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This, though not free from objection, is certainly better than Mr. Sandars's rightful," as rightful," as it can be defended by going back, not to τὰ ἠθικά, but to ἦθος and ἔθος ; but it seems impossible to get any single English term to express the distinction. There is a useful note on the word " Recht" on page 12.

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To note two small misprints:-on page 113 n., Hegel's should be in italics, as part of the title of a book which is not Hegel's; on page 219, line 22, for "inured" should obviously be read "issued". In the sentence translated on page 280, the "and" before "which" is hardly quite correct.

D. G. RITCHIE.

Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie. Von WILHELM WUNDT,
Professor an der Universität zu Leipzig.
Dritte umgear-

beitete Auflage. 2 Bände. Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1887.
Pp. xii., 544; x., 562.

The amount and range of Prof. Wundt's work are scarcely less noteworthy than is its value. Some readers of MIND may not know that he has written standard books on physiology and physics, but all must have noticed the extent of his philosophical writings. Since the publication of the second edition of the Physiologische Psychologie in 1880, MIND has recorded the completion of the Logik (ix. 158), a volume of Essays (xi. 132), the Ethik (xii. 285), a Streitschrift (xii. 478), and the constant issue of the Philosophische Studien, to which the editor is also the most frequent contributor. Now we have a new edition of the Physiologische Psychologie. We may look on this as Prof. Wundt's master-work, for it is his psychological thought that pervades and brings into unity the whole of his philosophical and physical writings. Those acquainted with the author's careful methods will not be surprised to find that this third edition is in many respects a new book. The work has been throughout revised, and to a large extent rewritten, its size having been increased by 145 pages. The general plan and arrangement, however, remain as in the preceding edition.

Mr. Sully contributed to the first number of MIND an article on "Physiological Psychology in Germany," concerned chiefly with the first edition of Prof. Wundt's work, and Mr. Ward noticed briefly (vi. 445) the appearance of the second edition. importance of the book, however, is such that I shall give some account of its general contents, as well as a notice of the matter which is new in this edition.

The

Prof. Wundt treats in his Introduction (i. 1-20) of the aim and scope of physiological psychology, and certain psychological data. Much of what he writes has become a matter of course, but this is largely due to the author himself. New sciences are not born full-armed from a single brain, but we owe to

Prof. Wundt the shaping of physiological psychology, and its acceptance by students both of physiology and psychology. The most interesting change in the Introduction is the addition of several paragraphs defining subjective and objective psychology, and subdividing the latter into physiological and social psychology (Völkerpsychologie). A work on social psychology is foreshadowed, which will follow the lines here traced, and treat of language, myth and custom.

Half of the first volume is given to a careful account of the nervous system and its relation to mind. Prof. Wundt, like Lotze, had the training of a physiologist and physician; but while in Lotze a mechanical natural science seems at times in conflict with an ideal philosophy, with Prof. Wundt physiology and psychology go hand in hand, mutually helpful. Thus this first section is not a mere anatomy and physiology of the sense-organs, nerves and brain, but a thorough study of "The Physical Basis of Mental Life". The psychologist cannot ignore the relation of consciousness to the material world; it is the point at which empirical psychology begins, and the question with which speculative psychology ends. The theories concerning the development of species and the conservation of energy are scarcely less important for mental than for physical science. Prof. Wundt begins at the beginning, treating in his first chapter the range of consciousness and the differentiation of its physical basis. He does not minimise the difficulty of inferring mental life from physical movement, a difficulty so great that the hylozoist can attribute consciousness to the falling stone, while Descartes denied it to even the highest brutes. But it is argued as highly probable, from the standpoint of observation, that consciousness is co-extensive with life; and as physiology assumes the phenomena of life to be based on the universal properties of matter, so psychology attri butes to the matter which we perceive an inner being from which the individual consciousness is developed. This view, resembling Clifford's mind-stuff theory (MIND iii. 57), is neither materialism nor hylozoism; it does not make mind a function of matter, nor does it identify the latent life of dead matter with actual life and consciousness.

Prof. Wundt next devotes two chapters to the structural elements and development of the nervous system, including a full account of the anatomy of the human brain. The following chapter, on "The Course of the Nerve-Fibres," takes up 84 pages, and is the most thorough discussion of the subject with which I am acquainted it will, however, be found hard reading by those who have not done practical work with scalpel and microscope. Another long chapter (pp. 66), no less complete than the preceding, is given to "The Physiological Functions of the Spinal Cord and Brain". The most recent researches of Ferrier, Hitzig, Goltz, Christiani, Luciani, Munk and Meynert are reviewed, and the conflicting evidence concerning localisation in the brain is sifted,

a position between that of Flourens and Munk being maintained. In this chapter Prof. Wundt seeks to find a physiological basis for the mental activity which he calls Apperception, and supposes the frontal convolutions to be the " organ of apperception ". The argument is, however, given a less prominent place in this than in the preceding editions, the scheme of an apperceptive hierarchy being put in small type. The sixth and last chapter of this section treats of "The Physiological Mechanics of Nerve-Substance". Prof. Wundt gives unwavering allegiance to the law of the conservation of energy and its application to the living organism. From this vantage-ground he studies the course of the nervous impulse and the nature of innervation, making use of his own researches in his work Die Mechanik der Nerven. There is complete analogy between the storing-up and release of energy, which are the fundamental functions of the nervous system, and perception and volition, which are the fundamental functions of consciousness.

