closer solidarity of will. For the two forces, to be truly efficacious, must be directed as one, there must be co-ordination, the higher advantage which would be secured by the prevalence of a single ethos must as far as possible be gained. Therefore the States joined in a military alliance tend to come together in a closer alliance of sentiment and of aspiration. It is true that history affords few instances of durable alliances, that alliances, on the contrary, have been frequently dissolved and rearranged. But this is because the experiment failed to prove efficacious in achieving the practical object desired, or because the environmental situation changed before a close and lasting co-operation had time to develop. Even a transient alliance of expediency must have some effect in developing the faculty for association and must leave States a little better than it found them. Consequently that tendency in the progressive development of nations must be noted, which shows itself in their growing capacity for closer spiritual co-operation, and in their consequent gradual acquisition of increased moral power, signifying, of course, enlarged physical efficacy.

The struggle is thus for combinations of States so strong as to establish order successfully in the face of the fiercest physical resistance, and it is certain that in the long run the combination of greatest spiritual, as distinct from mere physical power, will tend to attain supremacy. But this may be so long a process of evolution that we may often see the spiritually weaker combination crush the spiritually stronger, by sheer brute force, before forces are so distributed as to be aligned for the ultimate moral phase of the struggle.

Balance of Power. The phenomenon known as "balance of power," considered as an actual situation, is nothing but the natural conflict of opposed forces, each of which is seeking consolidation. It has often been assumed that such a situation really signifies a relation of stable, rather than of unstable equilibrium, which comes to the same thing as a conflict so ordered as to be what might be called a continuing "draw," or perhaps a prolonged armistice even. The testimony of history would easily show that as a matter of fact such equilibrium has never lasted long. In the natural development of the struggle, one of the supposedly "balanced" powers must sooner or later get ahead of the other, and wars break out either to materialize this advantage or else to countervail

it by a new array of hostile energy-wars on the one hand of triumph, disclosing a temporary victory in the struggle for supremacy, on the other hand of renewal of the struggle under the pretext that the “balance of power" must be restored.

But "balance of power" must be dealt with not only as external phenomenon but as a doctrine of politics. It is doubtful if, as such, it is professed with such clearness of conception as to be a deliberate aim of statecraft, for the object of statecraft could hardly be that of deliberately strengthening the enemy, and of course if such a doctrine were to be applied as a general principle, of universal scope, it would mean not only that the State must be as strong as its enemies, but that they must be as strong as the State. Rather is "balance of power" a principle of statecraft solely so far as it is an affirmation of an actual relationship of interacting restraints, which may sustain a claim of power without exciting suspicion of an ambition to secure increase of power. But no such implied disavowal of ambitious designs, on the part of a "balance of power" statecraft, can really affect the actual character of the struggle, which must of course conform to the general law of the struggle of all natural forces to overcome the resistance in their path and to supplant the forces with which they contend. The struggle will go on till it results at last in victory for one side, and in consolidation. Then a new opposition may be expected to develop within the consolidated order, at first indistinct, then pronounced. As the issue of force sharply defines itself a new "balance of power" stage will develop, in turn to be succeeded by consolidation. "Balance of power" is thus simply a certain stage of the struggle between opposed forces-one might say the stage of alignment in preparation for the actual duel for supremacy.

In support of the "balance of power" doctrine is found not only the practical statecraft that employs it as a means of disarming the suspicion of competitors, but also the anti-imperialistic dogma of those people whose conceptions are not attuned to the harmony of a lofty ethos in which might and right are united, but who see only, in the triumph of force, despotism and the denial of right. Anti-imperialism, the doctrine

• Tarde thus expresses his general law: "Les pouvoirs divisés d'abord et hostiles, se sont centralisés pour se diviser de nouveau, mais d'accord entre eux." Les Transformations du Pouvoir, Paris, 1899, 200.

of small States, the doctrine of a liberty guaranteed by mechanical checks and balances, are thus outgrowths of a lower ethos peculiar to the earlier stage of the struggle for consolidation. Because of their close relation to this lower ethos the anti-imperialists are those who, in fact, will be found to be maintaining most insistently the doctrine of the equality of States-which means the equality of their forces-and the principle of self-interest as a much more important factor in international right than it would be under a broader conception of the general interest of the community of nations and under a less atomistic conception of the individual rights of States.

