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Fear and Anger (Kummer, Freude, Furcht, Zorn)—and with these under their typical and, as he says, "conventional" expression. The descriptive part of his essay is preliminary to a physiological theory of the emotions, the distinctive feature of which is that all are reduced to vaso-motor phenomena. First it is found that the chief emotions dealt with form contrasting pairs in respect of their physiological, and in particular their vaso-motor, effects. The conjecture is then thrown out that these latter effects are primary and the others derived, and the facts are found to be all explicable on this supposition. The ordinary mode of speech that makes emotions the "causes" of their physiological accompaniments is then criticised. In the order of events, the author concludes, the relation that really exists is the inverse of that which is ordinarily assumed and which he himself had assumed provisionally. The mental emotion is not the cause of the accompanying vaso-motor phenomena, but these are the effects of physical causes, to which "psychical causes" admit of reduction. In their essential character the phenomena of emotion are the same whether their cause is "physical" or "psychical" (e.g., a toxic agent or an association of present with past events); and, in their strictly scientific expression they must be identified with their physiological, that is, ultimately with their vaso-motor, accompaniments. The scientific problem of the psychology of the emotions is to determine the reaction of the vaso-motor system on different influences. Its solution, the author admits, is as yet far distant. The aim of the present investigation is merely to fix the problem. In a note (n. 22, pp. 88-90) Dr. Lange points out an interesting anticipation of his vaso-motor theory by Malebranche. He has a reference to Darwin's Expression of the Emotions (n. 16, p. 86), bringing against the evolutionary view of physiognomical expression an objection similar to Prof. Mosso's (see MIND X. 619), and claiming exclusive validity for "physiological analysis".

Das menschliche Erkennen. Grundlinien der Erkenntnisstheorie und Metaphysik. Von A. DORNER, Doctor der Theologie und Philo. sophie. Berlin: H. Reuther, 1887. Pp. iv., 512.

This book is divided, after an introductory section (pp. 1-39) on the claims of Dogmatism, Scepticism, Criticism," Apriorism," and Empiricism, into two parts, consisting respectively of "Investigations in Theory of Knowledge" (pp. 39-352) and" Metaphysical Investigations (pp. 352-512). The subdivisions of part i. are as follows:-(1) Sensible Experience, (2) Representation and Concept (Judgment and Syllogism), (3) The Concepts bound up with Judgments of Worth (Concepts formed in connexion with feelings of pleasure and pain; æsthetic, ethical, and religious concepts), (4) Ideals and Categories, (5) Methodological Discussions. The author having decided for the Critical as opposed to the Dogmatic and Sceptical positions, tries to establish, on Critical grounds, a doctrine that is neither pure Empiricism nor pure "Apriorism". Empirical and a priori elements are to be recognised as existing together in all knowledge. To the power of knowing there are objects that correspond. That which knows is a substantial soul. Except on these suppositions, knowledge is inexplicable. The metaphysical theory developed in the second part claims to unite the conception of "immanence" with that of "transcendence," and the conception of "teleological" with that of "mechanical evolution. "The highest metaphysical power in the world," according to this doctrine, is "the ethical, intelligent will of the Spirit," which, by modifying the mechanical interaction of the parts of the world, brings its order to perfection. At the beginning of evolution,

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mechanism preponderates; at its end, "teleological organisation" will be universal. Mechanism is the conservative principle, teleology the principle of progress. The whole "world-process," whether divisible into "aeons or not, is one and continually progressive. The ground of its unity is the unity of the "world-cause". So far as teleological organisation is realised in individual beings, it is effected by "central substances," gathering round them in the proper order groups of interacting atoms.

Das Wesen der Seele und die Natur der geistigen Vorgänge im Lichte der Philosophie seit Kant und ihrer grundlegenden Theorien historischkritisch dargestellt von Dr. J. H. WITTE, Professor an der Universität in Bonn. Halle-Saale: C. E. M. Pfeffer (R. Stricker), 1888. Pp. xvi., 336.

Regarding the problem of "the nature of the soul" as fundamental not only for philosophy but also for scientific psychology, the author has set himself to examine all the more important theories of the soul since Kant, in relation to the general doctrines of the thinkers by whom they have been put forth, and with a view to arriving at a valid theory. The book will receive Critical Notice' later on.

Die Welt in ihren Spiegelungen unter dem Wandel des Völkergedankens,
Prolegomena zu einer Gedankenstatistik. Von ADOLF BASTIAN.
Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1887. Pp. xxviii., 480.

Ethnologisches Bilderbuch mit erklärendem Text. 25 Tafeln, davon 6 in
Farbendruck, 3 in Lichtdruck. Zugleich als Illustrationen beigege-
ben zu dem Werke Die Welt in ihren Spiegelungen, &c.'.
Author, &c.

