finished your work; anticipate it, so that the sun of liberty may never go down on the land of Roumania. Citizens! do not lose a moment; and you, priests of the living Rouman Church, complete before the whole world the holy tabernacle of this day. Anoint the Prince of Roumania with the chrism of your faith, and he will become the Rouman hero. I know that before you have ended reading this your souls will have overflowed with love for the new prince. I too, in my turn, like a true Rouman, will now exclaim, 'Long live Charles I., Prince of Roumania, one and indivisible.'"

This burlesque mixture of outrageous braggadocio and silly profanity (which in the present case has been considerably softened in translation) is a very fair sample of what commonly passes in Roumania for political eloquence. In another document, issued about the same time by the Ministry, and signed by such well-known names as John Ghika, Rosetti, and others, these would-be politicians show an ignorance of history of which a schoolboy would be ashamed. They speak of Frederick the Great as a sovereign "who, by his knowledge and strong will, converted the small duchy which had been entrusted to him by the nation into the strongest monarchy in Europe," and of Prince Charles's father as having "sacrificed himself for the unity of Germany, by voluntarily abdicating his throne." This marvellous production terminates with the following maudlin trash

:

"In this sacred moment, when heaven seems to be opening to Roumania, we swear most solemnly in your presence, and in that of God and of all Europe, that we are certain Charles I. will lead the Roumans on the road of law, virtue, and freedom, and that only with and through him can we fulfil the great mission which has been marked out for us by Providence. Arise then, Roumans! the hour of salvation has struck. The book of the future life of Roumania is open before you; place, then, one hand on your recent and bleeding wounds, and with the other write with life-giving pen in the book of universal suffrage, Charles I., Prince of the Roumans. Providence, wishing to enlighten us by visible signs, has decreed that on the very day of the completion of the plébiscite, namely, on the 8th (20th) April, Charles I. will end the 27th year of his life. Providence, wishing to cheer us, has decreed that the Danube, that river to which we owe the protection of Europe, should flow from the country in which our Charles was born.

And this is the nation that pretends to be "the teacher of the civilised world," the "nation which leads all other nations," and which has acquired in a few months the experience of centuries! Surely never were more extravagant national pretensions put forward on more slender grounds than in these curious state papers, which, for eccentric bombast, are hardly surpassed even by the proclamations of the Emperor Soulouque. Nor should it be forgotten that they are not the production of the street demagogues, but of the most eminent statesmen of Roumania, and may therefore be safely accepted as a test of the political capacity of the nation."

That the establishment by such a people of a Daco-Rouman empire would, even if it were possible, only create an additional element of

disorder in the East, will now be pretty evident. The difficulties created by its internal disorganisation and want of political capacity, moreover, are still further complicated by the anomalous position it occupies in the European political system. When the great Powers turned their attention to the affairs of the Principalities after the Crimean war, justly considering that the best security for a permanent peace in the East would be an organisation of Roumania on such a footing as to make her an effectual barrier between Russia and Turkey, they found that the political relations between the Porte and the Principalities were of a very vague and unsatisfactory character. These relations were chiefly based on treaties which had been concluded in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenthc enturies, between the Sultans and the Moldavian and Wallachian princes. By the treaty of Nicopolis, signed in 1393 by Mircea I., Prince of Wallachia, and Bajazet I., and that of Adrianople, signed in 1460 by Vlad V. and Mahomet II., Wallachia was to have her own laws, the Porte was not to interfere in her administration, no mosques were to be built on Wallachian territory, and no Turk was to be permitted to settle in Wallachia. The prince, moreover, though his election had to be recognised by the Porte, was to be a Christian, and elected by the metropolitan, the bishops, the boyards, and the representatives of the nation. The protection of Turkey was, in fact, limited to the defence of the country against foreign aggression; and in return for this protection she received from Wallachia a tribute of 10,000 piastres (£100). The arrangement between Turkey and Moldavia was of a somewhat similar kind. It was also established by two treaties, one in 1513 between the Moldavian prince Bogdan and Selim I., and the other in 1529, between Peter Rares and Soliman II. By these treaties Moldavia was recognised as "a free and unconquered country," its laws, customs, and rights were to be for ever inviolable, the election of its prince, who was to be recognised by the Porte, was not to be interfered with, and the Turks were not to buy land or establish mosques on Moldavian territory. Moldavia was to be styled "independent" in all official communications from the Ottoman Government, which further engaged to guarantee her against aggression in consideration of the payment of a yearly tribute of 4,000 ducats (£2,000). It is important to bear in mind the provisions of these treaties, as they are constantly appealed to, even to this day, as the basis of the relations subsisting between Turkey and the Principalities. They were, however, repeatedly violated by the Porte, which has for centuries treated the Principalities as conquered territory. The introduction of the Fanariote hospodars was in direct contradiction to the stipulation that the Rouman princes should be elected by the people, without foreign interference; while the cession of the Bukovine to Austria, and of Bessarabia to Russia, without the

concurrence in either case of the inhabitants of those countries, and the arrangements effected between Turkey and Russia by the treaties of Kutchuk-Kajnardji in 1774, of Jassy in 1791, of Ackermann in 1826, and of Adrianople in 1829, for making over the protectorate of the Principalities to the latter Power, made the obligations into which Turkey had entered to defend them against foreign aggression practically a dead letter. As for the right of suzerainty, which has lately been so often referred to, such a right was never conferred on the Porte by either Moldavia or Wallachia, and it was only mentioned for the first time in the treaty of Adrianople, in concluding which the Principalities had no part.

This was the diplomatic situation in Roumania when the representatives of the Great Powers met at Paris to conclude a treaty of peace after the Crimean war. By that treaty, which was signed on the 30th of March, 1856, the Principalities were freed from the protectorate of both Turkey and Russia, and their rights and privileges were placed under the guarantee of Europe. These rights are defined as consisting of an independent and national administration, and total freedom. of religion, legislation, commerce, and shipping. The suzerain rights of Turkey were also to be preserved; she was empowered both to defend the country against foreign attack, and, with the concurrence of the guaranteeing Powers, to restore order if the public peace should be endangered in either Moldavia or Wallachia. At the same time it was provided that a commission should be appointed to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants in regard to the final organisation of the Principalities. This at once stirred the Radical party into action. The cry of "Union and a foreign prince," which has ever since been the political watchword of the more sensible and honest of the Rouman politicians, was raised both at Bucharest and Jassy, and the agitation was pursued with such success, and, it must be added, by such unscrupulous means, that in the divans which were convoked for the purpose of eliciting the feeling of the Principalities on the subject of their future organisation, the programme of the Radical party was adopted unanimously at Bucharest, and with only two dissentients at Jassy. The result of the voting in the latter town was especially suspicious, for until very recently the Moldavians have been strongly opposed to a union. Be this as it may, however, the decision of the divans filled Turkey with consternation. Obviously a union would be the first step towards absolute independence, and the selection of a foreign prince would be a second and even more decided step in the same direction. The Powers were all more or less taken by surprise, except, perhaps, France, who at once declared herself with suspicious alacrity in favour of the union. Turkey protested, and was supported by Austria, who began to fear lest the Daco-Rouman agitation should spread to the Rouman territories of her empire. The other Powers

remained neutral, but it was eventually decided to maintain the separation. In regard to the other wishes expressed by the divans, the task of the Commission was far easier. In compliance with those wishes a convention was signed on the 19th of August, 1858, granting to the Roumans, in the words of Count Walewski's circular of the day following, "an elective assembly, voting laws and controlling budgets; responsible ministers; equality before the law, and in the matter of taxation; the enjoyment of political and religious liberty; the liberty of the individual guaranteed; the abolition of class privileges—privileges which have been much abused; and the principle of permanency introduced into the magistracy." A native hospodar was to be elected for life (instead of for seven years, as before) in each principality, and to do homage and pay tribute to the Sultan-the Moldavian a million and a half of piastres (£14,000) and the Wallachian two millions and a half (£23,000).1

These bran-new institutions, modelled with exemplary care by the diplomatists at Paris after the most approved constitutional patterns, were soon found not to work. To use the picturesque expression of one of her own statesmen, Roumania was as yet, politically speaking, far too young for all this apparatus of self-government, and looked in her new dress like a child with his grandfather's coat on. She had an army, but it was useless for all purposes of defence; a representative assembly of which, there being no middle class, the only members belonged to the aristocracy; a complicated bureaucracy, with the most inextricable disorder in the affairs of the State; and a free press, nearly every organ of which was inspired by the Government that happened to be at the head of affairs. The Radical party, moreover, encouraged by the differences which existed among the guaranteeing Powers on the question of the union, were by no means disposed to accept the convention to the letter. When the two Turkish Kaimakams, or governors, of Moldavia and Wallachia gave up their appointments on the 1st of November, 1858, it was determined to evade the provision which stipulates that each principality should elect its own hospodar, by making the election in both fall on the same man. This highly characteristic stratagem succeeded perfectly, and what makes the whole affair still more characteristic is that the man who was elected was a colonel in the Moldavian militia, of considerably damaged reputation, who was scarcely known, even at Jassy, except in the billiard-room where he passed his days and the greater part of his nights. The "Rouman nation" soon found reason to repent its choice. Prince Couza plundered the State treasury as unscrupulously as any of his Fanariote predecessors, changed his ministry twenty-seven times in seven years, dissolved his chamber

(1) One of the conditions of the recognition of Prince Charles by the Porte is that this tribute should be doubled.

three times in the same period, and finally established, by a coup d'état-which was an exact copy, minus the massacres, of the Napoleonic one-a new constitution abolishing ministerial responsibility, vesting in the sovereign alone the right of initiating new laws, extending the franchise to nearly the whole of the peasant class, and withdrawing it from four-fifths of the artisans, and stipulating, like the well-known article in the Prussian constitution, which has been so freely used by Count Bismarck, that if the budget is not voted by the chamber, it shall be calculated upon the same scale as that of the previous year, and applied irrespective of the vote. Thus was the Convention of 1858 violated in all its most important provisions; yet the political charlatan who took this bold step was not only not taken to task by the guaranteeing Powers, but was decorated for his achievement by the Sultan, whom he had probably persuaded that the great danger after all of the Principalities becoming independent would lie in their getting too much liberty. Such is the value of a European protectorate and a Turkish suzerainty to Roumania.

The incidents which followed Prince Couza's coup d'état-the Bucharest massacre, the Prince's expulsion from the Principalities, and his succession by Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, are doubtless still fresh in the memory of the reader, and have been fully described in the articles entitled "Public Affairs" in this Review. It only remains to consider the present position of Roumania, and her probable prospects for the future. Few will now deny that the guaranteeing Powers, in framing the Convention of 1858, made a great mistake. That convention not only established a state of things which it was impossible to maintain, but imposed on the Powers obligations which they have not made the slightest attempt to fulfil. The whole of the system they bound themselves to keep up has broken down, and they have hardly even expressed regret at the result. Whatever may be the future fate of Roumania, it is scarcely possible to avoid anticipating that her connection with Turkey-which it was the chief object of the Powers to consolidate must before long be dissolved. So long as a Couza sat on the throne of the Principalities, his subjection to the Porte was rather a convenience to him than otherwise, as it served to screen him from the consequences of his rapacity and tyranny; but the son of the wealthy prince of HohenzollernSigmaringen and relative of the two most powerful monarchs on the Continent will naturally take the first opportunity of freeing himself from what he cannot but regard as a humiliating bondage. Nor, looking at the matter from a European point of view, does there seem to be any advantage in retaining the connection. Experience has proved that Turkey is powerless to stop the spread of Russian influence in Roumania, while no European Power would dream of preventing her resisting by force of arms an incursion of