citing, for example, more than once his position that the purpose of the university is "to keep alive philosophy". While holding that the basis of modern education ought to be scientific, he contends that, even in the most elementary teaching of science, what ought to be especially kept in view is the conception of the universe towards which the special sciences contribute and the ethical and social consequences of this conception, not the mere application of science to industry. In higher education, philosophy is that to which everything else ought to point. "As the sciences are integrated in philosophy, so scientific instruction ought to be integrated in philosophical instruction, in order to be educative of all the intellectual faculties and of all the moral faculties of man."

Della Religione e della Filosofia Cristiana.

Studio Storico-critico di BALDASSARE LABANCA, Professore ordinario di Filosofia morale nella Università di Pisa, incaricato per la Storia del Cristianesimo nella Università di Roma. Parte Seconda: La Filosofia Cristiana.

Torino: E. Loescher, 1888. Pp. xv., 691.

The appearance of the first part of this work, on Primitive Christianity, was chronicled in MIND xi. 588. The second part, which completes the work, may best be described as a history of the relations between theology and philosophy during the patristic and scholastic periods. To this the former volume, giving a view of the origins of Christian theology itself and of its relation to ancient thought, is introductory ; while the last chapter of the present volume (ch. xi., pp. 557-669), on "Christian Philosophy and Modern Philosophy," serves as an epilogue to the whole. The work throughout is written in an impartial spirit and with full knowledge of the literature of the subject. The author's contention is that the relation between articles of faith and the reasoning upon them that constituted Christian philosophy was essentially unstable. The Schoolmen, like the philosophic Fathers, were in reality "implicit mystics," accepting their creed by faith, although they threw it into a philosophical form. Thus on one side philosophy tended, by its intrinsic movement, to break with ecclesiastical tradition and constitute itself independently; while on the other side the Christian philosophers were exposed to the attacks of the "explicit mystics," who did not wish to reason about their faith at all. These last were able to bring philosophical scepticism into their service; and under the combined attacks of mysticism and scepticism the Scholastic philosophy decomposed. The intellectual revolt of the Renaissance was at first indifferent to the positive doctrines of Christianity, but hostile to the traditional philosophy. Afterwards, in the 17th and 18th centuries, when the authority of the Schoolmen had been effectually broken down, the Christian creed was openly attacked and Scholasticism in its turn treated with indifference. Last of all, the attitude of modern thought towards Christianity, both in its theological and in its philosophical expression, has become historical instead of polemical. It is as a contribution to historical criticism that the author has written both this and his former volume. Italian philosophy, he holds, has now special need of historical studies of religion undertaken in the spirit of German research. And in entering upon this line of study, so characteristic of the present century, Italy will be taking up again the direction of modern philosophy that was initiated by Vico. It is instructive to compare with Prof. Labanca's positions those of Dr. Werner, the Catholic historian of the Italian philosophy of the 19th century (see MIND xi. 447).

Die Einheit des Geisteslebens in Bewusstsein und That der Menschheit. Untersuchungen von RUDOLF EUCKEN, Professor in Jena. Leipzig: Veit & Co., 1888. Pp. xii., 499.

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The author here follows up his Prolegomena zu Forschungen über die Einheit des Geisteslebens in Bewusstsein und That der Menschheit (see MIND X. 477) by the constructive work then promised. Every philosophical construction, in his view, must be the expression of tendencies that are active in the life of the age, and must be not simply a system of thought, but also a doctrine applicable to practice. Thought is at present mainly critical, and there is no definitive system. There are, however, two strong currents of positive thought, each of which finds its expression in a certain philosophical "syntagma," as it may be called (since, though less than a system," it is more than a 'direction"), having the character of a theory of life as well as of a speculative synthesis, and of a theory to which a great part of practical life really conforms. The two great modern doctrines of "Naturalism" and "Intellectualism," which correspond to this description, are portrayed by the author in the first part of his book (pp. 1-136) in a very striking manner. He understands by Naturalism the doctrine which, starting at the beginning of modern times as an attempt to explain the world entirely by immanent causes, passes into the "mechanical philosophy" of the 17th and 18th centuries, and ends with the reduction of man to a link in a universal mechanism, consciousness being now regarded as wholly outside the series of real causes and effects. By Intellectualism he means the doctrine which starting from the opposite side, that is, from the side of mind as opposed to nature, but viewing mind exclusively as intellect, ends in the reduction of man to a link in the logical process of a universal Reason. completed form of Intellectualism is represented by the Noetism" of Hegel. These two doctrines, the author finds, have, in their completed forms, in spite of all differences, a marked resemblance. Equally they tend to the suppression of personality as a criterion of worth; for with both the supreme principle of explanation is the "thing," the impersonal "process," "Nature"-conceived in the one case as a mechanical, in the other case as a logical, system. Notwithstanding their resemblances, however, they cannot coalesce; for they are divergent in their applications to details. Nor is that characteristic tendency of modern civilisation which gives them their power entirely unopposed. Along with the increasing tendency to ascribe worth to an impersonal process or to external things rather than to subjective states of feeling, there is a growing sense of the value of personality. To the characteristic tendencies of modern civilisation are opposed at once Christianity and classical culture. Now, although it is impossible to restore the past in the form it actually had, its continued activity under change of form is still to be counted with. Neither suppression of any of the opposing tendencies, nor a compromise destroying their individual characteristics, is to be looked for. The only hope of reconciliation is in a deeper criticism. If it can be shown that Naturalism and Intellectualism dissolve under criticism from their own points of view, and that modern life as well as the past gives a basis for a "doctrine of Personality," then this new doctrine, provided it can take up the valuable elements in each of the others, may claim to supersede both. The aim of part ii. (pp. 137-340) is to show how each modern "syntagma" requires, for its own working-out, elements which its ostensible principles do not admit. Naturalism, it is found, can never succeed in its effort to dispense with all spontaneous activity of the spirit. The system of the natural sciences, for example, which it regards as the highest type of know

