summoned to it are still under the power of the invading Prussian army. Such a parliament, therefore, if now convoked, could have no practical influence on the Prussian Government. And in what town ought it properly to assemble? Surely not in Frankfort, where they have only just buried the chief magistrate who hanged himself; nor in Dresden, or Hanover, which are still sighing under military contributions. It is as yet too early to send the German Deputies to Berlin, which after all would unquestionably be the town best fitted for such a purpose.

THE fighting in ITALY being now over, for the present at least, it will be useful to cast a glance at the results which it has achieved. That the battle of Custozza, great as was the loss on both sides, was not, in a military sense, a decisive one, is now admitted on all hands. It neither enabled the Austrians to crush their enemy before he could recross the Po, nor did it inflict on the Italians anything like the disorganisation which prevailed in the Austrian army after the battle of Königgrätz. But it had this great advantage for both parties, that it gave Austria a pretext for withdrawing honourably from the possession of Venetia, and at the same time saved the Italians from a defeat to which it is only too probable that their headlong rashness would have exposed them. An Italian victory at Custozza would very likely have been one of the greatest disasters that could have befallen the Italian arms, for it would inevitably have resulted in a reckless attack on the Quadrilateral—a step which, in the opinion of the most experienced military men of Europe, would have been fatal to the army that attempted it, and from which the brave and experienced General Fanti did his utmost on his deathbed to dissuade his colleagues. It should be remembered, too, that although the Italian army behaved with great courage and firmness, these qualities were in a great degree neutralised by the incapacity of their leaders. The strategical combinations of General La Marmora in Italy were almost ludicrously inefficient compared with those of General Moltke at Berlin, and the marvellous accuracy with which the movements of the Prussian divisions were calculated, and their concentration effected just at the right time, was in strong contrast to the loose and irregular way in which Victor Emmanuel and Cialdini crossed the Po, and their utter ignorance of each other's movements, which exposed them to be beaten in detail by their enemy. This was, no doubt, attributable in part to the far superior military organisation of the Prussians; but the mistakes of La Marmora were so obvious that many have since accused him of treason in so arranging matters as to make the Italian army fall an easy prey to the enemy, and thereby place Italy at the mercy of France. As for the subsequent march of Cialdini through the eastern part of Venetia, it has done nothing to retrieve the reputation of the Italian strategists, for, considering that it was a mere promenade militaire, it should have been completed in one-third of the time. The military qualities of Cialdini, which since La Marmora's failure have been placed by the Italians on a par with those of the most famous generals of Europe, seem to have been very much over-estimated. We have heard a very

competent authority say of him that "he is the only man that can ruin the Italian cause, for unfortunately he always promises a great deal more than he can perform." On the whole, it cannot be said that the Italian regular army has established a reputation in the last campaign that will entitle it to be ranked among the most efficient armies of Europe. With the single exception of the small but brilliant and well-sustained battles fought by General Medici in the

Italian Tyrol, its conduct during the campaign has been marked either by foolish rashness, or culpable inaction.

The campaign of the Garibaldians in the mountain passes north of the Lake of Garda has been equally brief and inglorious. It has now been proved beyond a doubt that raw volunteers are worse than useless in a campaign against regular troops, even when the operations are not conducted in the open field. The vast and undisciplined crowd of officials, shopkeepers, and boys fresh from school, whom the patriotic enthusiasm of the country had collected round Garibaldi, only acted as a clog on his movements without in any way adding to the strength of his army. Probably, if he had been spared the co-operation of these well-meaning, but useless patriots, and had only had under his orders, together with a few Bersaglieri regiments—the hardy and thoroughly-disciplined warriors with whom he fought in 1859, he would have been in Trent long before the armistice was signed. As it was, much time was wasted, and many valuable lives sacrificed, in overcoming the reluctance of the great majority of the troops, most of whom had never before been in action, to advance against the enemy.

