from which I have started, and the ideals I have striven to attain, are derived chiefly from the study of modern English theoretical writers upon law, and of an English school of philosophy. Herbert Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy suggested most, though not all of the general views set forth in these pages, and, on the other hand, Sir Henry S. Maine's publications-which have given rise and date to a transformation of the historical and scientific study of law, not less important, nor less healthy in its tendency than that initiated by Savigny-have indicated the direction in which results were to be sought. To these two great masters of contemporaneous thought I am indebted for the matter of this book, more than I am able to indicate in detail." This acknowledgment is further emphasised by the dedication of the book to Sir Henry Maine. The principal divisions of the contents are as follows:-Book i. "Introductory Doctrines" (pp. 25-98); Bk. ii. “Fundamental Notions": Part i. "Society" (pp. 99-215); Part ii. The State" (pp. 216-311); Part iii. "Law and Right" (pp. 312-443). The place of "philosophy of law and civil society" among the social sciences is thus indicated:-"The will and consciousness of individuals combining in human communities so as to become public will and public consciousness, and the laws relating to the same, are the objects of sociology or social science, which may be further distinguished into ethics, political economy, the philosophy of law and civil society, and politics" (p. 41). Between the series of the social and of the physical sciences comes psychology. "Social consciousness and activity can be always reduced ultimately to the consciousness and activity of individuals, and their explanation is furnished by the mental constitution and the situation of the individuals. The social sciences-in so far as they are of a deductive character-are therefore founded directly on psychology" (p. 65).

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The Reign of Causality: A Vindication of the Scientific Principle of Telic Causal Efficiency. By ROBERT WATTS, D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in the General Assembly's College, Belfast. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1888. Pp. x., 414.

This volume consists of a series of chapters, mostly polemical and apologetic, on Prof. Tyndall's Belfast Address, Prof. Huxley's "Automatism," Mr. Spencer's Biology, The Unseen Universe, the inferiority of "the Huxleyan Kosmogony" to the Mosaic, Prof. Drummond's Natural Law in the Spiritual World,-which, it is concluded (p. 357), "cannot be accepted either by scientists or theologians,"-Mill's Utilitarianism, &c. The author's position, laid down in the first chapter as "An Irenicum; or, a Plea for Peace and Co-operation between Science and Theology," is that theology and science are at one in not being content with merely formulating the laws of phenomena. Equally, they require not only the rejection of Hume's doctrine of causation but the assertion of final as well as of efficient causes. And science, like theology, can only find rest in "an adequate Causality". "Constituted as man is, he cannot rest in any theory of this wondrous universe, which does not place an omnipotent moral intelligence first in the absolute order of existence, as the efficient cause of all forces, whether chemical, mechanical, vital or mental" (p. 148).

The Heroic Enthusiasts (Gli Eroici Furori). An Ethical Poem by GIORDANO BRUNO. Part the First. Translated by L. WILLIAMS. With an Introduction compiled chiefly from David Levi's Giordano Bruno o la Religione del Pensiero. London: George Redway, 1887. Pp. 170. This is a most unfortunate attempt at translation of the first five

dialogues of the Eroici Furori of Giordano Bruno, preceded by an introductory sketch of the philosopher's life, which seems to be for the most part translated from the source mentioned on the title-page. To say that the translation of Bruno is full of blunders gives a very imperfect idea of its inaccuracy, which is not merely casual but affects the whole structure. This, for example, is the version that is given of a passage of fundamental importance in the second dialogue. "CICADA. So that we can never hold the proposition of being contented or discontented, without holding the proposition of our own foolishness, which we thereby confess; therefore, no one who reasons, and consequently no one who participates, can be wise; in short, all men are fools. TANSILLO. I do not intend to infer that; for I will hold of highest wisdom him who could really say at one time the opposite of what he says at another-never was I less gay than now; or, never was I less sad than at present (pp. 57-8). The doctrine that Bruno is here expounding is that virtue or wisdom consists in a state of indifference as regards the two contrary extremes of joy and sorrow. The expression translated to "hold the proposition of being contented or discontented" (tener proposito d'esser contenti o mal contenti), means simply to talk of being "contented or discontented". "No one who reasons, and consequently no one who participates," ought to be "no one who speaks of it (that is, of being sad or joyful), and conse. quently no one who participates in it (that is, in the extreme of sorrow or joy)". "He who could really say at one time the opposite of what he says at another," ought to be "he who could truly say sometime the opposite of what that other person said" (who had once declared that he was never so happy as at the present moment). "Foolish" and "foolishness" ought rather to be "mad and "madness". A passage below, which is of equally fundamental importance for the understanding of the whole book, is perverted into the following extraordinary sentence :"This, then, to return to the point, is how this enthusiastic hero, who explains himself in the present part, is different from the other baser ones-not as virtue from vice, but as a vice which exists in a subject more divine or divinely, from a vice which exists in a subject more savage or savagely; so that the difference is according to the different subjects and modes, and not according to the form of vice" (p. 59). Bruno's point here is that "the heroic enthuisasm which is explained in the present part" (questo eroico furore che si chiarisce nella presente parte), is formally a "vice," a kind of "madness" (pazzia), since the heroic enthusiast, the seeker of absolute knowledge, fluctuates between the extremes of joy and sorrow, and does not remain poised at the centre of indifference like the wise or virtuous man; but that this "vice" differs from others in that its " subjects and modes" (that is, the persons who display it, and its modes of appearing) are nobler or more divine than the subjects and modes of "vulgar' or "bestial" joys and sorrows, though it is not different as regards the mere formal character of being a vice (secondo la forma dell' esser vizio). When passages expressing the central ideas of the book are "translated" in the way that has been seen, it is not worth while to give specimens of mistranslations of single phrases, though there are many quite equal to the rendering of " eroico furore" by "enthusiastic hero".

Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History. An Exposition by GEORGE S. MORRIS, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. ("Griggs's Philosophical Classics," No. 6.) Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co., 1887. Pp. xiii., 306.

The editor of this workmanlike (American) series of volumes "devoted

to a critical exposition of the masterpieces of German thought," makes here his own second contribution to it. From Kant's chief work, with which the series was inaugurated (see MIND vii. 604), he passes now to give account of Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts (pp. 1-110), and Philosophie der Geschichte (pp. 111-336). Where there was so much to report (a good deal of it, incidentally, in actual translation of Hegel's own words), it has not been found possible to include much comment or criticism. The work appears to be done in a spirited as well as accurate fashion. Coming from so trained a hand, it is not the less to be welcomed because already there happens to be a full English translation of the Phil. d. Gesch. Opportunity may, it is hoped, be found later on for some estimate of the contents of the volume.

The Elements of Psychology: A Text-Book. By DAVID J. HILL, LL.D., President of Bucknell University, &c. With illustrative Figures. New York and Chicago: Sheldon & Co., 1888. Pp. xxvi., 419. This text-book "has grown up in the author's class-room during a period of nearly ten years, and has been gradually adapted to the practical needs of those who could devote to the study only a single term of three months". In this character it suggests comparison with Prof. Dewey's Psychology (see MIND xii. 439), addressed about a year ago to the same class of students. That book was marked by a freshness and originality of treatment that excited doubts only as to its appropriateness for the purpose of elementary instruction. The present author, who has written other text-books for students, shows himself in divers ways (including the use of a great variety of types) a good deal more alive to the object immediately in view; and if he also, in that view, departs less from the beaten track of exposition, he is not without his justification. His plan seems to be that of trying to work the latest results of scientific inquiry into a scheme of faculty'-psychology framed on the general lines of Hamilton's. It is not an easy task, and the 'fit' cannot be called very exact. Perhaps it would have fared better with the digestion of the "three-months "-student if there had been rather less effort to give him a taste of everything and of everybody. Yet it is impossible not to be struck by the author's comprehensiveness of statement on all topics, and by his carefully considered way of inweaving so many and manifold references with his text; the result being an exceptionally full book for its size. In the actual exposition, it is to be remarked that, after short Introduction (pp. 1-10) of a very general character, Intellect, begun immediately, is not allowed much more than the space given to Sensibility (taken in its old wider meaning) and Will. These three names mark, in the author's view, "elemental powers of the soul," in correspondence with Knowledge, Feeling and Volition as the distinguishable elemental phenomena" combined in actual experience. Under Will (pt. iii.), he is from the start anxious to contend for a region of fact to be studied only by "examination of consciousness," without yielding to the "temptation " of working into it "from the side of bodily manifestations," and the more because such method of approach must always, he thinks, prove vain. It seems a somewhat awkward proceeding, thereupon, to follow, in pt. iii., with a first long chapter of "Involuntary Action," including not only "motor mechanism" and "instinctive action," but also " acquired action" or "habit," some of which presupposes "will". Clearly from the author's point of view, or from any other, the bodily side of the case is not to be excluded. He is more consistent with himself in putting off to quite the end the question of "development of will"; but when he gives "attention, assent, choice,

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execution" as its four stages in order, it is plain that he takes "development" in an unusual and peculiar sense. As to general position, while he professes (p. 2) to keep Psychology clear of Metaphysics, he might have more exactly defined the psychological bearing of those "primary affirmations" (of existence, co-existence, persistence) ascribed to the soul at p. 7, or of the sections on "being," &c., in the chapter of "Constitutive Knowledge". A very commendable feature of the text-book is the collection of figures at the end (pp. 377-403). Where reference to the nervous system, sense-organs, &c., is unavoidable, it should surely be rendered at least as definite as illustrations can make it; and there is no way of presenting them so unexceptionable as this upon which the author has fallen-massing them together, with appropriate verbal description, in an appendix.

Geulince. Étude sur sa Vie, sa Philosophie et ses Ouvrages, par VICTOR VANDER HAEGHEN, Docteur en Philosophie et Lettres, Docteur en Droit. Gand: Ad. Hoste, 1886. Pp. 231.

