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tante de la paresse ou d'un ramolissement du cerveau, est presque toujours une œuvre d'hypocrisie. Il ne s'est jamais produit de grande doctrine dans le monde sans qu'une idée préconçue n'en ait fourni le germe, n'est servi à son incubation, n'ait présidé à sa naissance, et ne se soit ensuite tenue en éveil sur les bords de son berceau" (p. 69). "La santé du corps, souvent nécessaire à l'émission de la pensée, n'est cependant pas suffisante pour garantir à celle-ci toute la portée qu'elle est susceptible d'atteindre; et, dans plus d'un cas, on pourrait contredire avec justesse l'aphorisme bien connu, tiré de Juvénal, en soutenant qu'il arrive de rencontrer une mens sana in corpore insano. La pléthore de la santé ne contribue pas toujours à l'activité de l'esprit" (p. 162).

La Conscience Psychologique et Morale dans l'Individu et dans l'Histoire. Par LUDOVIC CARRAU, Directeur des Conférences de Philosophie à la Sorbonne. Paris: Perrin, 1887. Pp. viii., 290.

This volume, by the translator of Prof. Flint's Philosophy of History in France and Germany, consists of chapters on the following subjects: (1) "Les origines de la conscience, de la pensée et de la volonté, selon G. H. Lewes," (2) "La folie au point de vue psychologique," (3) "La responsabilité morale dans certains états analogues à la folie et chez les criminels," (4) "L'humanité primitive et l'évolution sociale, selon M. Herbert Spencer," (5) "La philosophie de l'histoire et la loi du progrès," (6) "L'évolution de la morale-La moralité chez les sauvages". All are interestingly written expositions of the theories of recent thinkers. The criticism is from the point of view of the Spiritualist school.

La Philosophie Religieuse en Angleterre depuis Locke jusqu'à nos Jours. Par LUDOVIC CARRAU, Directeur des Conférences de Philosophie à la Faculté des Lettres de Paris. Paris: F. Alcan, 1888. Pp. vii., 295. This second volume by the same author has the merits of the first. It consists of expositions, together with criticism, of the religious philosophy of Berkeley, Butler, Bolingbroke, Hume, Hamilton, J. S. Mill, Mr. Spencer and Dr. F. E. Abbot. The chapter on Bolingbroke contains also a brief sketch of the history of English Deism. Two chapters (pp. 29-63) are devoted to Butler,-the first to his Ethics, the second to the Analogy. In a concluding chapter (pp. 270-95) the author contends that, after all the criticism it has undergone, the argument of Anselm and Descartes from the idea to the existence of a perfect being still retains its validity. M. Carrau's volume, it may be mentioned, is intended as a continuation of De Rémusat's Histoire de la Philosophie en Angleterre depuis Bacon jusqu'à Locke (see MIND iv. 128).

L'Intelligence des Animaux. Par G. J. ROMANES. Précédée d'une Préface sur l'Evolution mentale par EDM. PERRIER, Professeur au Muséum d'Histoire Naturelle de Paris. 2 Tomes. Paris: F. Alcan, 1887. Pp. xl., 230; 254.

This translation of Mr. Romanes's Animal Intelligence is preceded by an interesting preface giving a sketch of modern theories of instinct from Descartes to Darwin. M. Perrier himself advocates a theory which, while taking from Mr. Spencer the position that "reflexes are the point of departure of all mental evolution," and not excluding reference to natural selection as the means by which instincts are preserved, regards intelligence as a necessary factor in their modification. In his own words: "Cette théorie prend pour point de départ les réflexes; elle admet la constitution, grâce à ces phénomènes inconscients, d'une première catégorie d'instincts; à la suite du développement de la con

science, l'intelligence intervient pour modifier ces instincts; mais son rôle est momentané; l'instinct modifié par elle se transmet intégralement par hérédité et peut s'exercer désormais, sans que son intervention soit nécessaire; enfin, la conscience se développant et avec elle la mémoire, l'intelligence, d'abord dominée par l'instinct, reprend le dessus et le masque d'une manière plus ou moins complète". He seeks to apply this theory to insects by supposing a change in their manner of life, due to change of climatic conditions, from the time when their instincts were first formed.