The most disastrous event, however, for the reputation of the Italian arms was the sea-fight at Lissa. Admiral Persano has very naturally and deservedly been called to a severe account of his conduct; but, as generally happens in such cases, people seem inclined to make him a scapegoat for the sins of others, and to attribute the defeat entirely to his mismanagement. At the beginning of the war the administration of the Italian navy, which had for some time been conducted by a dashing cavalry officer, General Angioletti, and then came into the hands of M. Depretis, an energetic and painstaking lawyer, who did not, however, add a knowledge of naval affairs to his legal acquirements, was in a very disorganised and inefficient state. Italy possessed a fine and numerous fleet; but it was wretchedly equipped and insufficiently manned. It was for this, and no other reason that Admiral Persano did not attempt to support the operations of the army by an attack on Venice or Trieste, and thereby afforded a fruitful subject of ridicule to the comic papers of Naples and Florence. Every effort was made both by the Admiral and the Minister to make the fleet efficient; but it was too late. One of the greatest deficiencies of the Italian navy was the want of engineers; and engineers were not to be had, for the foreigners, who usually perform this duty on Italian ships, declined to serve in the navy in time of war. The equipments of every kind, that were also wanting, were more readily obtained; but it was found to be impossible to fit up the fleet with them in less than several weeks. Meanwhile the popular indignation at the inaction of the fleet daily increased; and when Persano, after the Austrian Admiral Tegethoff had twice defied him to come out and fight before Ancona, sailed on the 12th of July, only to return on the 16th without having come into collision with the enemy, the outcry against him was so loud and general that the Minister himself went to Ancona to push on the operations. At the same time Ricasoli, seeing that the conclusion of an armistice was imminent, telegraphed to the Admiral that he must effect a landing, cost what it may, on the Dalmatian coast, so as to place the Italians in an advantageous position in the forthcoming negotiations. It is very characteristic of the two Governments, that while the Italian Ministry urged its Admiral to this, as it turned out, exceedingly unfortunate expedition with the greatest possible eagerness, the Cabinet of Vienna did its best to dissuade Admiral Tegethoff from doing what has for the present virtually assured to Austria the command of the Adriatic.

It is known that when the Italian fleet began the attack on the fortifications of Lissa, Admiral Tegethoff was still with part of his fleet at Pola. On learning that Persano had left Ancona, he telegraphed to Vienna, to ask whether he might attack the Italian fleet; but the only reply he received was a laconic "No." When, however, the intelligence reached him that the Italian fleet was bombarding Lissa, he determined to risk an action on his own responsibility, and Austria has to thank him for an act of disobedience which has procured her the only solid victory she has gained in the course of the war.

The political advantages which Italy has gained by the campaign have, it must be confessed, been but small, considering the heavy sacrifices she has made. It was not Italy, but Prussia, that made Austria give up Venetia; and it is very doubtful whether the small conquests of Garibaldi and Medici in the Italian Tyrol will be held as sufficient to establish her right to that district. That its possession is necessary to Italy as a strategic frontier is undoubted, and it seems to us that this alone is a sufficient justification of her claim to it. The population, however, has shown some hostility to the Italian Government, and Austria might plausibly argue that a Power which professes to be based on the Napoleonic principle of nationalities cannot claim to annex, for strategic reasons, some hundreds of thousands of people who are opposed to its rule. Indeed, she seems disposed to back her view of the subject by arguments of another and far more forcible kind, if we may judge by the large bodies of troops which she is despatching to her southern frontier. Italy, on the other hand, has at present no alternative but either to support her claims by a war in which she would certainly be defeated, or entirely to abandon them by making a peace with Austria the terms of which will probably overthrow the government that concludes it, if it does not lead to revolutionary manifestations.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT continues to watch attentively the course of events in central Europe, and it would be a great mistake to suppose that it has entirely withdrawn from all participation in the arrangement which is being arrived at between the late belligerents. The negotiations between Prussia and Austria are, it is true, now going on without its intervention; but this is simply because MM. Benedetti and Grammont have been excluded from them, and is by no means attributable to a desire on the part of France to let the two Powers adjust their quarrels by themselves. As for Italy, she is still represented by France in the negotiations with Austria, and no official communications have yet passed between the Cabinets of Vienna and Florence.

The eagerness of France to have a hand in the settlement of affairs in Central Europe is curiously illustrated by the fact that within the last few days she has again changed her policy, which, as is known, was at first strongly in favour of Austria, and then gradually became only pacific, without any leaning to either side. Having decided not to intervene by force of arms in favour of Austria, the Emperor Napoleon could not, consistently with his dignity, take any prominent part in the negotiations so long as he sided with that Power; he therefore abandoned Austria altogether, and is now gradually leaning towards Prussia. Several reasons appear to have induced him to take this step. In the first place was that above mentioned-the desire to be admitted to the negotiations, which was only to be fulfilled by his taking the winning side. Another strong inducement was the fact that the most eager adversaries of Prussia in France are the Legitimists and Catholics, whose views, they being his natural

opponents, he was of course strongly inclined to regard with suspicion. Finally, the attitude of Russia in favour of the small German States, and her hints that the moment would be an opportune one for a Congress, still further confirmed the view that the adversaries of Prussia were the representatives of those principles of Conservatism and Legitimacy which are abhorrent to the Napoleonic mind. While thus showing a decided leaning for Prussia, France remains on good terms with Austria, who indeed has now become quite reconciled to her old adversary. It is also worthy of remark that in the preliminaries of peace which have been signed at Nikolsburg it is for the first time officially stated that the Emperor Napoleon has accepted Venetia from the Emperor of Austria, and that he will not give it up to the Italians until he thinks proper. As for the idea of a Congress, which has been broached by Russia in the interest of the small German princes, there is at present no prospect of its being realised, both France and Prussia having shown themselves averse to it, the first because her influence in a Congress would necessarily be subsidiary to that of Count Bismarck, and the second because she is not disposed to admit the interference of the other powers in her designs.

