completing volume "is proceeding and will be published in a few months". Dr. Flint's preface gives some account of the author's life and commends the work to English readers,—although he thinks such commendation almost unnecessary, since its merits are so great and obvious that they can hardly fail to be recognised by all who become acquainted with it". The following sentences explain the exact scope of the book, which, as Prof. Flint points out, is not precisely what would seem to be implied in the title. "It does not profess to be a Universal History of the Philosophy of Religion. . . . Pünjer warns us by his very title that he will confine his researches within the area of Christendom. On the other hand, his book is not merely a History of the Philosophy of the Christian Religion--a History of the Philosophy of Christianity.

He aimed at being the historian, not merely of the Philosophy of Christianity, but of the Philosophy of Religion, so far as it had sprung up on Christian soil and under Christian influences. The title of his work served to indicate his intention, and was thus far justified. Otherwise, however, it can hardly be deemed appropriate. Spinoza, the English Deists, Diderot and Voltaire cannot with propriety be held to have been Christian philosophers. . . . Further, although it is easy enough to understand how in a sense there may be a philosophy of Christianity, it is difficult to conceive of a distinctively Christian philosophy of religion. ... Indeed, there are no traces either in the Geschichte or the Grundriss that Dr. Pünjer supposed that there was any exclusively and specifically Christian philosophy of religion. Hence the title of his work, although it served one important purpose, would seem to have been by no means a just expression even of his own thought." The Grundriss mentioned above is an unfinished critical volume (published under the editorship of Dr. Lipsius in 1886) in which the author purposed to set forth his own view on the chief questions with which a religious philosophy should deal. The present work is wholly expository. After an introductory survey treating of the Philosophy of Religion up to the Reformation (pp. 1-62), the rest of the volume (which is coincident with Book i.) falls into the following sections:-(1) The Beginnings of Independent Speculation, (2) The Doctrines of the Reformers, (3) The Cultivation of Philosophy before Descartes, (4) The Oppositional Movements within Protestantism, (5) The English Deism, (6) Descartes and Spinoza, (7) The 18th Century in France, (8) Leibniz and the German Aufklärung, (9) The Opposition to the Aufklärung.

Outlines of the Science of Jurisprudence. An introduction to the Systematic Study of Law. Translated and edited from the Juristic Encyclopædias of PUCHTA, FRIEDLAENDER, FALCK and AHRENS. By W. HASTIE, M.A. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1887. Pp. xliv.,

282.

A translator of rare competence, Mr. Hastie is also so indefatigable as apparently to have determined not to rest till he has turned the fertilising stream of German thought upon every field of philosophical inquiry which his countrymen have been cultivating with modest means-and but moderate success. Beginning with philosophy of Art (according to Hegel, see MIND xi. 437), and having now also (as just seen) added philosophy of Religion, he follows up another earlier excursion into philosophy of Law (according to Kant, see MIND xii. 301) with the present series of translations from some of the foremost German jurists of this century; and, having done so much for the philosophical enlighten. ment of the legal English student, is even going presently to step down to a lower level and help him with a translation of Brunner's historical

account of the sources of English Law. The (philosophical) scope of the present volume may be sufficiently gathered from the titles of its five parts: (1) Outlines of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right; (2) System of Jurisprudence as a Scientific Organism; (3) The Scientific Study of Jurisprudence-its Preliminaries, Special Subjects, Means and Appliances; (4) Principles of Juristic Methodology; (5) Definition and History of Juristic Encyclopædia. One may have a less ardent belief than the translator in the theoretic validity or practical virtue of German Naturrecht, and yet give a warm welcome to this well-considered effort to broaden the intellectual view of students reared upon little more than Austin's Lectures. The editorial work of annotation-designed to bring the text into relation with the literature accessible to English studentsis done throughout with intelligence and also impartiality; nor should the fluent argumentation of the translator's preface (pp. 7-37) fail of recognition.

