As to cargoes coming out of Germany, the United States said that, under the rules governing enemy exports, only goods owned by enemy subjects in enemy bottoms are subject to seizure and condemnation, while by the declaration it is proposed to seize and take into port all goods of enemy "ownership or origin." The United States maintained that the origin of goods destined to neutral territory on neutral ships is not and never has been a ground for forfeiture, except in case a blockade is proclaimed and maintained, and it was queried upon what principle of law the cargo or a neutral ship, sailing out of a German port, could be condemned? And if it was not condemned, what other legal course was open except to release it? In case the belligerents construed their declaration as an announcement of a blockade, the United States insisted that there should be some limit to the radius of activity of the blockading vessels so that neutral vessels would not be liable to seizure far from the scene of the blockade.

Great Britain replied, on March 15th, that, succinctly stated, the object of the declaration is to establish a blockade to prevent vessels from carrying goods for or coming from Germany, but that in initiating a policy of blockade, the British Government felt reluctant to exact from neutral ships all the penalties attaching to a breach of blockade. In order to alleviate the burden which maritime war inevitably imposes on neutral seaborne commerce, Great Britain would refrain altogether from the exercise of the right to confiscate ships or cargoes which it had in respect of breaches of blockade, and would limit themselves to stopping the cargoes destined to or coming from the enemy's territory. Concerning the radius of activity Great Britain stated that it was not intended to interfere with neutral vessels carrying an enemy cargo of a noncontraband nature outside European waters, including the Mediterranean.

Accompanying the British note was an order in council published on the same date indicating the manner in which the proposed measures would be carried out. The order applies to all vessels sailing after March 1, 1915, not only to and from German ports, but to and from neutral ports.

All merchant vessels bound for German ports are required to discharge their cargoes in a British or allied port where, subject to the right of requisition by the crown, noncontraband goods will be restored to the persons entitled thereto under the direction of the prize court.

All merchant vessels which sail from German ports are required to discharge goods laden at such ports, in a British or allied port where, sub

ject to the right of requisition by the crown, they will be sold under the direction of the prize court and the proceeds dealt with in such manner as the court may deem to be just. Neutral property laden at German ports and discharged in British or allied ports, may be released on the application of the crown, and the proceeds of the sale of goods laden in Germany which had become neutral property before the date of the order in council, may be paid to the persons entitled thereto, but the proceeds of the sale of all other goods laden in Germany may not be paid out of court until the conclusion of peace.

All merchant vessels bound for neutral ports carrying enemy property or goods with an enemy destination are required to discharge such goods and property in a British or allied port where, subject to the right of requisition by the crown, noncontraband goods will be restored to the persons entitled thereto upon such terms as the prize court may consider just. This provision does not apply to vessels carrying goods laden at German ports.

All merchant vessels which sail from neutral ports with enemy property or goods of enemy origin may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port where, subject to the right of requisition by the crown, they will be sold and the proceeds dealt with in the discretion of the court. Neutral property of enemy origin may be released on application of the crown but no proceeds of sale may be paid out of court until the conclusion of peace, except upon application of the crown or proof that the goods had become neutral property before the issuance of the order in council.

This order, the covering note explained, afforded a wide discretion to the prize court in dealing with the trade of neutrals in such manner as may in the circumstances be deemed just, and particular attention was directed to the following provision inserted in the order to facilitate claims by persons interested in any goods placed in the custody of the prize court under the order:

Any person claiming to be interested in, or to have any claim in respect of, any goods (not being contraband of war), placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize court under this order, or in the proceeds of such goods, may forthwith issue a writ in the prize court against the proper officer of the Crown and apply for an order that the goods should be restored to him, or that their proceeds should be paid to him, or for such other order as the circumstances of the case may require.

Great Britain gave assurances that the instructions which would be issued to the fleet, executive officers and committees upon whom the

order conferred powers, would impress upon them the duty of acting with the utmost despatch and of showing in every case such consideration for neutrals as may be compatible with the object of establishing the blockade.

After an examination of this order in council the United States on March 30, 1915 informed Great Britain that, were its provisions to be actually carried into effect, it would constitute "a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace." It was asserted by the United States that "a nation's sovereignty over its own ships and citizens under its own flag on the high seas in time of peace is unlimited; and that sovereignty suffers no diminution in time of war, except in so far as the practice and consent of civilized nations has limited it by the recognition of certain now clearly determined rights, which it is conceded may be exercised by nations which are at war." These rights were enumerated as the right of visit and search and the right of capture and condemnation if, upon examination, a neutral vessel is found to be engaged in unneutral service or to be carrying contraband of war intended for an enemy's government or armed forces; the right to establish and maintain a blockade of the enemy's ports and coasts and to capture and condemn any vessel taken in trying to break the blockade; the right to detain and take into port for judicial examination all vessels which may be suspected for substantial reasons to be engaged in unneutral or contraband service, and to condemn them if the suspicion is sustained. "But such rights," continued the American note, "long clearly defined both in doctrine and practice, have hitherto been held to be the only permissible exceptions to the principle of universal equality of sovereignty on the high seas as between belligerents and nations not engaged in war."

