Изображения страниц
PDF
EPUB

acquired. "The golden rule of learning," in the author's view, is "One thing at a time, and that thing perfectly" (p. 138); and the means of keeping the pupil's attention on the one thing is to awaken interest in the cultivation of the "faculty" as distinguished from the learning of particular "facts".

Spinoza. By JOHN CAIRD, LL.D., Principal of the University of Glasgow. ("Blackwood's Philosophical Classics," No. 12.) Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1888. Pp. 315.

Though this latest volume of the "Philosophical Classics" series runs a good way beyond the length of its companions, it differs from all of these in limiting itself to an "examination" of its subject's philosophical system. It is true, as the author remarks, that another biographical account was not needed after the recent works of Mr. Pollock and Dr. Martineau; yet the relation of the volume to the others of the series in which it forms part-the series having a special aim of its own—was also to be considered. Such as it is, the book seeks to deal with Spinoza's philosophy from an independent point of view, with result that shall haveCritical Notice' later on.

A Critique of Kant. By KUNO FISCHER, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Heidelberg. Translated from the German by W. S. HOUGH. Authorised English Edition. London: Swan Sonnenschein, Lowrey & Co., 1888. Pp. xi., 188.

66

The translator is somewhat at fault when he says that Fischer's History has been "until a recent date [see MIND xii. 610] wholly inaccessible to English readers," since Mr. Mahaffy, as far back as 1866, extracted from it the original exposition of the K. d. r. V. Upon that, however, the historian made a considerable advance in his second edition, not only of the Kant-volumes (iii., iv. of the whole work), but also of the Fichte-volume (v.), with which was incorporated in 1884, as Introduction to the History of the Post-Kantian Philosophy," a matured estimate of the philosopher's whole achievement that had already been published separately in 1883. It is this piece that is now translated; and, as a comprehensive as well as penetrative-while yet always lucid and intelligible-judgment upon Kant's thought in its inner development, it should prove of excellent service to English students. As regards the rendering, there can be no doubt of the translator's competence, shown as it is in his careful consideration of equivalents for the terms of art (whether or not he may have in all cases adopted the most unexceptionable ones). It appears also in the high level of faithful reproduction that in general he attains. Yet, while he has "aimed to be exact," it cannot be said that he has always succeeded. Thus, in the paragraph begun on p. 21, neither the first nor the second sentence is quite satisfactory, as anyone may see who will compare with the original the words rendered (in the one case) "nor is it pure subject," and (in the other) "since these belong to the constitution of the human body". Again, on p. 22, we read what there is no need to go to the original to reject: "Sense is one faculty, understanding another; this (!) is receptive of material, that (!) form-giving and productive, &c." To be sure, the more advanced student would not here be led astray by so obvious a transposition of pronouns, but a beginner might be sadly confused. It is Dr. Hough, we observe, that has undertaken to inaugurate the projected "Library of Philosophy," mentioned at the end of the present No., with a translation of Erdmann's Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Phil. Nothing could be more welcome; but may one hope that the translator will be

very careful with a work whose condensed expression it should tax any. body's powers to convey?

A Student's Manual of Psychology. Adapted from the Katechismus der Psychologie of FRIEDRICH KIRCHNER by E. D. DROUGHT. London: Swan Sonnenschein, Lowrey & Co., 1888. Pp. viii., 344.

Attention was drawn in MIND ix. 318 to the merits of Kirchner's Catechism of Psychology. They are such as to make the present translation of it a really useful addition to the English "student's" psychological library. He will here get very good general indications of the history of the science, and be put in easy possession of the main results of German inquiry in this century. The translation cannot be called other than satisfactory. There is a little looseness at the beginning that might easily have been avoided: as where, on p. 1, "sich stets wiederherstellende Einheit " is rendered by "unbroken unity"; or where the author's declaration that the existence of the soul will have to be proved, followed by an enumeration of the words in different languages for 'soul,' gets curiously changed into "We may notice the names for mind as some evidence that mind exists". As the translation proceeds, blemishes like these appear not to recur or to recur but rarely. The translator may have judged, on the whole, rightly in omitting references to German books that could seldom be turned to. It is not so clear that he has done well to override the author's distinction of types and give to all parts of the exposition an equal prominence.

The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast of West Africa: Their Religion, Manners, Customs, Laws, Language, &c. By A. B. ELLIS, Major, 1st West India Regiment. London: Chapman & Hall, 1887. Pp. vii.,

343.