The second section (i. 289-544) treats of "Sensation". The first chapter (seventh of the book) is named "The Origin and General Properties of Sensation," and is concerned with the physical stimulus, and more especially with the development, structure and function of the sense-organs. In the next chapter, on "Intensity of Sensation," Prof. Wundt gives an independent mathematical derivation of Fechner's formula, but distinguishes, as Fechner does not, between "equal increase or decrease in quantity of sensation" and "least noticeable change in sensation". He favours a psychological interpretation of the law, but thinks this is not inconsistent with a physiological import. This chapter (as also that dealing with the Time-relations of mental phenomena) is much enlarged in this edition by accounts of experiments made during the past eight years in the Leipsic laboratory. As I have recently (MIND No. 49) described these, I shall not attempt to notice them here. Following the chapter on intensity of sensation is one on "Quality of Sensation," which treats in succession of touch, temperature, sense of effort, organic sensation, taste, smell, hearing and sight. No very great alterations are made from the preceding edition, but in all cases the most recent work is incorporated; for example, the researches on the temperaturesense and the Neurological Society's discussion on the muscular sense. The last chapter of the section, on "The Emotional Tone of Sensation," gives feeling its due place, beside intensity and quality, as a necessary element of sensation. Prof. Wundt ably discusses the relation of the emotional side of sensation to its intensity and quality, and to the total content of consciousness, but does not separate pure feelings of pleasure and pain from cognitive elements as sharply as Mr. Ward.

The third section (ii. 1-244) is on "The Formation of Presentations": treating of the development of perception through touch, hearing and sight, and the part played by each in giving us our

idea of space and the external world. The section is throughout carefully revised, the chapter on "Hearing" being entirely rewritten. The limits of this notice make it impossible for me to give an account of Prof. Wundt's views either on special matters, such as binocular vision and local signs, or on general theory. He published his first work Die Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung as long ago as 1862, and his doctrine is surely worthy of more respect than Prof. James (MIND Xii. 543 ff.) pays it.

The fourth section (ii. 225-462), on "Consciousness and the Train of Ideas," is one of great importance. As the preface tells us, Prof. Wundt has been engaged in experimenting on the timerelations of mental phenomena ever since 1860. This section gives a complete description of such experiments and of the light they throw on consciousness and attention. We are thus brought to the theory of Apperception, which has recently been attracting notice. The word was introduced into philosophy by Leibniz to denote a spontaneous activity of the mind through which presentations are clearly distinguished. Use was made of the word by Kant and by Herbart, and Prof. Wundt gives it a prominent place in his psychology. According to him, will is inseparably bound up with consciousness; it is activity of the mind, as necessary for perception as for movement. This activity of the mind is called Apperception (attention) when it is directed to perception and the train of ideas, and Volition when it is directed to movements of the body. Apperception is the more fundamental of the two we must have the idea of a movement before we can carry it out. The will is determined by feelings of pleasure and pain, but it is the centre to which all motives converge and from which all thought and action proceed. In apperception our will is concerned with our ideas, whence we perceive the unity of will and get the basis of self-consciousness.

66

Following the chapters on consciousness and apperception is a chapter treating of The Association of Ideas". Prof. Wundt distinguishes simultaneous from successive association, and discusses the part played by apperception. In this chapter memory, imagination and reason are briefly reviewed. There remain two chapters in this section, the one on "Emotion," the other on "Disturbances of Consciousness". In the former, passion and desire, the temperaments and the intellectual emotions, are acutely discussed; in the latter, hallucinations, dreaming, hypnotism and insanity are treated as far as seems advisable in a work on general psychology.

The fifth section (ii. 463-530), on " Will and Volitional Movement," contains three chapters: the first on the development of the will; the second on automatic, reflex, instinctive and voluntary movement; and the third on language. These chapters are not materially changed in this edition; they contain much that is worth careful study, but I am not able here to call attention to special matters.

The sixth and last section of the work (ii. 531-54) treats of metaphysical theories concerning the nature of mind, and the points of view from which consciousness can be studied. It is reprinted with scarcely the change of a word from the second edition. The few changes made in this edition in the more theoretical parts, and the sweeping changes necessary in the parts dealing with matters of fact, may lead some to praise the stability of reason, others to rejoice in the progress of science. Prof. Wundt comes to the final conclusion that "what we call mind is the inner being of the same unity which outwardly we look upon as the body belonging to it". But, he goes on, "mental being is the reality of things, and its most essential property is development. The human consciousness is for us the summit of this development; it is the point in the course of nature at which the world comes to reflect on itself. Not as a simple being, but as the developed product of countless elements, the mind of man is what Leibniz called it, a mirror of the world."

It is much to be hoped that an English translation of the book may now be made. Even those who know some German will find the original difficult reading, and the French translation, begun from the proof-sheets of the second edition but published scarcely more than two years ago, is already obsolete. The difficulties in the way of publishing such a translation remind us of the extent to which science is handicapped in England by the methods of publication. All important English books on scientific subjects are translated into French and German, and a new edition of a work such as the one before us, extending to more than 1100 large octavo pages and containing 210 woodcuts, can in Germany be admirably printed and sold for 18s. Our only chance of having an English version of the Physiologische Psychologie would seem to be through the co-operation of the Clarendon or the Pitt Press, and this might well be granted in the case of one of the great scientific monuments of these days. J. MCK. CATTELL.

Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Abhandlung des Communismus u. des Socialismus als empirischer Culturformen. Von FERDINAND TÖNNIES. Leipzig: Fues's Verlag (R. Reisland). Pp. XXX., 294.

This book is in its first intention a study in economics. But since the bourgeois economy of modern times must, in order to be fully understood, be presented in its connexion with and contrast to earlier historic forms of man's life amongst his fellows, the writer necessarily passes beyond purely politicoeconomic investigation to an analysis of the general social problem. He finds his clue to the solution of this in the psycho

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