Histoire de la Psychologie des Grecs. Par A.-ED. CHAIGNET, Recteur de l'Académie de Poitiers, Correspondant de l'Institut. Tome I. Histoire de la Psychologie des Grecs avant et après Aristote. Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1887. Pp. xxii., 426.

M. Chaignet is a philosophical scholar who has been long at work and with much distinction, though no previous production of his has come under notice in these pages. One issued in 1884 we especially regret not to have seen-a comprehensive Essai sur la Psychologie d'Aristote, which was "crowned" by the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. Among his earlier works, it may interest readers of MIND to note the following:-La Philosophie de la Science de Langage (1875); Pythagore et la Philosophie pythagoricienne (1873); La Vie et les Ecrits de Platon (1871); Vie de Socrate (1866); De la Psychologie de Platon (1863); Les Principes de la Science du Beau (1860). Most of these also have received “Academic "recognition. The present work is issued of his own independent motion, but still has relation to the last of his officially distinguished works-the Essay on Aristotle's Psychology. This, in fact, is henceforth meant by the author to be read as the proper transition from the first to the second part of the volume now published; for, after adding to his account of Plato's psychology (pp. 203-46) a sketch of the doctrine as it was continued in the Old Academy (represented by Speusippus and Xenocrates), he passes here at once (p. 267) to the followers of Aristotle, beginning with Theophrastus. The account of these, ending with Strato (pp. 332-51), it should be noted, is broken by a short chapter (pp. 303-16) entitled "Le Pneuma". This is interesting in comparison with the (more developed) episode on that same topic which Prof. Siebeck in his Geschichte der Psychologie (see MIND X. 289) finds it necessary to introduce at about the same stage; and the more interesting, because M. Chaignet, though not unfamiliar with German philosophical literature, evidently knows nothing of his immediate predecessor in this historical field. At p. v. of his Preface, he expressly says that he is not aware that his subject has been treated by anyone, in or out of France, since the German F. A. Carus in 1808. It is a little disappointing, in these days of free international communication, to find that a work like Siebeck's, which as far back as 1880 had covered the ground as far as the Old Academy and four years later had advanced as far as Thomas Aquinas, should still in the present year not have come to the knowledge of so activeminded a scholar as M. Chaignet. If it had done so, he would probably not have thought it necessary to begin with so elaborate an apology for his enterprise as he offers in his Preface. That Preface, however, cer

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tainly gives him occasion for some very effective and interesting discussion on the relation necessarily subsisting between Psychology and Metaphy. sic. So far as we have been able to see, the treatment of his subject in the text falls at various points a good way short of his German rival's; yet the subject is one that needs all the illustration that either can bring to it. It should be added that in an Appendix, M. Chaignet gives first "The External History of the School of Aristotle" (pp. 353-70), then a Table of the Peripatetic Scholarchs," and lastly at considerable length (pp. 374424) a "Liste alphabétique raisonnée des Péripatéticiens du Lycée understanding this so widely as to include some account, longer or shorter, of all the more important Schoolmen. The present volume will be followed by one or more others, according as the author may have strength to continue a subject to which he has devoted many past years of study.

,,

Victor Cousin. Par JULES SIMON de l'Académie Française, Secrétaire perpétuel de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques. Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1887. Pp. 184.

