phases of Plato's thought. The first phase is that of the "realistic substantially Socratic" period, in which the thoughts of the philosopher were turned to projects of political reform. The second phase is that of disgust with practical life, of desire to escape into a supersensual world. For the majority of critics this has served to characterise Plato's thought as a whole; since it was in this stage that the "ideal theory "had its origin. The third phase is that of partial return to the real world. In this last phase, "the Socratic reawakens," and the two first phases find their reconciliation. Having distinguished the books of the Republic as belonging to the first or second period or to the transition between them (phases A, A-B, B), the author proceeds to trace the development of Plato's thought, manifest in his chief work, through the series of the remaining works. In the first period he places the Lesser Hippias, Laches, Charmides, Lysis, Euthyphro, Protagoras; at the end of the first period and after "Republic phase A," the Apology and the Crito at the beginning of the second period the Gorgias and the Meno, afterwards Phædrus, Cratylus Republic phase A--B," Theaetetus Sophistes, Euthydemus, Politicus, Parmenides; at the end of the period Republic phase B" with Phado. The "positive introduction to the third period" is the Symposium, the whole purpose of which, as the definite transition to a new phase of thought, is summed up in the theory of the union of the tragic and the comic drama; to the third period belong the Philebus, the Timæus and the Leges. The final "redaction" of the Republic also may be placed in this period of "Platonic compromise ". 66 66 Geschichte u. System der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung. Von Dr. HEINRICH V. EICKEN, Staatsarchivar in Aurich. Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta, 1887. Pp. xvi., 822. The admirable section on medieval "Science" (pp. 589-671) in this work by no means exhausts its philosophical importance. It is an attempt, more carefully considered and comprehensively wrought out than any before it, to understand and reconcile the two antithetic aspects of the ecclesiastical system of the Middle Ages--on the one hand, ascetic aversion from the world, and on the other, the straining for world-dominion. Here it must suffice to indicate that the exposition falls into four parts-i. "The Christian doctrine of Redemption and its historical antecedents" (in the Roman, Greek and Jewish schemes of life); ii. "The Middle Age and the Christian Theocracy" (as this latter becomes established on the victory of the Papacy); iii. "The System of the Christian Theocracy"; iv. "The Break-up of the System". It is in part iii., after a striking estimate of the influence of Greek thought in part i., that the author chiefly displays his philosophical ability, as he deals successively with State, Family, Economic Conditions, Law, Science, Poetry, Plastic Art, within the theocratic system. Under "Science" a remarkably instructive view, within brief compass, is given of the manner, and also of the sense, in which Aristotelianism came to be accepted as the philosophy of the Church; but even more interesting, because springing from more independent and original research, are the succeeding sections on the medieval conceptions of Nature and of History. The book, all through so full of matter vigorously grasped, is also well and effectively written. But how could so able and earnest a scholar think of leaving a work of that magnitude and importance with but two pages of general Contents' and not a word of Index to the endless variety of the details? RECEIVED also: A. Bain, English Composition and Rhetoric, Pt. ii.: "Emotional Qualities of Style," Lond., Longmans, pp. xvi., 325. C. E. Plumptre, Natural Causation, Lond., T. F. Unwin, pp. 198. 255. W. L. Courtney, Studies New and Old, Lond., Chapman & Hall, pp. R. Potter, The Relation of Ethics to Religion, Lond., Macmillan, pp. x., 85. E. Swedenborg, The Soul or Rational Psychology, New York, New Church Board of Publication, xxvi., 388. C. Morris, The Aryan Race, Chicago, S. C. Griggs & Co., pp. vi., 347. A. Naville, De la Classification des Sciences, Genève-Bale, H. Georg, pp. 46. Mme. Jules Favre (née Velten), La Morale de Socrate, Paris, F. Alcan, pp. vi., 428. E. Beaussire, Les Principes du Droit, Paris, F. Alcan, pp. vi., 427. J. Delboeuf, L'Hypnotisme et la Liberté des Représentations publiques, Liège, T. Weber, Metaphysik, Bd. i., Gotha, F. A. Perthes, pp. viii., 427. O. Veeck, Die religionsphilosophischen Grundanschauungen Trendelenburgs, Gotha, E. Behrend, pp. 93. O. Seiffert, Beiträge zu den Theorien des Syllogismus und der Induktion, Breslau, Bremer & Minuth, pp. 49. F. Erhardt, Kritik des Kantischen Antinomienlehre, Leipzig, Fues (R. Reisland), pp. 83. R. Avenarius, Kritik der reinen Erfahrung, Bd. i., Leipzig, Fues (R. Reisland), pp. xxii., 217. M. Dessoir, Bibliographie des Modernen Hypnotismus, Berlin, C. Duncker (C. Heymons), pp. 94. 