Same

In his present work, the author applies his conception of a psychology of national and race-ideas specially to the region of cosmology; describ ing, by his characteristic method, the forms that the common thought of peoples has taken in their beliefs about the constitution of the world. The accompanying atlas (with special explanatory text) gives a series of carefully selected and well executed plates-some reproducing actual works of art, others (apparently) constructed from verbal description: altogether, a very instructive collection. The author's study of the cosmological ideas of historical civilisations, as expressed in their religious systems, ranges, literally, "from China to Peru," and, in addition, he takes in the ideas of early Greek philosophers, of Gnostics and Cabbalists and of medieval geographers, as well as of Polynesians and Maoris. The whole work is not less remarkable than his previous ones for its varied learning, and is equally inspired by his theoretical idea, expounded on so many other occasions, of an jective" or ethnic psychology.

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Zur neuen Lehre. Betrachtungen von Dr. H. DRUSKOWITZ. Heidelberg: G. Weiss, 1888. Pp. 53.

This is a sequel to the author's essay noticed in MIND xi. 589. He both continues his examination of doctrines that claim to replace the historical religions and seeks to formulate more accurately the conditions of a satisfactory "substitute for religion". For himself, he finds satisfaction "in the idea of an immeasurable capability of progress, and of a grand end, a victorious conclusion of the ascending planetary development," towards which man is to contribute, not for the sake of his "greatest happiness," but for the sake of a "higher order, of which he is the forerunner".

Werden, Sein und Erscheinungsweise des Bewusstseins.

Von Dr. med.

EMANUEL JAESCHE. Heidelberg: G. Weiss, 1887. Pp. 80. This is an essay having for its general purpose to bring into view the unity of knowledge as displayed in the series of the sciences from those that deal with "corporeal things," "animated creatures" and " scious creatures," to those that deal with "self-conscious creatures". The author has developed his idea at greater length in a book, Das Grundgesetz der Wissenschaft, noticed in MIND xi. 136.

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Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie. Von WILHELM WUNDT, Professor an der Universität zu Leipzig. Dritte umgearbeitete Auflage. 2 Bände. Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1887. Pp. xii., 544; x., 562. This third edition of Prof. Wundt's standard work has been throughout revised and to a large extent rewritten. The subjects of the sections and chapters are the same as in the second edition (published in 1880), but the text is largely altered and much is altogether new. Vol. i. has been extended 45; vol. ii., 92 pages. In view of the sweeping alterations and additions now made, Critical Notice' will follow.

RECEIVED also:

J. Drummond, Philo Judaeus, 2 vols., Lond., Williams & Norgate, pp. 359, 355.

J. Rhys, Hibbert Lectures on Celtic Heathendom, Lond., Williams & Norgate, pp. 708.

H.C. Bastian, On different Kinds of Aphasia, Lond., Brit. Med. Assoc., pp. 28.
N. Vaithianathen, Some Observations on Logic, Madras, National Press, pp. 78.
G. T. Stevens, Functional Nervous Diseases, New York, D. Appleton, pp. 217.
Th. Piderit, La Mimique et la Physiognomonie, Paris, F. Alcan, pp. 280.
P. Aubry, La Contagion du Meurtre, Paris, F. Alcan, pp. 184.

0. K. Notovich, La Liberté et la Volonté, Paris, F. Alcan, pp. 256.
P. Regnaud, Origine et Philosophie de Langage, Paris, Fischbacher, pp. 443.
M. Panizza, La Fisiologia del Sistema Nervoso, 3a ed., Roma, Manzoni, pp. 441.
G. Cesca, L'Educazione del Carattere, Verona-Padova, Drucker e Tedeschi,
Pp. 26.

H. v. Eicken, Gesch. u. System der mittelalt. Weltanschauung, Stuttgart,
Cotta, pp. 822.

A. Ganser, Alles Reale Sein, &c., Graz, Leuschner u. Lubensky, pp. 27.
H. Ebbinghaus, Die Gesetzmässigkeit des Helligkeitscontrastes, Berlin, pp. 15.
F. Kirchner, Schematismus der Philosophie, Halle a. S., Schwetschke.
R. Eucken, Die Einheit des Geisteslebens, &c., Leipzig, Veit, pp. 499.
C. Sigwart, Die Impersonalien, Freiburg i. B., J. C. B. Mohr, pp. 78.
E. Pfleiderer, Zur Lösung der Platonischen Frage, Fr. i. B., Mohr, pp. 116.
H. Münsterberg, Die Willenshandlung, Fr. i. B., Mohr, pp. 163.
G. Glogau, Abriss der philosophischen Wissenschaften, Bd. ii., Breslau, W.
Koebner, pp. 417.

NOTICE will follow.

66

VIII.-NOTES.