This volume deserves the particular attention of all students of savage religion and savage psychology in general. Its title, at least when quoted without the full length of tail, might easily cause its importance to be overlooked. More significant and effective was the name of the author's earlier book, The Land of Fetish; though it is now one of his objects to correct, after more careful inquiry, something in his previous representation of negro religion. During a long service on the Gold Coast, he has not been deterred by the enervating influences of the most oppressive of human climes from making a remarkably close investigation of the ways of savage thought, so easily misinterpreted when superficially observed. Whether, with all his care, he has even yet succeeded in reaching a true and final interpretation of some of the facts he notes may be doubted; but what cannot be questioned is the freshness and genuineness of the contribution he here makes to the literature of anthropology. Especially noteworthy are his remarks on "Fetishism" in c. 12. Though the more careful among modern writers have ceased to use the word in De Brosses's indiscriminate sense, there is still so much confusion in its current employment that Major Ellis does good service in now (if not formerly) deliberately laying it aside in his general description of West African religion, and bringing it forward only when the question is whether the savage negro is in the way of worshipping material "odds and ends" (as Mr. Lang has happily called them, see MIND iv. 453), like sticks or stones, credited with some kind of spiritual attributes of their own. That there is little or no trace of such worship among the tribes of the Gold Coast, is the conclusion to which the author has been brought by his more protracted inquiry. The "tutelary deities" in such accidental material shape, which some "individuals "

procure with formalities carried out by themselves, or which "particular sections" or "companies" in a tribe obtain through the intermediation of priests, acquire in all cases, he believes, their divine character by communication from spirits attached to quite a different order of material phenomena. The true gods of the negro, all more or less maleficent in character, are found by Major Ellis to be mainly nature-powers--connected with river, lagoon, ocean-surf, forest, mountain, or the like. It is such powers, imagined in some kind of exaggerated human form, that, on the one hand, are liable, in certain very exceptional cases, to be elevated to a higher level of deity, with an ascription of relatively universal influence; and that, on the other hand, lend themselves, in the great majority of instances, to a diffusion of their spiritual activity into conveniently transportable objects, with or without the help of priestcraft. While not denying the evidences of ancestor-worship, especially in the more settled society of Ashanti, and while expressly connecting the development of family-divisions with a worship of animals, it is this conception of nature-worship that the author is chiefly concerned to bring into view as the result of his search. Very curious is his account of how, beside (if not above) the small class of "general deities" elevated out of the multitude of nature-powers classed as "local deities," one deity not maleficent--and therefore only recognised rather than worshipped-has found a place, under the name of Nyankupon; this is a savage rendering of the Christian God, adopted within the last four centuries from the overmastering European settlers on the coast, in tribute to their masterfulness, and not any relic, as some have supposed, of a purer primitive faith. Other notable features of the book are the chapters on "The Priesthood" and on "Psycholatry and Human Sacrifices". The author finds much evidence of artful conspiracy to deceive among the priesthood of both sexes. His account of the animistic conceptions of the negro--developed, as he recognises, not least in explanation of the phenomena of dreams—is less clear and consistent than could be wished, but includes some apparently new facts that should henceforth be reckoned with in any theory of primitive psychology.

6

Social History of the Races of Mankind. Second Division: OceanoMelanesians'. By A. FEATHERMAN. London: Trübner & Co.,

1888. Pp. xxxii., 418.

[ocr errors]

After an interval of one year (see MIND Xii. 295) the author completes with this volume that second of the six (irregularly published) divisions of his whole work which is occupied with his race of Melanesians,' scattered over the islands and islets of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The two Melanesian' volumes, about equal in external size to the two single volumes previously given to Aramaeans' and 'Nigritians,' do not really much surpass one of these in amount of letter-press; a different thickness of paper being judiciously chosen to give to the volumes a uniform appearance. The author may now be congratulated upon thus having a full half of his laborious course behind him. There is nothing left to be said on his astonishing industry or on the straightforward directness with which he succeeds in presenting the results of his vast reading. One may doubt whether the affirmative confidence of his general statements regarding the 'Races' -as to their independence of each other or as to the relationship of the divisions made within each-is always sufficiently grounded; but no unprejudiced person will be other than grateful to him for having conceived so great an enterprise and for carrying it through with so much devotion. The burden of his present Preface is an argument

against "the Darwinian hypothesis of transformism," that can here only be mentioned.

The Analytic Theory of Logic. By WILLIAM RENTON. Edinburgh: James Thin; London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1887.