L'Education Morale dès le Berceau. Essai de Psychologie appliquée. Par BERNARD PEREZ. Deuxième Edition entièrement refondue. Paris: F. Alcan, 1888. Pp. xxiv., 320.

This second edition of M. Perez's work, reviewed in MIND vi. 281, is very much altered from its original form, being, indeed, as the author says, "in many respects a new book". The first part ("Premiers développements et formation morale de la volonté," pp. 1-110) "owes almost nothing to the preceding edition ". "Cette partie de mon étude," the author proceeds, "fait, d'ailleurs, une sorte de préparation générale à la culture des sens et des émotions, instruments et objets de discipline morale. Mon traité d'éducation morale, qui est souvent de la morale en action, a ainsi gagné en cohérence, en unité, et peut-être aussi en clarté. Les préceptes forcément épars s'y rattachent comme à un centre naturel." A feature of this new first part, as of the book in general, is the utilisation of the psychological work that has been done since the original appearance of the book. M. Ribot's monographs, for example, are frequently cited. The chief alterations in the way of omission are the suppression of the chapter on æsthetics (utilised in the third edition of Les trois premières Années de Enfant) and of the chapter on "Le sens naturaliste". The last is omitted as being "a metaphysical digression"; it having been the author's desire to make the book practical all through, and to avoid all controversial matter. This seems to be in part what has determined him to omit the aesthetic chapter, some controversial points of which were remarked on by his reviewer in MIND. "L'influence directe du sentiment esthétique sur les émotions et les habitudes morales," he says, "se produit pour le mal comme pour le bien. Quant au caractère moral que peut revêtir lui-même le sentiment esthétique, outre que la question est bien controversée, l'inconvénient était inévitable, dans un livre comme celui-ci, de dire là-dessus trop ou trop peu."

Philosophie des Schönen. Von EDUARD VON HARTMANN.

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systematischer Theil der Esthetik'. 8 Lieferungen.
Duncker (C. Heymons), 1887. Pp. xv., 836.

Zweiter Berlin: C.

Von Hartmann's History of German Esthetics since Kant, the appearance of which was noted in MIND xii. 308, is now completed by the promised systematic Treatise (which forms parts 13-20 of the cheap edition of the "Selected Works "). The principal divisions of the new work are as follows:-Book i. "The Conception of the Beautiful." (1) "The Esthetic Phenomenon (Schein) and its Ingredients." (2) "The Concretion-Stages of the Beautiful.” (3) "The Contraries of the Beautiful." (4, 5) "The Modifications of the Beautiful" (with and without "Conflict "). (6) "The Place of the Beautiful in the Life of the Human Spirit and in the World-All." Book ii. "The Beautiful as Existing." (7) "The Beautiful in Nature and History." (8) "The Origin of Artistic Beauty." (9) "The Non-independent Arts of Formal Beauty and the Unfree Arts." (10) "The Simple Free Arts." (11)

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"The Composite Arts." With omission of everything that relates to the classification of the particular arts, the following may be presented as a sketch of the author's general principles and results. He begins with a refutation of two opposite errors as to the nature of beauty-"the naïvely realistic error that beauty has its seat in things-in-themselves" and "the subjectively idealistic error" which suppresses "the moment of objectivity," of being beautiful for all persons, as the first suppresses "the moment of subjectivity," of being beautiful only for subjective appearance. His own position is that the work of art is " objectively real," but that only its effect, the subjective appearance in the mind of the artist or of another person, is "beautiful". "The cause of the beauty of the image in the perception of the beautiful is only in the thing-in-itself, which is not beautiful; and in all production of beauty it appertains to the artist to create things-in-themselves which, although not themselves beautiful, yet necessarily become causes of beautiful images in normally organised men." This position is that of "Transcendental Realism". The distinction of the æsthetic relation in the subjective appearance from the theoretical and practical relations is that it "completely abstracts from the trans-subjective reality which lies causally at the ground of the subjective phenomenon, and is satisfied by the appearance as such so far as it is only beautiful," while the theoretical and practical relations "are not interested in the appearance (Schein) as such, but only trouble themselves about it in so far as it forms the bridge of union with the trans-subjective reality and functions as its representative in consciousness". At the same time, "the æsthetic appearance is no illusion, but ideal reality as actually present content of consciousness". When æstheticians say that art requires "Anschaulichkeit as opposed to " 'Begrifflichkeit," they have something true in their minds, but express it falsely, putting the part for the whole; for "Anschaulichkeit" is only a character of some of the arts. That which constitutes the essential character of all is " Scheinhaftigkeit" or "Phenomenalität". "Bildlichkeit" also is no essential character of the beautiful. And again, as the term "æsthetic appearance" cannot be replaced by "intuition' or "image," so it cannot be replaced by "form" (as opposed to "content"); though the mode of expression that places beauty in form, rightly understood, may express the true conception. Not only is the "æsthetic appearance" set free from "the objective reality of things," but also from "the subjective reality of the beholder". That is to say, the reality of the subject as well as of the object is forgotten or absorbed in the "pure appearance". Beauty, thus understood, is regarded as revealing itself in a series of stages from "formal beauty" as "the pleasurable in sense," through formal beauty as manifested in mathematical, dynamical and "teleological" relations, in life and in the genus, to "concrete beauty" as realised in "the individual as microcosm". In the endeavour to represent the individual, is found the justification of the revolt against academical tradition when this has come to forbid the representation of everything but the abstract type. The terms "Realism and "Naturalism" by which artistic revolutions sometimes try to justify themselves are thus only "masks" which the effort after "concrete individuality" as opposed to "abstract generality" puts on in a complete misunderstanding of its own true nature. "The individually beautiful work of art is not more beautiful than the generically beautiful work for this reason, because it corresponds better to nature and reality; but rather the reality of nature is more beautiful than the generically beautiful work of art because it responds better than this to the aesthetic demand for concrete individuality."

Finally, "the last and deepest thing in beauty is everywhere and at all stages a mystery". This mystery in beauty depends on the presence in the work of art of an "unconscious idea" immanent in the "æsthetic appearance" and not directly known but only felt. With the cessation of this mystery, with the becoming perfectly conscious of this unconscious idea, beauty would disappear.

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Die Erkenntnistheorie der Stoa (Zweiter Band der Psychologie '). Von Dr. LUDWIG STEIN, Privatdozent in Zürich. Vorangeht: "Umriss der Geschichte der griechischen Erkenntnistheorie bis auf Aristoteles ". Berlin: S. Calvary & Co., 1888. Pp. 389.

Dr. Stein here continues his monograph on the Stoic Psychology-of which the first volume was noticed in MIND Xi. 594-by a second volume dealing with the Theory of Knowledge of the Stoics and their predecessors. A third volume, on the Stoic doctrine of the Passions, which is to be accompanied by a general Index, will complete the work. The whole monograph promises to be of standard importance. In the present volume a preliminary account is first given of the development of Theory of Knowledge from the beginning of Greek philosophy to Aristotle (pp. 1-85). The fragmentary suggestions of the philosophers of the " preSophistic" period are carefully brought into view; but at the same time it is insisted that the earlier "doctrines of knowledge" do not indicate grasp of the "problem of knowledge" as a whole; being always buttresses of a doctrine already completed, instead of foundations for the construction of a doctrine. After the Sophists and Socrates, all philosophy was necessarily based on a more or less systematic theory of knowledge; and this had its definite place assigned to it by Aristotle. Theory of knowledge has in the Stoic system the place which it has in modern philosophy and which really belongs to it, viz., that of " a propedeutic foundation of the whole of philosophy". More specially, it is conceived as a kind of psychological introduction to formal logic (p. 103). The Stoic theory of knowledge as it proceeded from Zeno was essentially empirical and nominalistic, and such it remained to the end, in spite of a leaning to rationalism on the part of some chiefs of the school. While much more finely articulated, it was in agreement as regards fundamentals with the Epicurean theory of knowledge; the metaphysical opponents the Stoics had in view being always the Sceptics. Without breaking with empiricism, however, the Stoics were able to find a place in their system for doctrines that appear to be distinctively rationalistic. Stoicism is throughout, Dr. Stein contends, "a great effort at reconciliation between opposing views in philosophy and life" (p. 142). Its effort at reconciliation of opposing empirical and rationalistic positions was identical in spirit with that of Leibniz (pp. 240-2 n.). Its own criterion of truth, however, in spite of the use made of " common notions," &c., remains always the pavravía karaλYTTIKŃ, and this, in the last resort, in an empirical sense. In some very interesting notes, Dr. Stein tries to prove a direct influence of Stoic ideas on Hobbes and Locke (pp. 117-19, 145-6, &c.). Alike during the Scholastic period and at the beginning of modern philosophy, no theory of knowledge, he finds, was so influential (beside those of Plato and Aristotle) as that of Stoicism. Of special interest for the author is the Stoic doctrine of σvykará@eois, which he explains as "judgment (piois) united with approval". This term was chosen, he contends, instead of xpious, in conscious opposition to the sceptical éroxý, for the sake of its implication of will as having part in intellectual assent. It is the starting-point in the reconciliation of determinism and free-will