Within the last ten or fifteen years there has been an extraordinary revival of interest, especially among German writers, in the Flemish thinker whose name, before all others, is associated with the doctrine of Occasionalism developed within the Cartesian school. English readers have remained too long ignorant of the contributions (from the hands of Profs. E. Pfleiderer, Zeller and others) that have thus been made to a truer understanding of one of the most interesting episodes in the history of philosophy, an episode that should have, indeed, a special interest for English readers, because of a certain marked affinity between at least part of the Occasionalistic doctrine and that Phenomenalistic theory of science which has got its most earnest expression from English thinkers of this century or before. The present monograph, to the production of which the recent German discussions have supplied the impulse, affords the best possible occasion for taking up the subject in these pages; and we hope to do so in an early No. The work of a fellow-countryman of Geulincx, it is of quite singular merit as a piece of research. Everything, apparently, that can now be learned concerning the ill-starred philosopher's life is here brought to light; and the bibliographical matter, especially hard of collection in Geulincx' case, is set out in a chapter that should henceforth be a model to all that have a like task in hand. The chapter follows, in a concluding section of "Geulingiana" (pp. 160-224), upon others that deal not less satisfactorily with what may be called the external relations of the philosopher's work; nor does the central division of the book (pp. 43-159), occupied with an exposition of the philosophy itself, come in any way short,-as will be seen when we return to it.

La Civilisation et la Croyance. Par CHARLES SECRETAN, Professeur à l'Académie de Lausanne, Correspondant de l'Institut de France et de l'Institut genèvois. Paris: F. Alcan, 1887. Pp. 474.

In this work the author believes that he has been able to express all the "personal convictions on the generality of things" that he would wish to see shared. His object is, without erecting them into a system, to justify them philosophically, and at the same time to apply them to the social and religious questions of the day. He begins with a discussion of "The Situation," political and economical (Part i., pp. 15-148). The conclusion is that the essential question, for those who wish to prevent the collapse of civilisation, threatened by the tendency of modern democracy to socialism, is the moral question. What is necessary in

order that the light actually attainable with regard to political and economical questions should have its due effect is that the moral ideal of humanity should be realised in a greater number of individuals—not necessarily in all or even in a majority. This leads to the philosophical question, for the obstacle to the realisation of the moral ideal is, in the author's view, the prevalence of a false philosophy. In Part ii. ("The Problems of Philosophy," pp. 151-330) he sets forth the philosophical doctrines which, he holds, can alone give a secure basis for a morality that affirms the absolute obligation of duty. A brief account of the chief positions of M. Secrétan's philosophy will be found in a notice of his former work, Le Principe de la Morale, in MIND X. 618. Its central position is the doctrine of a "moral solidarity" of the human race depending on the real unity of substance of the species. The doctrines against which his attack is directed are, accordingly, "individualism, atomism, nominalism". These he connects with the prevalence of an empirical theory of knowledge. His own doctrine he identifies with a philosophical interpretation of Christian theology; seeking, at the same time, to make it independent of any particular view as to the historical basis of Christian dogma, and offering it for acceptance on purely philosophical grounds. The relation of philosophy to Christian theology is considered more closely in Part iii. ("Religion," pp. 333-454). Specifically, the connexion of M. Secrétan's philosophy with theology is in his theory of the moral solidarity of the race as taking the form of a common participation of mankind in a guilt that springs "from a deviation of which we rendered ourselves guilty in our original unity". A doctrine of the Fall of Man, he holds, follows directly from the postulation of Theism, Creation and Free-will, as these follow from the assertion of the primacy of the practical over the speculative reason. The idea of Creation may be combined with that of Evolution by means of the Aristotelian distinction of "possibility" from "actuality"; and the assertion of an Evolution is necessary in order to explain the real solidarity of all individuals. Christian morality is summed up in the words "love and justice"-neither of them in separation, but both as implying one another. Its practical manifestation is not to be sought in historical Christianity. The cause that the author has wished to serve, he says in concluding, "is not a return to the past; it is the advent of a new era; it is Christianity in spirit and in truth, which has always subsisted in some souls and which has never reigned".

La Méthode Conscientielle. Essai de Philosophie Exactiviste. Par LÉON DE ROSNY. Paris: F. Alcan, 1887. Pp. xiv., 180.

This essay is divided into twelve chapters, bearing the following titles:-"Du Critérium scientifique et de la mesure dans laquelle peut être acquise la Certitude"; "Positivisme et Exactivisme"; "De la Nature universelle"; "Des Forces morales cosmiques"; "L'Instinct et la Révélation intime"; "De la Liberté et des Idées préconçues"; "De l'Observation et de l'Expérience"; "Lois et Manifestations" "Conventions et Hypothèses"; "Les Systématisations inévitables"; "De la Morale absolue"; "De l'Hygiène intellectuelle ". The author's ideas about method-accurate observation of the facts of nature and examination of consciousness-are less distinctive than his theory of the world as an organism having perfection for its end; the duty of man being to help to realise this perfection by "collaborating at the great work of universal Nature". In chapters vi. and xii. there are rather interesting defences of paradoxes. A couple of sentences may be quoted from each. "La guerre aux idées préconçues,-quand cette guerre n'est pas la résul