But these considerations should not lead one to discard the practical expedient of the formation of powerful international coalitions as a means of resisting the force of rival combinations. Opposition of power-we will not say "balance of power"-is, indeed, a necessary stage in the evolution of international force, and the far-seeing statesman will not only realize that combinations are inevitable, but he will exert himself to secure to his country the advantage of artificial combinations, albeit unnatural alliances, alliances merely of convenience, as a means of enabling the ethos of his own State to secure the maximum of efficacity." For this reason one should be sparing in one's condemnation of the policies pursued by the British Foreign Office of late years. The alliances formed were surely not such as to secure the greatest possible moral efficacy, but they were perhaps the strongest alliances of convenience, in default of moral alliances, which could have been formed in the exigencies of the practical situation. And we may be sure that it will be long before the international politics of the future can dispense with alliances of expediency and with "balances of power" based solely on the principle of expediency. Wars may effect new distributions of power, but the prudent statesman will hardly rely on moral force alone to insure the stability of a system formulated in a treaty of peace, but will turn his attention to the task of contriving effective artificial checks and

7 "Wohl zeigen alle wahrhaft grossen politischen Denker einen Zug cynischer Menschenverachtung, und wenn sie nicht zu stark ist, hat sie ihr gutes Recht. Grade wer von der menschlichen Natur nicht Unmögliches fordert, wird die genialen Kräfte, die trotz aller Gebrechlichkeit und Bestialität in ihr ruhen, erwecken." Treitschke, ii, 545.

balances. It would be a mistake, however, to attribute to this purpose a wholly disinterested effort to secure an even matching of forces, which would mean impotence. The "balance of power" formula will therefore commonly mask the intention to secure a predominance of force rather than merely a force exactly equal to that of the opponent. The “balance of power" policy, in international relations, will thus tend rather to a quasi-equilibrium than to a real equilibrium of forces.

Other Dangers and Inconsistencies of the Doctrine of Equilibrium. We have criticized the "balance of power" formula, not as a maxim of expediency, for as such it is useful, but as a doctrine of international order. To treat it simply as a practical means to the attainment of this international order is one thing, and to treat it as the indispensable condition of such order and the necessary goal of all practice is another. The latter conception is found only in the minds of those who misconceive the world process and attach their faith to an untenable doctrine which lays undue emphasis on the régime of competition. The natural order is competition, co-operation, centralization. The balance of power doctrinaire is he who would indefinitely prolong the régime of competition, at the expense of the successive stages, which are relegated to a minor position. He is an anti-imperialist and an anti-federalist. So great is the dislike of the anti-federalist for centralization that he opposes that co-operation between States which, entailing a redistribution of power, would tend toward centralization or consolidation. He desires his country to be a member of one of two powerful rival coalitions, or to maintain a position of isolation, rather than to occupy an independent position in an international concert, or to reach so many friendly understandings with other nations as to make rival coalitions unnecessary. Albeit unconsciously, therefore, the anti-federalist resists the principle of close international co-operation, as something to be preferred to competition, admitting it only as a help to the formation of strong coalitions, that is, as a means to the competition which he desires above all else. Strange to say, therefore, and paradoxical though it may appear, it is the anti-federalist and the anti-imperialist whose influence is most powerfully exerted for war. For while he does not openly or consciously choose war, he labors earnestly to produce the very situation of sharp opposition from which war arises. Anti-imperialism, anti

federalism, the doctrine of competition-call it whatever you will-is thus in the highest degree inimical to the peace of the world. Obstinately maintained, the doctrine of limited interest and limited power, according to which each member of the family of States is to be autonomous and equal, one of the components of an absolutely rigid organization, tends inevitably to political violence to war.

While the anti-imperialist professes peace, he really foments war. This inconsistency seems to result from the dilemma in which antiimperialism finds itself. It has an intense fear of physical force, which is, in its estimation, but the manifestation of despotism and of moral anarchy. But how shall society extricate itself from the régime of force without invoking force? How shall moral order be maintained without a resort to the instruments of force? There are only two avenues of escape from the dilemma. One is the absolute elimination of all force, which results of course in an anarchical position. The other is the tacit assumption of a force not frankly acknowledged, a force which is to maintain its present distribution in an enduring situation. The antiimperialist is impaled on this horn of the dilemma when he permits himself to be drawn, in his dogmatic insistence on competition, to the defense of monopoly. The existing distribution of forces, even though it be highly unequal, will command his support if it seems to him to offer a guaranty of stability. The English anti-imperialist who deprecates the acquisition by Germany of a commercial port equal in importance to London falls into a very extraordinary inconsistency, for his professed hostility to redistribution of force and to a new basis of consolidation does not prevent him from supporting a dynastic, monopolistic principle assuring the perpetuity of the existing régime.

The Relation of War to the World Process. War is useful, when no other expedient is available, as a means of consolidating world force and uniting the world ethos. The object of war is the subjugation of the

8

In one of his earlier essays, "Ueber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts," Hegel first developed the thought that war is necessary and useful. Ziegler, "Hegels Anschauung vom Krieg," Archiv für Rechts- und Wirthschaftsphilosophie, vi, 88 (Oct. 1912).

Ziegler connects this thought with "the conception of the people as a moral totality or individuality." "Die Beziehung von Individualität zu Individualität ist entweder die positive des ruhigen, gleichen Nebeneinanderstehens im Frieden oder die negative