66

This is a pamphlet of 16 pages on Symbolic Logic, in which is effected the demolition of Aristotle and the Schoolmen. "He (Aristotle) has no idea, &c.; and is absolutely in error in supposing, &c. The Aristotelian theory of figure and mood has no meaning whatever." The reader is asked to compare "the symmetry of the results" of the author's analysis with the "brutal methods of the schoolmen ". Though, as to Boole, it is allowed that "it would be impossible to surpass the ingenuity of some of Boole's transformations," yet the author would tacitly repudiate the indeterminate' result of the logical converse of multiplication which Boole so much emphasises. This repudiation is, in fact, the key to the whole theory presented to us. Let us see how it works. On p. 3, "There is no such thing as an animal that is a rigid body" is written symbolically "ra = 0, whence ro/a, or a rigid body is not an animal' The symbol o/a is thus the mathematical expression for the term not-a". So if v means vegetable, v=o/a. Hence r = v, or 'a rigid body is a vegetable '. (The author would have us observe "the elegant results of his analysis".) In a similar way, he proceeds to prove" the Laws of Thought; and, after several substitutions, he reaches that of Identity: the logician of ordinary training would have supposed that this law was assumed in the possibility of making any substitution whatever. Thence follows "the remarkable theorem that the laws of Thought are fundamentally identical". However remarkable this theorem may be considered, the author hardly does himself justice, as his powerful analysis would clearly lead to numberless other even more remarkable theorems. Some examples, expressed or suggested, will suffice to show how the fabric of Aristotle totters under the blows dealt by this masterhand. Thus we have hitherto been taught that A E are impossible premisses in the first figure. But not at all. On p. 11, No Spartans are Athenians; all Athenians are Greeks' yields the conclusion, 'The Spartans are not the Greeks in question'. Poor Aristotle would have supposed that the conclusion was a mere repetition of the first (minor) premiss and that there was no elimination in the case at all. Similarly, p. 11, take I A in the first figure. All Spartans are Greeks; some not these Greeks are animals' yields the conclusion, Spartans are not animals '. It is true the author writes "Athenians "in the place of animals,' thereby modestly concealing the really novel and remarkable character of the conclusions derivable by his method. Again (p. 12, § 32), as a pair of negative premisses: All Egyptians are non-Greeks; no nonGreeks are Athenians; .. no Egyptians are Athenians'. Aristotle would have stupidly called this first premiss affirmative, for (p. 7) "his error was to conceive the negative as attached to the copula ". Lastly (§§ 26 and 34), as a case of inference from two particular premisses: A quarter of all men are fighting animals; and a third of all fighting animals are cocks and bulls'; .. multiplying our premisses, One-twelfth of mankind are cocks and bulls'. The weakness of Aristotle would have led him to suppose that this unexpected conclusion really depended on the tacit universal proposition, All fighting animals are men,' the truth of which he might have hesitated to accept. There are other methods and results in which the Aristotelian student would feel more at home; but in the main we are sure the recognition of Mr. Renton's system will (when it comes) mark a new era in the history of logical doctrine.

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

The Ethic of Freethought. A Selection of Essays and Lectures. By KARL PEARSON, M.A., formerly Fellow of King's College, Cambridge. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1888. Pp. 446.

Prof. Pearson's Selection of Essays and Lectures derives its title from the author's "standpoint that the mission of Freethought is no longer to batter down old faiths," but to attempt the construction of a new basis of rational conduct. The volume is divided into three sections :66 Freethought" (pp. 13-134), "History" (pp. 137-314), and "Sociology" (pp. 317-446), each consisting of five papers. Sections i. and iii. consist almost wholly of lectures, while Section ii. consists wholly of reprinted essays. The titles of the papers of Section i. are-" The Ethic of Freethought," "The Prostitution of Science," "Matter and Soul," "The Ethic of Renunciation," "The Enthusiasm of the Market-place and of the Study". Of the next Section, the first two essays-" Maimonides and Spinoza," Meister Eckehart the Mystic '-were originally published in MIND (viii. 338 and xi. 20). These two papers have been selected as 66 fairly closely related to points treated in the first section"; the last three-"Humanism in Germany," "The Influence of Martin Luther on the Social and Intellectual Welfare of Germany," The Kingdom of God in Münster "-as dealing with "a period in which the forces tending to revolutionise society were in many respects akin to those we find in action at the present day". The five papers of Section iii. are entitled “The Moral Basis of Socialism," "Socialism in Theory and Practice," "The Woman's Question," "Sketch of the Relations of

66

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

66

Sex in Germany," "Socialism and Sex". The sections and papers, although, as the author points out, not so widely diverse as a glance at their titles might lead the reader to suspect, are yet too heterogeneous to admit of any brief summary of their contents-which, besides, do not always come within the province of MIND. The author's chief philosophical conclusions are these :-(1) "The laws of the physical universe follow the logical processes of the human mind. Externally, matter appears as the basis of a world, every process of which is in logical sequence; internally, mind pictures a similar world following exactly the same sequence. This identity of the physical and rational processes is the greatest truth mankind has learnt from experience. So great is our confidence in this truth, that we reject any statement of a physical fact which opposes our clear reasoning. . . . Any physical fact which is opposed to a physical law is opposed to a mental law; we cannot think it, it is impossible" (pp. 74-5). (2) "The only practical method of making society, as a whole, approach the freethinker's ideal of morality, is to educate it, to teach it to use its reason in guiding the race-instincts or social impulses. . . . Society depends for its stability on the morality of the individual. The morality of the individual is co-ordinate with his education. It is therefore a primary function of society to educate its members" (p. 126).

The Theory of Law and Civil Society. By Augustus Pulszky (Dr. Juris), Professor of Law at the Royal Hungarian University of Budapest, Corresponding Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Member of the Hungarian Parliament. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1888. Pp. 443.

Originally published last year in Hungarian, this book is now reproduced by the author in English. "The choice of English as the vehicle of my ideas is," he writes, "but the due acknowledgment of a moral debt of gratitude. The impulse to the investigations I have tried to pursue, the methods applied, the conceptions of science and its functions

« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »