain beyond the seas and to found great colonial states in Africa the author shows that the great European Powers entered with much timidity, which was partly overcome by humanitarian motives of the call of duty to penetrate the wilds to stop the slave trade and establish peace and security.

Although French colonial enterprises in Africa began in 1636 and were extended and consolidated between 1854 and 1865, France really did not dream of a great Mediterranean-Congo colonial empire until the early eighties when the Senegal colonists reached the Niger, and she began it in the following decade by the consolidation of holdings in West Africa and on the Congo. Although she occupied Algiers in 1830, she exercised a mere military protectorate there, failed to study problems scientifically, and had no enlightened and progressive colonial policy until about 1880. She evolved a more progressive policy after the acquisition of Tunis (1881) to which she applied a good administration based on lessons learned by blunders in Algeria.

England, with the spirit of conservatism, and without any preconceived policy of expansion, was led to extension of territory by

unexpected or serious developments. In 1877, when she had an opportunity to secure control of all East Africa, she was not ready to consider seriously any general policy of colonial expansion. In 1884, although forced by circumstances of 1882 to interfere in Egypt, she was still undecided on a policy of colonial expansion until forced to act by new conditions. Under Gladstone's leadership she would never have consented to turn Egypt into a British protectorate. Until 1884 she had been in no haste to enter upon a race for territory in West Africa, but under pressure of French and German activities she realized the necessity of formulating a definite policy of expansion there, and in June 1885 to protect British interests on the Niger she proclaimed a British protectorate over the region-the beginning of a policy which by 1914 resulted in the amalgamation of all Nigeria into a single united protectorate. Her period of indecision and undertainty was not fully ended until about 1885 after the fall of the Gladstone ministry. Both in South Africa and Egypt she showed a lack of acuteness and promptness in seizing opportunity and in accepting duty.

The interest of both England and France in African colonization was stimulated by the organization and activities of the independent Congo Association, the formation of the Congo Free State in 1884, the work of the resulting Conference of Berlin of 1884-85 at a time when Great Britain was taking over the administration of Egypt, and by the entrance of Germany into Southwest Africa in 1884 and into East Africa in 1884-85.

Although Germany was under strong pressure after 1878 to enter the field of international politics, Bismarck postponed action until he had firmly secured the position of Germany in Europe through a tariff program and by the formation of the Triple Alliance of 1882. Alarmed at conditions resulting from the industrial revolution and increase of population at home, and partly influenced by the delay of the British government to establish a protectorate over Atlantic coast territory (north of Cape Colony) in which German missions had been established, Bismarck in 1884 determined upon colonization. He sent a warship to take possession of territory in Southwest Africa, in which England promptly recognized German rights; and, in 1885, he officially proclaimed in East Africa a German protectorate, which through the influence of England was recognized by the Sultan of Zanzibar.

Aroused by the entrance of Germany into Southwest Africa, and the expansion of the Boers westward, England took under her protection

Basutoland in 1884 and Bechuanaland in 1885-the latter in order to keep the way open to the north of the native districts of Matabeleland and Mashonaland whose possibilities attracted the attention of Cecil Rhodes (and John Hays Hammond) by 1888.

The later attempt (after 1890) of Germany to secure the Uganda region by treaties with the natives was frustrated by the prompt action of the British East African Company, which from 1890 to 1892 obtained a control that made permanent the British protectorate in East Africa and won the key to the Nile. By new treaties (after 1895) the British Government secured the Nile as the frontier of Uganda and proceeded to safeguard her interests in that region by a railroad which was begun in 1895 and which reached Lake Victoria at the close of 1901.

One of the most interesting chapters in the book is that on South African expansion and union, treating the British policy after 1814, the consequences of the "Great Trek," the withdrawal of English responsibility and sovereignty from the Transvaal and Orange river territory in 1852-54, the plans for federal union in 1857, the annexation of the Transvaal in 1877, the disastrous reversal of policy under Gladstone resulting in the revolt of the Transvaal and the recognition of its independence by treaty of 1881, and the new factors which changed completely the situation and forced England after 1884 to adopt a policy of forward movement. Although the author states that the British Government did not grasp the salient features of the situation at the Cape and never evolved a continuous and enlightened policy until the days of the Boer War, he justifies the policy of England in relation to the war and the later liberal views resulting in the formation of the Union in 1910. He optimistically states that the old racial animosity and composition which still exists in the Union will probably not be a serious menace in the future.

In the chapter on Morocco, one obtains several glimpses of events which have a bearing upon the present war in Europe: the sudden intrusion of the Kaiser into the field of Morocco diplomacy in 1905 to prevent the consent of Morocco to the Anglo-French treaty of 1904; the Algeciras Congress of 1906 by which Germany intended to test the Anglo-French entente and force the diplomatic isolation of France; the later grave error of intrusion by the Kaiser in Morocco affairs in 1908, contrary to the agreement of 1906; the dispatch of the Panther to Agadir by the German Government at a critical moment in 1911, evidently to prevent the establishment of a French protectorate which had be

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