480. L. Haller, Alles in Allen, Berlin, C. Duncker (C. Heymons), pp. xv., E. Fechtner, Die praktische Philosophie u. ihre Bedeutung für die Rechtsstudien, Wien, A. Hölder, pp. 87. K. Bruchmann, Psychologische Studien zur Sprachgeschichte, Leipzig, W. Friedrich, pp. x., 358. H. Steinthal, Der Ursprung der Sprache, 4te Aufl., Berlin, F. Dümmler, pp. xx., 380. W. Lutoslawski, Erhaltung u. Untergang der Staatsverfassungen nach Plato, Aristoteles, &c., Breslau, W. Koebner, pp. viii., 140. NOTICE will follow. IX.-NOTES. PROF. LADD ON BODY AND MIND. Prof. Ladd, in MIND No. 50, p. 311, challenges any critic to point out confusions in his treatment of the relations between body and mind. I think I can show that his theory, as set out in Elements of Physiological Psychology, is not so clear and consistent as he seems to suppose it. (1) In refuting materialism Prof. Ladd has implicitly refuted his own views. He says, p. 589: "All physical events are modes of motion. . . . This is as true of the human brain as it is of the clod of the valley. Its atoms cannot be conceived of as doing anything, so long as they remain material atoms, that does not essentially consist in changing their relations in space to other material atoms." He then proceeds to show that this view of neural phenomena makes it impossible to regard mental phenomena as their product. Now it seems to me that this view of neural phenomena tells equally against his own theory of the interaction of soul and body. If the material atom as such does nothing but change its spatial relations, how can it act on something which is not in space at all? If, on the other hand, the material atom does more than change its spatial relations, it so far ceases to be material in Prof. Ladd's sense. That which is extended and movable is on this view something more than extended and movable, and it is impossible to say how much more. Why should it not be conscious, or in some way have consciousness as its product? Prof. Ladd may say that the production of consciousness by the interaction of material particles is mysterious and unimaginable. But on his own showing the interaction of material body with immaterial mind is equally mysterious and unimaginable. (2) Prof. Ladd finds it impossible to suppose interchange of energy between brain and mind, because states of consciousness are not modes of motion. If there were such interchange, there would, according to him, be " some formula conceivable for indicating what amount of chemical change or nerve-commotion in the matter of the brain is the mathematical equivalent of the conception of home, of the sense of obligation, or of the idea of God" (p. 653). This he regards as a reductio ad absurdum. Now, if Prof. Ladd rejects, on the ground of its intrinsic absurdity, the hypothesis of an interchange of energy between mind and brain, he is logically bound to suggest some mode of interaction, which is not in like manner absurd. I have carefully looked for passages in his book likely to throw light on this question. The following seem most to the purpose: "Energy is stored by the processes of nutrition in the nervous elements of the brain: it becomes kinetic in connexion with the phenomena of consciousness" (p. 653). "The mind has not power to constitute in opposition to fixed chemical affinities a single molecule, or to excite the slightest movement of a single muscle, without involving the nervous system in the expenditure of the required energy. Moreover, this energy must be started in the appropriate cortical areas and descend along the allotted motor tracks" (p. 664). I infer from these statements that Prof. Ladd supposes the mind to determine transfer of energy in this or that direction without increasing or diminishing its amount. Now this is equivalent to saying that it acts like a condition of mechanical constraint. According to this hypothesis, the mind determines the motions of nerve-molecules, much as an inclined plane may determine the direction in which a ball shall roll without decreasing or increasing the energy expended in moving it. But Prof. Ladd will admit that a state of consciousness is as little to be compared to an inclined plane, or anything of the sort, as it is to be compared to a mode of motion. It is as difficult to conceive the soul acting as a condition of mechanical constraint as it is to conceive it receiving energy from the material system and returning it again. If Prof. Ladd rejects the one view because it is inconceivable, he ought on the same ground to reject the other. If he has some alternative hypothesis to propose, I should be glad to know what it is. (3) Prof. Ladd argues from the unity of consciousness to the existence of a real unitary being as the subject of consciousness. Now this argument has been submitted by Kant, in the K. d. r. V., to a most