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French remained at Vera Cruz, and in 1862 advanced on Puebla, where they were met and defeated by General Diaz. But a year later another French army was dispatched to Mexico, which besieged Diaz at Puebla, and forced his surrender after desperate fighting. The capture of Mexico City and the installation of Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico soon followed. Then ensued a protracted guerilla warfare, in which Diaz went through extraordinary adventures, was several times captured and escaped, and finally recaptured Puebla, repulsed the Imperialist army advancing from Mexico City, and on June 21, captured the capital, two days after Maximilian had surrendered at Queretara. It was the intervention of the United States, at the close of the Civil War, which made possible the expulsion of the French invaders; but the military glory of the achievement belonged to Diaz, and made him the idol of the Mexican people.

Diaz might then have taken the presidency of the Republic; but loyalty to his old chief Juarez dictated his retirement to the estate near Oaxaca given him by the people of that state. More disorders followed; in 1872, Juarez dying, Lerdo de Tejada became president under the Constitution. His four years' term was marked by a series of conspiracies and insurrections, with the people discontented and impoverished. Finally in 1876, Diaz, going to Texas, there organized a revolution in the radical northern provinces. His resources were inadequate; he was defeated in battle after battle, and after a series of hairbreadth escapes, he succeeded in reaching the south, where he again raised an army, and at the great battle of Tecoac defeated the Lerdistas, and in November, 1876, became the President of Mexico.

Diaz devoted his first term to the restoration of order and to efforts to reconcile the political factions by which the nation was torn. He retired at the end of four years to make way for Gonzales, and during the latter's term of office, he travelled extensively in the United States. In 1884, it was generally recognized that he was the only man who could save Mexico from herself; he was elected President again, and remained in the office without serious opposition, until 1911.

There followed what is generally regarded as the golden era in the history of Mexico. A transformation began almost immediately. The President encouraged the building of railroads and telegraphs, the development of mines and plantations, water works, sanitation. He beautified and extended the capital city, built opera houses, and above all else, established a system of free public education and put the re

public on a sound financial basis. Foreign capital quickly gained confidence and flowed into the country from Europe and the United States, greatly to its benefit and development. Diaz gathered about him administrators and financiers of recognized ability, and the machinery of government was efficient. The thirty years of his presidency, during which he was sometimes re-elected by methods recognized as extraconstitutional, marked an era of industrial and economic growth never previously known in Mexico, and hardly surpassed in the United States during the same time.

But throughout the later years of his regime the embers of discontent and revolution were smouldering in Mexico, and the government only rested secure upon the army. The administration of the criminal law was a farce, and the courts were notoriously venal and incompetent. Administrative scandals arose; many of the president's official adherents were undoubtedly corrupt and more than one was false to him; but it must be said for him personally that he accumulated no fortune and died a comparatively poor man.

As Diaz grew old, his iron grip upon the situation gradually loosened; his splendid army dwindled to a skeleton; men whom he trusted intrigued against him. General Bernardo Reyes, the Governor of Nuevo Leon, organized an insurrection, and was promptly put in jail; but after him came Francisco I. Madero, a political dreamer not unlike the type of the French revolutionist. He started a revolution in San Antonio, and conducted a presidential campaign from within the walls of a prison. But the insurrection grew from guerilla outbreaks into a widely extended revolution, with which a honeycombed government was unable to cope. Discouraged, disgusted and worn out, Diaz resigned on May 5, 1911, and at once left the country, never to return.

What has happened to our unfortunate neighbor since is still current history; what will happen to it in the future, no man can foretell. But truth compels the statement that the happiest and most progressive epoch in Mexico's history was the thirty years of Diaz's supremacy. Following the establishment of Mexican independence in 1810, down to 1876, the country was in the hands of seventy-nine executive heads, including an emperor, many presidents, many dictators, and never with a firm government. As time passes, the conviction will grow that Diaz was its wisest as well as its strongest ruler. But it must be admitted that the Diaz regime was fatal to itself. It was not a government founded upon the solid rock of representative institutions, and no democracy can

live which is governed in any other way. Porfirio Diaz will live in history as one of the great generals of his country; he will live as a great executive, who realized the splendid possibilities of Mexico, who knew its weakness and sought to educate his people. But it is true that his policy aimed at the exploitation of the Mexican nation rather than its development on the broad lines that must underlie democratic institutions.

We cannot close this inadequate sketch of a useful and remarkable career without recording the fact that President Diaz was always a firm friend of the United States. During the long period of his supremacy, no diplomatic misunderstandings arose which were not peaceably adjusted in the spirit of true friendship. He shares with President Roosevelt the honor of submitting the first international controversy to the Hague tribunal for determination, by promptly accepting the offer of the United States to refer to the decision of that tribunal the controversy over what is known as "The Pious Fund of the Californias." In so doing the two American republics not only vivified The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, but set an example to all the world, which has since been followed in many instances for the settlement of international disputes. In his honor an American president went outside American territory for the first time when President Taft visited him at Ciudad Juarez in October, 1909.