ledge-so much so that it would make modern philosophy the handmaid of special science, as mediæval philosophy was the handmaid of theology -is inexplicable except as a product of the activity of thought. Intellectualism, on the other hand, can never succeed in completely spiritualising everything. The external obstacles to the movement of the spirit are real. Man, after all, remains in part a link in a natural process. The contradictions of things are not to be got rid of by dialectics. The criticism, however, which makes manifest the incompleteness alike of Naturalism and Intellectualism, supplies their relative justification. Each is justified in what it affirms against the other. In the doctrine of Personality, which reconciles and completes both, unity is sought not in a one-sided reference of everything to external nature or to the purely intellectual part of the mind, but in an investigation of man's spiritual life as a whole. This positive doctrine is developed in part iii. (pp. 341-499). The personality of man, it is concluded, must have its ground in a "universal Self," and the universal or "cosmical" Self must be conceived as acting "transcendentally"; the history of mankind being inexplicable either as a purely "natural" process or as an immanent process of a cosmical Reason". In human action, the social and historical process manifested in civilisation is to be taken up into the personality so as to become the object of its interests, not the personality absorbed in the process. The principle of human activity, therefore, is teleological," and not merely "causal"; but the ethical end is not an end for the natural or empirical "individual," but for the "person" regarded as a member of a world of personalities.

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Abriss der Philosophischen Grund-Wissenschaften.

Von Dr. GUSTAV GLOGAU,

ordentl. Professor der Philosophie a. d. Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel. Zweiter Band: "Das Wesen und die Grundformen des bewussten Geistes (Erkenntnisstheorie und Ideenlehre)". Breslau: W. Koebner, 1888. Pp. xii., 477.

The first volume of this work appeared eight years since, and was briefly noticed in MIND V. 588. In the meantime the author has published his Grundriss der Psychologie (1884), which was reviewed in MIND X. 451. He now continues his larger philosophical undertaking by this second volume, the scope of which was indicated in the general survey given by him on the publication of the first. The work is to be completed by a third volume; and the reader is asked to reserve judgment on the last section of the present instalment till the completion of the whole work. In these circumstances it may suffice for the present to mention that the author describes his general position as that of “Specu lative (as opposed to "sceptical” or “ positivist") Criticism," and that he recognises three different "ways of knowledge," viz., "The historical construction of Phenomenology, the logical of 'Ideenlehre,' and the speculative of Religionsphilosophie'." The second volume, like the first, is divided between "Erkenntnisstheorie" and "Ideenlehre" properly so-called. The more special titles of its two parts are:-"The nature of the Conscious Spirit (pp. 15-150), The ground-forms of the Conscious Spirit" (pp. 151-477). The second part (pt. iv. of the whole work) is divided into three sections :-"Ethik" (pp. 153-306), “Esthetik" (pp. 307-426), "Noetik" (pp. 427-477).

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Die Philosophie Arthur Schopenhauers. Von Dr. R. KOEBER. Heidelberg: G. Weiss, 1888. Pp. vii., 319.

This "compendium," dedicated "to the memory of Arthur Schopenhauer, whose hundredth birthday the cultivated world celebrates this

year," is a very clear and good exposition. The author has not intended to add anything of his own, but to let Schopenhauer speak for himself. Prefixed to the exposition is a brief sketch of the philosopher's life (pp. 1-3). The rest of the book is divided as follows:-Part i. ~ Propedeutic. -Theory of Knowledge (pp. 4-163). (1) On Philosophy in general and its relation to Religion, to the Empirical Sciences, to History, Art and Mathematics. (2) History of Philosophy.-Historical derivation of the doctrine of Schopenhauer.-Schopenhauer's Place in History. (3) Theory of Knowledge. Part ii. Metaphysics (pp. 164-319). (1) Metaphysics of Nature, or Nature-Philosophy. (2) Esthetics. (3) Ethics.

Die Willenshandlung. Ein Beitrag zur Physiologischen Psychologie. Von HUGO MUENSTERBERG, Dr. phil. et med., Privatdocent der Philosophie an der Universität Freiburg. Freiburg i. B.: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1888. Pp. v., 163.