In distinction from M. Janet's monograph, noticed in MIND xii. 141, the purpose of which was to set forth the exact nature of Cousin's philosophical work, the present volume by M. Jules Simon (which is the first of a series entitled "Les Grands Écrivains Français") aims chiefly at giving a personal portrait of Cousin. The book is divided into the following chapters:-"La Biographie," "La Philosophie," "Le Régiment," "Les Batailles," "Les Amours,"-of which the second (pp. 30-75) is an exposition of Cousin's philosophical ideas, while the next two (pp. 76-159) deal with his administrative activity, and the last with his literary studies of the 17th century. The account of the philosophy, although brief, is sufficient to bring out its characteristic features, and the description of the state of philosophical instruction in France during Cousin's dominance, by the slight difference of its point of view, serves usefully to supplement M. Janet's. The chief divergence is that M. Simon insists more on the despotic character of Cousin's administration. No "system," he admits, was "imposed"; "il était seulement entendu qu'on enseignerait partout l'existence de Dieu, la providence, la spiritualité et l'immortalité de l'âme, le libre arbitre, le devoir. Si un professeur avait bronché sur un de ces points, à l'instant il aurait trouvé sur lui la main de M. Cousin (p. 115). The general conclusion is that Cousin's great services were "of the political order". "Comme philosophe et chef d'école, M. Janet emploie tout son grand talent à le reconstruire, ce qu'il ne sera jamais nécessaire de faire pour Kant, Schelling ou Hegel. Mais il n'y a pas besoin d'efforts pour démontrer que Cousin a exercé sur la philosophie, sur l'enseignement et sur les lettres françaises la plus grande et la plus heureuse influence." Pour l'Histoire de la Science Hellène. Par PAUL TANNERY. "De Thales & Empédocle." Paris: F. Alcan, 1887. Pp. vii., 396.

This work is an interesting and important contribution to the history of the first period of Greek thought. Begun ten years since, and published by instalments in the Revue Philosophique, it now appears with many additions, including translations of the fragments of the philosophers and of the passages relating to them in the "Doxographers". By the term "Hellenic science," the author intends to convey, first, that he deals exclusively with the purely "Hellenic" period of Greek philosophy, and next, that he deals with it in its scientific rather than its metaphysical aspect. His work is thus "a sort of complement of

the history of the origins of philosophy". Of the sciences that can be said to have become more or less specialised in antiquity, medicine and geometry-the second of which the author has treated in a separate volume (La Géométrie grecque, comment son Histoire nous est parvenue et ce que nous en savons, 1887)—are left aside, and cosmology, general physics and astronomy principally dealt with. The author's method is to set forth first the detailed scientific doctrines of each thinker and thence ascend to the view of the whole, rather than to present first the general metaphysical idea and afterwards view the details in the light of this, as has been the custom with philosophic historians. By the use of this method he has purposed to bring out the resemblances rather than the differences between doctrines and to display the scientific progress made during the period rather than the evolution of metaphysical conceptions. What he finds is that, while on the whole some advance was made in detailed explanation, the greatest merit of each thinker of the first rank is to have put clearly some new question of general scientific speculation; and that the questions put by the Hellenic thinkers, after all the progress made in the meantime, still remain open for modern science, and may perhaps remain open indefinitely. The first two chapters, after an introduction (pp. 1-17), give preliminary expositions of the sources of the fragments (c. i. "Les Doxographes Grecs ") and of what is known as to their chronology (c. ii. "La Chronologie des Physiologues"). The remaining chapters (ii.-xiii.) deal separately with the philosophers in the following order :-Thales, Anaximander, Xenophanes, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Hippasus and Alcmaeon, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles. This list differs from the list in the latest edition of Ritter and Preller's standard collection (see MIND xii. 310) chiefly by the absence of a special chapter on Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans and by the omission of the later Physici (Leucippus and Democritus, Diogenes of Apollonia, Archelaus and Hippo). Instead of the fragments being ordered according to topics, as in Ritter and Preller, an independent exposition of each system is first given, upon which follows in each case a literal translation first of the passages in the Doxographers and then of the original fragments, without note or comment. The author's investigations have led him to some new conclusions as to the rank to be assigned to different thinkers. Thales and Xenophanes, he holds, do not properly belong to the philosophic series; the former having merely introduced into Greece some rudimentary scientific notions that were already current in Egypt and the East, and the latter having been a "humoristic poet," who attacked the popular theology, rather than definitely a philosopher. The series of the Ionics begins with Anaximander, and the series of the Eleatics with Parmenides. Zeno and Melissus, on the other hand, have been allowed less than their due importance; the first being regarded chiefly as an ingenious dialectician, and the second as only a representative of Eleaticism who defended the doctrine of Parmenides without making any contribution of his own to its statement. The importance of Zeno has been underrated because his well-known arguments finally expelled from philosophy the notion they were intended to combat, which was in reality the Pythagorean notion of bodies as "sums of points"; the point being, for the Pythagoreans, "a real unity," and the whole, consequently, a real plurality. Zeno, in order to show that unity belongs to the whole and not to an indivisible minimum, proved that if the continuous consists of indivisible elements motion is impossible. The conception he attacked did not reappear in its original form. The Pythagorean school itself advanced to the more abstract view that had become necessary, and henceforth