THE WILLIAM P. FRYE CASE

In our last issue (page 497) a summary was given of the negotiations between the United States and Germany over the sinking of the American vessel William P. Frye by the German auxiliary cruiser Prinz Eitel Friedrich. It appeared at that time that Germany had admitted liability under the treaties between the United States and Prussia of 1799 and 1828 for the damages sustained by American citizens, but held that the case should be submitted to the German prize court at Hamburg. It also appeared that the United States did not see any reason for submitting the case to the German prize court. Germany having admitted her liability under the treaties, the status of the claimants and the amount of the indemnity were the only questions remaining to be settled, which the United States suggested could be more properly dealt with through diplomatic channels.

From the correspondence exchanged since that time, however, it is

apparent that the question is not one of such easy solution as the United States thought. It now transpires that Germany's admission of liability was not intended to include an admission that the treaties with Prussia had been violated by the sinking of the Frye. Germany asserts that the recognition by Article 13 of the treaty of 1799 of the right of a belligerent to stop contraband supplies on their way to an enemy implies the right in extreme cases to effect this purpose by the destruction of the ship, and that the treaty merely obligates the party at war to compensate the neutral for the damages sustained, whatever be the manner adopted for stopping the contraband supply. It is further asserted that, since the Prussian-American treaties contain no stipulations as to how the amount of this compensation is to be fixed, and since, according to the general principles of international law, the exercise of the right of control over trade in contraband is subject to the decision of the prize courts, the question of compensation must be submitted to the German prize court for determination.

The United States maintains that there is no justification in the treaty stipulations for the sinking of the Frye, but, on the contrary, that the belligerent right to deal with contraband, recognized in the treaty, is limited by the express stipulation of Article 13 of the treaty of 1799 that "in the case supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of contraband, if the master of the vessel stopped will deliver out the goods supposed to be of contraband nature, he shall be admitted to do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into any port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage." The character of the cargo, for which, incidentally, the United States makes no claim because it was not American property at the time of seizure, is, in the view of the United States, irrelevant as far as the justification of the sinking of the vessel is concerned. If the cargo of the Frye was non-contraband, the destruction of either the vessel or the cargo was not justified under the circumstances according to any rule of international law; if it was contraband, the Frye should have been allowed to proceed upon delivering it out in accordance with the provisions of Article 13, just quoted.

The United States also relies on Article 12 of the treaty of 1785 with Prussia, the material portion of which will be quoted for convenience of reference.

If one of the contracting parties should be engaged in war with any other Power, the free intercourse and commerce of the subjects or citizens of the party remaining neuter with the belligerent Powers shall not be interrupted. On the contrary, in that case,

as in full peace, the vessels of the neutral party may navigate freely to and from the ports and on the coasts of the belligerent parties, free vessels making free goods, insomuch that all things shall be adjudged free which shall be on board any vessel belonging to the neutral party, although such things belong to an enemy of the other.

For the foregoing reasons, it was maintained that the claim presented by the American Government is for an indemnity for a violation of the treaty, in distinction from an indemnity in accordance with the treaty, which sort of claim is a matter for diplomatic adjustment and is in no way dependent upon the action of the German prize court.

In support of her interpretation of the treaties, Germany disposes of Article 12 of the treaty of 1785, by alleging that it merely formulates general rules for the freedom of maritime intercourse, and leaves untouched the question of contraband, which is specifically dealt with in the following article, now in force as Article 13 of the treaty of 1799. The pertinent parts of this article will also be quoted for convenience of reference:

And in the same case of one of the contracting parties being engaged in war with any other Power, to prevent all the difficulties and misunderstandings that usually arise respecting merchandise of contraband, such as arms, ammunition, and military stores of every kind, no such articles carried in the vessels, or by the subjects or citizens of either party, to the enemies of the other, shall be deemed contraband, so as to induce confiscation or condemnation and a loss of property to individuals. Nevertheless, it shall be lawful to stop such vessels and articles, and to detain them for such length of time as the captors may think necessary to prevent the inconvenience or damage that might ensue from their proceeding, paying, however, a reasonable compensation for the loss such arrest shall occasion to the proprietors; and it shall further be allowed to use in the service of the captors the whole or any part of the military stores so detained, paying the owners the full value of the same, to be ascertained by the current price at the place of its destination. But in the case supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of contraband, if the master of the vessel stopped will deliver out the goods supposed to be of contraband nature, he shall be admitted to do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into any port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage.

In order to prevent neutral vessels from carrying war supplies to her adversary, Germany claims that she has the right under this article to detain the ship and cargo for such length of time as she may think necessary, or to take over the war supplies for her own use upon paying full value for them. It is pointed out that the right of sinking is not mentioned in the treaty and is therefore neither expressly permitted nor expressly prohibited, so that on this point the treaty must be supplemented by the general rules of international law. The sinking of the

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