The result of the foregoing statements and observations appears to be that notwithstanding the threefold armistice between the belligerent powers, and though, after the preliminaries had been signed, peaceful negotiations have been carried on uninterruptedly between the respective parties, the state of things is yet very complicated and anything but free from danger. We have already pointed out the difficulties by which the Italian Government are beset with respect to the tenacity of Austria, the clamours of their own people for the possession of South Tyrol, and the rather mysterious policy of the Emperor of the French, who at this moment is still the rightful possessor of Venetia. But there are other, and even more serious, difficulties to contend with. There is, for instance, the Grand Duchy of Baden, which demands to become a member of the North German Confederation, while, according to the Nikolsburg Convention, all German territories south of the Maine, Baden included, should form a separate confederation. There is, again, Saxony with her guaranteed sovereignty, but who might be pressed so hard by Prussian contributions that she would perhaps prefer being incorporated into Prussia at once. And, finally, there are, if reports speak true, the demands of France for the restoration of her frontier as it existed in 1814, viz., the frontier which was granted to her by the Paris Convention, on the 23rd of April, 1814. If it be true that the Emperor now demands the restoration of the French frontier of 1814, on the part of Prussia, he evidently asks for a "rectification" which is beyond the power of Prussia to grant, Saarlouis alone belonging to her, while Landau is the property of Bavaria, and the two other named places are Belgian property. Whether the Emperor really thinks the present moment favourable for robbing Belgium of two important fortresses, whether he really asked of Prussia what Prussia has no right to concede, whether in the end he would be satisfied with Saarlouis, and whether there really exists a secret arrangement between him and the Prussian Premier bearing upon the "rectification" of the French frontier, it is impossible seriously to discuss so long as we have no better facta to guide us than a meagre and ill-worded telegram from Paris.

August 11th.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

APOLLONIUS OF TYANA; THE PAGAN CHRIST OF THE THIRD CENTURY. An Essay by ALBERT REVILLE, Doctor in Theology, and Pastor of the Walloon Church in Rotterdam. Authorised translation. J. C. Hotten. 1866.

In these days of hurry and hard work, a thoroughly good monograph, intelligent, interesting, reliable, brief, is a boon to the general reader; but a thoroughly good monograph requires very superior workmanship. To discriminate between the essential and the non-essential, bringing the former into full light and casting the latter away; to give perfect truth of perspective when the scale on which figure and incident are delineated is necessarily minute; to convey in the firm, free, decisive touches of a sketch, the soul and substance of all that a picture could reveal; this requires the "mallet hand." In Carlyle's Diamond Necklace, Count Caliostro, Mirabeau, and in Macaulay's Essays on Clive and Hastings, we have samples of this species of composition so excellent that the English critic is severe in his demands. Dr. Reville's Essay on Apollonius of Tyana is sensible, useful, and short; but it has neither the brilliancy, the raciness, nor the compact and trenchant vigour of our best modern work in this kind. More might have been made of the admirable materials available in this instance for the purposes of the biographic sketcher, and there is hardly enough of originality in the theory maintained respecting the character of Apollonius, and the book in which Philostratus portrays him, to have made it imperative to translate the piece into English. No harm is done, however; for the essay is pleasant and instructive so far as it goes, and any one who, knowing nothing of Apollonius, has but a couple of hours to devote to the subject, may be safely referred to Dr. Reville's performance.

"The acknowledged triumph of Christianity"-thus commences Dr. Reville -"during the reign of Constantine, has always been considered one of those unaccountable revolutions and one of those historical surprises which, unconnected as they seem to be with any phenomena of the past, might almost be deemed miraculous." This is much too strongly put. It is recognised by all who are informed upon the subject, that the period during which Christianity supplanted Paganism-a period embracing at least four centuries-was one of general intellectual and spiritual transition. A process of disintegration and dissolution was going on in the Pagan system. The heart of mankind was filled with an inarticulate but mighty yearning for the new, though the sympathies and associations of the past were still powerful, and the eye of the race was beginning to look with strange irresistible fascination towards the spiritual dawn, so beautiful in its golden and roseate gleaming on the azure of heaven, so tender in its radiance on the dewdrops of earth, though tears would still rise at the thought that the ancient lights, "so loved, so honoured once," must be extinguished. It was a time when profound modification was taking place in the ideas and feelings which had reigned supreme in the classic civilisation; when polytheism, in the gross anthropomorphism of its conceptions of deity, and the rude sensuality of its views of pleasure, was being rejected by intelligent minds; but when attempts