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regarded the point as having strictly no magnitude, and numbers as abstractions-not concrete elements of things. Hence arose the misunderstanding of Zeno's arguments, which now passed into the hands of the Sophists. The reconstruction that M. Tannery attempts of Zeno's whole argument on motion (pp. 253-60) may be compared with that which is attempted by M. Dunan from a different point of view (see MIND X. 307). The Eleatic school, M. Tannery contends, was not in its origin idealistic. The "being" of Parmenides is "extended substance,” "the Cartesian matter". Not-being" is empty space. What Parmenides affirms is "limited space filled with matter," or the Cartesian plenum. In this doctrine, though not itself idealistic, the basis was given for idealism, and Melissus drew the idealistic conclusion. The expressions of Parmenides that are usually taken for statements of idealism are not to be interpreted in the sense that "to think and to be are the same," but in the sense that "to be intelligible and to be are the same ". The point of view of Parmenides remained throughout realistic. It was only when Melissus had laid down definitely the proposition that being is incorporeal (ἓν δὲ ἐόν, δεῖ αὐτὸ σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν) that idealism was "read into Parmenides. Among the Ionics, the merit is assigned to Anaximander of having been the first to arrive at a solution of the question of the origin and end of the world that is identical in essence with Mr. Spencer's (p. 105), and, so far as can be seen, must continue indefinitely to be a possible solution. Anaximenes is found to have been the first to affirm with precision "the unity of matter, or rather of substance" (p. 158)—an affirmation which still remains for modern science" a postulate". The scientific problem raised by Heraclitus was that of the possibility of the coexistence of a general with an individual consciousness (p. 189). In the theory of the elements of matter, not only did the ancient philosophers think out the conceptions that science has worked with ever since, viz., the doctrine of the four elements (first definitely stated by Empedocles and afterwards triumphant in its Aristotelian form), and the atomic doctrine that was ready to take its place when its utility was exhausted; but further, a conception was suggested by Anaxagoras which may find scientific application if ever the atomic doctrine should in turn be found to have rendered all the service it is capable of. The ultimate elements of Anaxagoras, according to M. Tannery, are not the oμoloμep described by Aristotle, but are qualitative "elements unattainable by any process of quantitative division. Matter is throughout, even to its smallest particles, "at once one and composite ". This theory is identical with the theory of matter suggested by Kant (p. 286). The points of interpretation selected here for mention have been exclusively points of speculative interest. While dealing adequately with the general aspect of the scientific thinking of the Physici, the author has also successfully carried out his idea of writing a history in which the positive scientific progress made during the period should be described. There is only space left barely to mention the two Appendices, the first of which (pp. 341-68) is a translation of the treatise of Theophrastus on Sensation, the second (pp. 369-91) a contribution to the history of the Pythagorean arithmetic. Les Sceptiques Grecs. Par VICTOR BROCHARD, Maître de Conférences suppléant à l'Ecole Normale Supérieure. Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques. (Prix Victor Cousin.) Paris: F. Alcan, 1887. Pp. 432.

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This is in all respects an excellent history of Greek Scepticism. The Sceptics are dealt with in a spirit at once sympathetic and critical.