DR. CATTELL ON ELEMENTS OF PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY".1

The generous praise which Dr. Cattell bestows in the October No. of MIND upon my Elements of Physiological Psychology, as a whole, receives my grateful recognition. Many of his criticisms of the details do not admit of reply by argument; for they concern matters like the amount of space, method of treatment, weight in evidence, to be assigned to particulars, and therefore raise such questions as every author must solve for himself in a practical way. For example, it may be open to debate, theoretically, whether a treatise aiming to cover the entire ground of physiological psychology in an elementary manner should devote any space to a description of the nervous system, and, if any, how much space it should thus devote. To such a question the reply must be: All depends upon what the author wishes to do. There can be little doubt that not one in a hundred of the readers of any work on this subject, even including the experts of different kinds, possesses, or can easily obtain, the material for forming that clear and symmetrical picture of the nervous mechanism which an understanding of its relations to the mind requires.

There is one class of Dr. Cattell's strictures, however, which appeal to me for a reply. His review is characterised by the frequent complaint of "confusion" in my treatment of individual topics. Now my own researches and reflections have been so elaborated, and my conclusions lie so clear in my own mind, that I am persuaded the appearance of confusion is due to some infelicity of expression on my part, or else the confusion is not my confusion. I wish, then, briefly to examine this class of Dr. Cattell's strictures.

In the first place, Dr. Cattell accuses me of confusion amounting to a "sheer contradiction," because I hold both that the nervous system must be considered as a mechanism and that there may be, and is, a causal connexion between this mechanism and the mind. In advocating the view that the nervous system is a mechanism, he is pleased to regard me as a "follower of Lotze". Now I can by no means claim so distinguished a title as this; but it seems rather strange that if I am to be regarded as a follower of the German philosopher in holding one of these tenets, I should not be regarded as equally his follower in holding the other tenet; for Lotze certainly advocated the view that the mind and the system of molecules which constitutes the central nervous mechanism are causally related to each other.

But in truth there is no incompatibility between these two tenets, and no confusion involved in holding them both. On the contrary, the marks of manifold confusion of the most antiquated kind are likely to become evident whenever anyone sets out to argue that there can be, or is, no causal relation between body and mind. It is then we hear the principles of a medieval metaphysics virtually affirmed in the name of modern science. 'Only like can act on like;' no action is possible except through contact' of extended beings; the only causation is through the 'transmission' of so-called physical energy under the principle of mechanical equivalents, &c. These are some of the assumptions which

6

1 This communication, which should have had immediate insertion, failed by accident to come to hand in time for the January No.-Ed.

bring confusion into the treatment of this subject. But these are cer tainly not the assumptions which I advocate.

The interacting molecules of a living nervous system without doubt constitute a molecular mechanism. They are a system of moving material beings, which at every instant must be regarded as conditioning each other. But they certainly do not constitute a closed' system. If they did, there could be no such thing as irritating' or 'exciting' the system either by external or internal stimuli. A half-dozen perfectly elastic billiard - balls thrown down upon a table with perfectly elastic cushions would, in all their subsequent motions, constitute a physical mechanism. But what if any of the balls are from time to time struck by a cue? They do not for that reason cease to constitute a mechanism; but they do cease to constitute a 'closed' mechanical system. other words, if we are to account for the behaviour of the balls, we have now to take the blows of the cue into the account. Neither does the effect of the many forms of constantly active stimuli, both internal and external, upon the nervous system render it any less a mechanism than it would be without this effect. It does, however, make it impossible to account for the action of this mechanism without taking the action of beings lying outside of it into our account.

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And now the question arises: Is the nervous system a mechanism absolutely closed' to all causal action from the mind? Everything in the way of actually observed fact concerning the relations of the two kinds of phenomena-phenomena of the nervous system and mental phenomena would encourage us to answer, No. But we are told, on the alleged authority of a certain form of a mechanical theory of the entire universe that, in spite of all appearances, we must answer, Yes. Why? I should be glad to know. Because action of mind on matter is mysterious, unimaginable, &c.? But so is every kind of action: action of material molecule on material molecule not the least so. Is it, then, because we must assume not only that all causal action is according to uniform modes or laws (which I readily grant), but also that all causal action is only between material molecules under the law of the conservation and correlation of physical energy? In other words, is it because the action of mind and brain on each other cannot be like the action of the billiard balls under the stroke of the cue? But it seems to me that those who maintain the latter view may excuse us from assenting to them (under penalty, I suppose, of being found guilty of confusion), until it has been shown more clearly how the behaviour of the nervous mechanism under ordinary physical stimuli is to be expressed in terms of the action of the cue on the billiard-ball.

In brief, I do not for a moment admit that Dr. Cattell's charge of confusion is at this point well founded. There is no confusion or incompatibility between the view that the nervous system is a mechanism and the view that this system stands in certain causal relations to the mind. Confusion arises, and that without easily assignable limit, when the attempt is made to explain all the uniformities of the occurrence of phenomena, mental as well as physical, as mere resultants of the causal action of physical elements under the law of the conservation and correlation of physical energy. But this is not merely a mechanical theory of the nervous system. It is the materialistic theory of the relations of mental phenomena to that system. The latter theory should never be confused with the former. I cannot believe that my book has fallen into this confusion.

In this connexion I may, perhaps, best refer to the surprise which Dr. Cattell expresses at the sentence in which I do not, as he says,

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