with or without reference-for the reference has not even the merit of being steadily sustained-to the rudimentary forms of predication that may be imagined to have done duty for the awakening intelligence of the first generations of speaking men. And (in ch. viii.) let the reader examine the scheme, strangely entitled, of "Roots or Concepts," which, at p. 475, after his detailed criticism of Mill's account of Names, the author propounds as that better, nay "best," classification of words for logical purposes "which is supplied by the history of language". The scheme is strangely called one of "Roots or Concepts" when, whether conceptual or no, it is a question of the Words or Names into which Roots have passed; but it is more important to observe that the scheme does not appear to have any logical utility at all. How does it avail the logician, occupied with the concept as expressed in the general name which is the indispensable means of abstract consideration, to be told by what device of unconscious passage through the collective noun (which expresses a complex object of sense) the general name as instrument of abstract thought was originally forged? Collectives as such are to be considered by the logician only in order to be excluded. In Prof. Müller's suggested scheme of logical terms, and in all the controversial skirmishes through which he fights his way to it, there is no sign of his having ever fairly asked himself the question what the precise philosophical function of the logician is, or what bearing the history of the development of words, so far as it can be made out, could have upon it. To be sure, logicians in general, and Mill among them, have not been too careful to confine themselves only to such distinctions of terms, or pursue their distinctions only to such lengths, as concern their own business. They thus in many ways lie open to a criticism that could easily be made trenchant enough. But as for the emendations which Prof. Müller tries to make upon Mill in particular, it cannot be said that they are successfully or skilfully made. To prove this in detail, by comparison (as would be necessary) of statements of the two writers, is more than can be attempted at the end of this lengthy notice. It may suffice here to point to any two or three pages among the twenty or thirty from p. 444, in support of the charge against our author of a want of grasp in these matters of logical controversy. Or, to narrow the issue, let trial be made of his character for discernment-meaning, always, philosophical discernmentupon the three pages, 471-4, given to the topic of " Connotative and Denotative Terms".

EDITOR.

Educational Ends; or, The Ideal of Personal Development. By SOPHIE BRYANT, D.Sc. London: Longmans, Green & Co.,

1887. Pp. x., 292.

Mrs. Bryant has long been known not only as a distinguished

teacher but as a particularly suggestive thinker about educational problems. The speculative impulse which was plainly

discernible in her occasional utterances has now concentrated itself in a serious philosophic effort, the result of which is a very thoughtful and instructive volume.

As its title suggests, Mrs. Bryant's work is a comprehensive and systematic handling of the ultimate ends of education. It is evident that the treatment of this subject, in order to be adequate, must transcend the limits of what is customarily marked off as the theory or science of education. A complete and final theory of education presupposes a definite conception of the perfect, or ideal, man, whom it is the concern of the educator to help to fashion. Our author directly addresses herself to the task of defining this ideal personality. Such a being unites in himself the two sorts of character or personal excellence that make for the ethical end, the Good, and the logical end, the True. Since the ideal mind or character (at once intellectual and moral) is wholly determined by reference to the objective end which it pursues, the treatment of it may be called ethical and logical. And indeed the author herself appears to regard her work as primarily or mainly a study in logic and ethics. At the same. time it is plain that any discussion of such character as real or realisable, whether actually developing itself now, or capable of doing so under certain supposable conditions, must include an account of the process by which it forms itself. It is evident that the author recognises this side of her subject when she writes in the opening of her Preface: The inquiry into Educational Ends, which is the object of this book, resolves itself immediately into an inquiry into the nature of that development which issues in the production of standard character". But here we clearly find ourselves within the boundaries of the psychological domain. For it is manifest that the understanding of the perfect man, no less than of the most imperfect of mortals, is only possible by help of general laws of mental development. Hence Mrs. Bryant's volume, though it seems to disclaim the character of a psychological treatise, does give us, in a fairly complete form, what may be called a psychology of the élite; and herein its peculiar significance and value appear to lie. With our modern habit of separating by such definite boundaries the speculative region of psychology on the one side from the practical regions of ethics and logic on the other, we are apt to forget that the ends which these last formulate exist only in relation to conscious minds that conceive them as objects of desire or as desirables. Ideal ends are, as Mrs. Bryant clearly shows, correlated, or rather vitally united to, the right or standard person who is so constituted as to strive after them. That this connexion is a real one is plainly seen in the fact that the psychologist, notwithstanding his assertion that he gives an account of all sorts of mind indifferently, finds himself com

pelled to prepare the way for the logician and the moralist by taking special account of the correct thinker and the right actor. Mrs. Bryant's volume is original just because it clearly discerns the overlapping of speculative and practical science here, and carefully defines the extent of this overlapping.

After a short introductory chapter on the Educational End in general, the author proceeds in Part i. of her volume to trace the several stages or moments in moral development. We have first

of all an account of the process as determined by the relation of the individual to the community and the claims of the latter on the former. This is dealt with in two chapters, "Self and the World: Duty" and "Self and Duty: Virtue". The process of moral growth is then followed out as spontaneous development independent of social control, under the heading, "The Quest of Freedom: Self-Devotion". By means of the Kantian idea of the virtuous man thus reached, viz., the man with the good will who "finds his perfection in pursuing those objects which further the perfection of the community," the author is enabled to develop a new and highly interesting system of virtues, which combines in an unexpected way pagan elements, as courage, with Christian elements, as faith and humility. The sketch of moral development is brought to a close by two chapters entitled "Object of Moral Devotion: Social Virtue" and "Sovereign Self in Sovereign Community," in which the mutual implications of individual and social virtue, and of the freedom of one and of all, are ably set forth.

In much the same way as the process of ethical development is here handled, that of logical development is dealt with in Part ii. The author leads her readers on from the first beginnings of the work of unifying the elements of experience into knowledge in what she calls "The Unity of Momentary Consciousness," or Perception, up to the final synthesis effected by science and philosophy. Here, as before, the object is at once to make clear the end and to explain the process by which this is realised. On the whole, this Part seems fresher and more suggestive than Part i., where, perhaps, the influence of Kantian thought is a little too apparent. However this be, the short account of logical processes is characterised by a union of shrewd psychological observation and logical penetration into the right methods of intellectual search.

The work concludes with a chapter on "The Unity of Educational Ends". By this is meant that ethical and logical character virtually include one another, that "moral character subserves and is necessary to the production of intellectual perfection," while, conversely, "truth being possessed righteousness fulfils itself".

This brief summary of the contents of Mrs. Bryant's work may suffice to indicate its scope. In dealing with such a subject from a new point of view, it was to be expected that the author would

now and again prove difficult; and it is probable that the critical reader will more than once be disposed to raise an objection. One point which the volume seems to leave rather vague is the precise relation of standard to typical character, or of ideal to universal development. The point is approached where the author touches on the connexion of the problems, how to make the most and the best of ourselves, and brings the "most" under the "best". This, however, she succeeds in doing, as it seems, by construing the "most" intensively as "greatest evolution of energy," rather than extensively as completeness of function or many-sidedness. It may be said with some force that there is a certain rivalry between the universal development aimed at by a Goethe and the loftier flights of moral and even of intellectual excellence so well described by Mrs. Bryant. That she has not deeply felt this difficulty seems conjecturable from her final chapter, which, in its complete identification of the logical and the ethical character, appears to contradict not only common facts but the observable tendencies of development. Mrs. Bryant does not apparently identify the True and the Good conceived objectively, but only seeks to demonstrate psychologically the identity of the will which is directed to each. But if we find that men do as a matter of fact show intense earnestness in the pursuit of truth and comparative indifference with respect to the moral end as a whole, it seems impossible to say that the logical and ethical purposes necessarily involve one another subjectively or psychologically. It is probably not insignificant, too, in this connexion, that Mrs. Bryant deals only with the logical and the ethical end, and altogether ignores that end of the Beautiful which is the dominant influence in so many lives.

As a relief from the severity of her general treatment of the subject, the author does not fail now and again to give us an interesting concrete observation, and once at least a delightful literary allusion. Some, in fact, may think she is at her best, not when discoursing on the abstractions of logic and ethics, but when she is presenting with admirable lucidity and scientific insight some new observation on human and especially childish ways, evidently plucked from the field of personal experience. Her remarks on points like the relation of self-will to obstinacy, and the varieties of stupidity (of which one, by the by, and that the more melancholy, is characteristic of town-children), are of great interest to the educator, and are sometimes turned with a literary skill that reminds one of George Eliot. It may, perhaps, be hoped that Mrs. Bryant will follow up her theory of ideal development by an account of some of the more frequent and striking varieties of actual growth, viewed in their relation of conformity or nonconformity to the standard process.

JAMES SULLY.

A Short Introduction to the Study of Logic. By LAURENCE JOHNSTONE. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1887. Pp. v., 250. This little book comes before the world under the express sanction of the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church in this country. From this point of view it possesses a certain interest, which its intrinsic merit cannot be said to command. It is divided into three parts, headed "The Agent," "The Act of the Agent," "The End of the Act of the Agent". These correspond in the main to the psychological, the formal, and the material divisions of logical doctrine. There is also a short introduction, besides 40 pages of questions serving as an examination on the preceding matter. The book may be commended for its general uniformity of method and treatment. The examples are novel and varied, but in some cases do duty for explanation. Others are chosen rather for their doctrinal than their purely logical interest, and are expressed in a tone of dogmatism hardly compatible with due encouragement of the logical spirit. The mingling of formal with material considerations adds to the interest of the book for the general reader, but, unfortunately, these are not always very clearly distinguished, and some confusion results. The less technical portions-as Definition and . Division-contain good remarks, though somewhat marred by adherence to old scholastic terms undefined and unexplained. The most decided merit is that a preparation is made for the discussion of Fallacies by the enunciation of the principles of Demonstration and Method, which the fallacies are shown to violate. In the ordinary text-book, these fallacies (except those which are purely formal) seem to come before the student from an unknown region and to have but little bearing on what precedes. The treatment of psychological and philosophical questions is crude. The student is expected to imbibe, without explanation or discussion, such statements as the following (pp. 10, 11):

"The mind is a 'tabula rasa' before it receives any impressions from without. It receives impressions, or the matter for ideas, through the senses, upon which the impression is made. By means of the 'sensus intimus' man becomes conscious of these impressions, of which the imagination then forms a picture or phantasm. Up to this point the cognition is merely a sensitive or sensible one, like that of animals. But from the picture on the imagination, the intellect draws that element which is akin to itself, that is, the immaterial incorporeal element, throws it into its mould-so to say-and the result is the species intelligibilis,' formed in the intellect itself, and representative of the exterior thing. When informed by the species intelligibilis' of a thing, the intellect simply names that thing to itself with a mental word; and the mind is conscious of the possession of its idea. . . . For instance: the eye sees a fan-tail, and thus there arises an external sensation; the consciousness of this sensation, obtained by the sensus intimus,' supplies the matter for the phantasm of the fan-tail, which is next formed in the imagination; and then in the intellect the species intelligibilis' or spiritual representation of the fan-tail comes into being; whereupon the intellect, then by a simple word, says in and to itself, fan-tail."