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"The question, how my will moves my arm,' is the problem of our investigation, and only this question, no other." This problem of "psychophysics" it is the author's aim to detach from all questions of ethics, metaphysics and theory of knowledge. He divides his investigation into three sections, the first dealing with "The act of will as a process of motion" (pp. 7-55), the second with "The act of will as a phenomenon of consciousness (pp. 56-99), and the third with "The act of will as conscious motion (pp. 100-163). The result of the first section is that when the act of will is considered simply as a process of motion of a 66 sensuous-motor apparatus," it can be explained, even in its highest forms, as a process that is preserved by natural selection on account of its utility to the organism. The result of the second section is that, from the psychological point of view, what is called the will is simply a complex of feelings Psychology is unable, on its own ground, to give a complete explanation of this complex. Since in the present investigation metaphysical hypotheses are not to be recurred to, the explanation must be sought in a psychophysical formula. To find such a formula is the object of the third section. The difficulty is found to be in explaining the connexion of the two series, the series of motions and the series of feelings. After examining and rejecting some historical doctrines, the author finds that the only hypothesis that remains is that the series of feelings is conditioned by the mechanical series; for this is complete in itself, while no psychical causal series is empirically given. The two series may, perhaps, be identical in the metaphysical, but they are not identical in the psychophysical sense. Various doctrines of the localisation of feeling are discussed. theory at which the author arrives is that consciousness is attached exclusively to sensory centres, and that perception and memory have the same material substratum. Sensory excitations together with associated excitations in the cerebral centres set going the motions of the limbs without any intermediation of motor centres. As there are no specific motor centres, so there is no specific psychical'will' that mediates between the conscious process and the motion. An act of will is simply a complex of feelings due to sensory excitations and stored-up traces of past excitations, followed by a motion of the limbs.

The

Die Impersonalien. Eine logische Untersuchung von Dr. CHRISTOPH SIGWART, o. ö. Professor der Philosophie in Tübingen. Freiburg i. B.: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1888. Pp. 78.

This is an elaborate discussion, principally from the logical point of

view, of all the chief forms of "impersonal expressions". These are arranged in ten classes, according to the complexity of their psychological basis, the first class containing those that express "a simple, momentary, outwardly-related affection of sense" (There is a sound, &c.), the last those that express the idea of an end as related to a parti cular situation (There is need,' &c.). The logical treatment of the subject is founded on the distinction drawn between judgments of naming (Benennungsurtheile) in which there is merely a synthesis of a perception with the representation resembling it, and judgments in which a thing is united with its action or property. Genuinely impersonal propositions are found to be without any reference to a thing as the subject of the judgment (pp. 42-3). "The logical kernel of the proposition is thus a judgment of naming" (p. 77). In the word 'Tonat, for example, what is really thought, the judgment that is passed, is nothing but the naming of what has been heard (p. 30). Since what is named is an individual and actually present phenomenon, the impersonal Benennungsurtheil has something in common with the "existential judgment," or "proposition of mere existence," which always refers to a concrete phenomenon and is never a general assertion about a class; but the process of thought that characterises the "judgment of naming" is reversed in the "existential judgment". In the former, the single object is given and the already known representation is thought of as agreeing with it. In the latter, the internal representation comes first; it is asked whether any single perceptible thing corresponds to it; and if such a thing offers itself, then we say, 'There is A,' 'A exists' (p. 53). The difference is that what is given in the existential judgment is not a phenomenon nameable in verbal or adjectival form, that can be detached from the thought of a thing to which it belongs, but has already the character of a Dingvorstellung (pp. 66-7). This particular case of the comparison of the "impersonal judgment" in its purest form with the "existential judgment" has been selected for its special interest, and also because it would be impossible in brief space to give any account of the variety of "impersonals" analysed. A compact summary of the principal results of the analysis is given in six propositions, on pp. 75-7. [See Mr. Venn's remarks above, p. 413.]

Zur Lösung der Platonischen Frage. Von Dr. EDMUND PFLEIDErer, Professor der Philosophie in Tübingen. Freiburg i. B.: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1888. Pp. 116.

Like the author's Heraclitus (see MIND xii. 305) this Platonic study is intended as a work of philosophical reconstruction, and of textual criticism only in subordination to this. The method adopted by him in both works is explained and defended; and some incidental replies are made to criticisms on the Heraclitus. No final conclusion as to the chronological order of the Platonic dialogues, he holds, can now be arrived at either on purely textual grounds or from external considerations. The clue to the sequence of the dialogues must be some intelligible order of thought that finds expression in them; and this can be detected only by philosophical, not by purely philological, criticism. Dr. Pfleiderer does not agree with those who find in the dialogues the development of a single consistent scheme of doctrine complete from the first. He finds the causes of the modification of Plato's thought, however, not in external impulses received in the course of his different journeys, but in an intrinsic process of development. In order to discover this process, he first examines critically the Republic, which he finds to consist of "disparate parts," the expression of the different