attempted by Cleanthes. This reconciliation reappears, either independently or under indirect Stoical influences, in both medieval and modern philosophy, in the Arabian school of the "Ascharija" (a subject of the author's special study) and in the Occasionalist school. Freedom, according to this view, consists in a joyous acquiescence, which the mind has the power to give or to withhold, in an inevitable judgment or act (pp. 191-5, notes 383-4). A feature of this, as of Dr. Stein's first, volume is the separate study of the chiefs of Stoicism. After the treatment of the doctrines of the school as a whole in nine chapters (pp. 89-300, “The Place of Theory of Knowledge," "The nyepovikov or Thinking Soul," "Perception," "Representation," "The Judgment," "Reason," "General Conceptions," "The Criterion of Truth," "Language-Nominalism"), there follow chapters treating of the doctrines of Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, "The Middle Stoa," Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius (pp. 300-87). The purpose of this " genetic" study is to show the effect of controversy in modifying the expression of particular doctrines, and at the same time to make it clear that the groundwork of the system remains unmodified till the dissolution of the school.

Louis de la Forge u. seine Stellung im Occasionalismus. Ein Beitrag zur
Geschichte der Philosophie von Dr. HEINRICH SEYFARTH. Gotha:
E. Behrend, 1887. Pp. 59.

This is a still later contribution than the monograph on Geulinex noted above (p. 298) to a right appreciation of the Occasionalist theory. It is specially concerned with a thinker of considerable prominence in his time, who has now become little more than a name. Born at Paris, early in the 17th century, practising medicine at Saumur, and becoming the friend and adherent of Descartes, De la Forge not only took part in the posthumous publication of the philosopher's Traité de l'Homme, but himself wrote an elaborate Traité de l'Ame humaine on Cartesian principles. There is a dispute as to the date of the original issue of this work, some carrying it forward from 1661 to 1666, while Dr. Seyfarth would place it (for reason given) in 1665, the year in which the first (incomplete) edition of Geulinex' Ethica appeared. The point has its interest in relation to the question of when or at whose hands the doctrine of Occasionalism first took shape. It is more important to note that, whether De la Forge came earlier or later than Geulinex before the world with his statement of the doctrine, it was unquestionably thought out by him in perfect independence, and with a breadth of view and a logical pertinacity hardly second to what the Flemish thinker displayed. In any attempt to understand Occasionalism, in relation to the Cartesian principles from which it so directly followed, it is therefore right and necessary not to overlook De la Forge's part in its development; and, in returning to the subject later on, we shall have more to say on Dr. Seyfarth's welcome and effective essay.

Veber Gemüthsbewegungen. Eine psycho-physiologische Studie von Dr.
C. LANGE, Professor der Medicin in Kopenhagen. Autorisirte
Uebersetzung von Dr. H. KURELLA, Prakt. Arzt. Leipzig: Theodor
Thomas, 1887. Pp. 92.

This is a translation of the work of a distinguished Danish pathologist on the Emotions, published originally at the beginning of 1885. The author lays down the principle, for the study of emotion, that the bodily, physiological expressions of the movements of feeling furnish the only point of support for their scientific investigation (p. 8). He only deals with certain selected emotions-the chief of which are Sorrow, Joy,

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