Taking up the provisions of the order in council, the United States, assuming that a blockade exists and the doctrine of contraband as to unblockaded territory is rigidly enforced, entered a protest against Great Britain's claim of the right to detain, requisition or confiscate innocent shipments which may be transported from the United States through neutral countries to belligerent territory and enemy goods which may be transported from neutral countries to the United States in neutral ships.

Recurring to Great Britain's notification that her measures constituted a blockade, the United States pointed out that the order in

council included not only the coasts and ports of Germany, but "embraces many neutral ports and coasts, bars access to them, and subjects all neutral ships seeking to approach them to the same suspicion that would attach to them were they bound for the ports of the enemies of Great Britain, and to unusual risks and penalties." Such limitations, risks and liabilities the United States contended "are a distinct invasion of the sovereign rights of the nation whose ships, trade, or commerce is interfered with."

Admitting that the changes which have occurred in the condition and means of naval warfare might make it impracticable to maintain the old form of "close" blockade with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports, the United States, however, maintained that:

If the necessities of the case should seem to render it imperative that the cordon of blockading vessels be extended across the approaches to any neighboring neutral port or country, it would seem clear that it would still be easily practicable to comply with the well-recognized and reasonable prohibition of international law against the blockading of neutral ports by according free admission and exit to all lawful traffic with neutral ports through the blockading cordon. This traffic would of course include all outward-bound traffic from the neutral country and all inward-bound traffic to the neutral country except contraband in transit to the enemy. Such procedure need not conflict in any respect with the rights of the belligerent maintaining the blockade since the right would remain with the blockading vessels to visit and search all ships either entering or leaving the neutral territory which they were in fact, but not of right, investing.

The British notes and the order in council announced that the interdiction of commercial intercourse with Germany was decreed as a measure of retaliation against Germany's war zone decree and activities in pursuance thereof, but the United States answered in the same terms in which it answered Germany on the same point, namely, that the allegation by Great Britain of illegal acts on the part of her enemy could not be cited as in any sense or degree a justification for similar practices on her part as they affect neutral rights.

The United States called attention to the great area of the high seas included in the so-called blockade and the distance from the territory affected to the cordon of blockading ships, and insisted that American vessels passing through this area on the way to neutral ports which Great Britain has not the legal right to blockade, be not interfered with; and, finally, the United States indicated its purpose to demand of Great

Britain full reparation for every act which, under the rules of international law, constitutes a violation of neutral rights.

Great Britain's reply of July 24, 1915, alleged that the right of a belligerent to blockade the enemy's ports has no value save in so far as it gives power to a belligerent to cut off the sea-borne exports and imports of his enemy, and that the contention put forward by the United States that if a belligerent is so circumstanced that his commerce can pass through adjacent neutral ports as easily as through ports in his own territory, his opponent has no right to interfere and must restrict his measures of blockade in such a manner as to leave such avenues of commerce still open to his adversary, is unsustainable either in point of law or upon principles of international equity. Continuing along this line, Sir Edward Grey said:

As a counterpoise to the freedom with which one belligerent may send his commerce across a neutral country without compromising its neutrality, the other belligerent may fairly claim to intercept such commerce before it has reached, or after it has left, the neutral state, provided, of course, that he can establish that the commerce with which he interferes is the commerce of his enemy and not commerce which is bona fide destined for or proceeding from the neutral state.

Anticipating the difficulty of citing authority in support of this alteration in acknowledged principles, it was contended that "what is really important in the general interest is that adaptations of the old rules should not be made unless they are consistent with the general principles upon which an admitted belligerent right is based," and that "if it be recognized that a blockade is in certain cases the appropriate method of intercepting the trade of an enemy country, and if the blockade can only become effective by extending it to enemy commerce passing through neutral ports, such an extension is defensible and in accordance with principles which have met with general acceptance." In this connection Great Britain cites the position of the United States in the Civil War when it was vital to the cause of the United States that it should cut off the trade of the Southern States. Neighboring neutral territory afforded convenient centers from which contraband could be introduced to supply the Confederate armies and from which blockade running could be facilitated. To meet this difficulty Great Britain alleges that "the old principles relating to contraband and blockade were developed and the doctrine of continuous voyage was applied and enforced under which goods destined for the enemy territory were intercepted before they reached the neutral ports from which they were to be reëxported." Although