searching examination, resulting in its complete rejection. I hold it to be a very serious ground for complaint against Prof. Ladd that he has nowhere in his book taken account of the Kantian criticism. There is no need to repeat Kant's objections here, because they have been stated again and again as clearly as they can be stated. Should Prof. Ladd offer any reply to them, I may have something to say on the subject. To ignore them as he has done is like coming over the wall instead of through the gate. G. F. STOUT. ARISTOTLE IN JEWISH PHILOSOPHY. Aristotle's influence over the Jewish mind culminated in Maimonides. It was not to be expected that the authority of the pagan philosopher would be accepted without a systematic effort to prove that Aristotelianism was compatible with Judaism. To demonstrate this was the task of Maimonides. But other Jewish authors were not content with merely showing that Jewish thought was consistent with Greek philosophy. To them, Greek philosophy was taken from Judaism, and Aristotle was a Jew. I do not mean to enter on the very difficult question as to how far early Greek philosophy may have really been modified by Oriental influences. I should only like to indicate as a sort of curiosity some of the amusing statements on the subject which may be found scattered in Hebrew books. Maimonides asserts:1 "Know that many branches of science relating to the correct solution of these problems (i.e., Physics and Metaphysics) were once cultivated by our forefathers, but were in course of time neglected, especially in consequence of the tyranny which barbarous nations exercised over us". Jehuda Halevi (1140) excuses the errors of philosophy on the ground that philosophers had not inherited divine wisdom: 2 "They were Greeks, descendants of Japhet, who dwelt in the North, while wisdom was an heirloom from Adam given to the seed of Shem. Wisdom never departed and never will depart from that seed. Wisdom did not reach the Greeks until they became mighty, when it was introduced from the Persians, the latter having obtained it from the Chaldeans. Hence there arose famous philosophers among the Greeks neither before nor after that time. And, from the time when Greece fell before Rome, not a single eminent Grecian philosopher has arisen, even to our own day." Halevi seems to have forgotten Thales, Anaxagoras, Socrates and Plato in this argument, but he possibly means to imply that Greek philosophy derived its ideas from Persia even before the Greek victories. 1 Guide of the Perplexed, ed. Friedländer, i. 71; ii. 11. 2 Kusari, i. 63, ii. 66; cp. Cassel's ed., p. 172, and Graetz, Monatsschrift, 1860. 4 We must now go a step further. Josephus1 has a lengthy statement, which, among other items of information, describes Pythagoras as indebted to the Jews for many of his philosophical conclusions. Clearcos makes Aristotle admit that he conversed with a Jew, and, in a trial of skill in philosophy which ensued, the Jew "communicated more to me (Aristotle) than he received in return". This passage in Josephus and a similar one in Eusebius were undoubtedly the sources of the marvellous fables invented by Jews later on. If Eusebius could gravely quote the opinion that Plato was only Moses talking Attic," little wonder that Jews should become enamoured of similar notions. The theory that the Greeks borrowed their philosophy from the Jews was also current among the Arabians.3 In the Arabic Letter of the Animals, translated into Hebrew by Kalonymus ben Kalonymus, the Greek boasts that his nation embodied science and philosophy, whereupon the reply is given: "Whence would you have got your philosophy and knowledge, of which you brag so much, if not from the Israelites in the time of Ptolemy, and from the Egyptians in the time of Themistus? You then carried them to your own land and claimed them as original." This reminds us of another author, who naïvely writes: "When Alexander went to Jerusalem, he appointed Aristotle as custodian of the books of Solomon. Aristotle thence derived his philosophy, for he translated Solomon's books into Greek and called them by his own name." Bibago (1521) quotes similar stories, giving a circumstantial account of a man of the tribe of Benjamin who acted as Aristotle's tutor. "A Greek philosopher (evidently Aristotle) once said: I spoke to a Jewish sage about Nature, and what he said did not seem much to me; we then spoke of philosophy (science of God), and he carried me so far that I could not follow him until I prayed to God for power to understand." Simon' the Just is quoted as the man who enjoyed the honour of converting Aristotle to Judaism. The pretended letter of Aristotle announcing to Alexander the change in his opinions is so exceedingly funny, that I venture to translate portions of it. "Thanks be to God who openeth the eyes of the blind and guideth sinners in the way; glorified be He with fitting praises, for He has dealt kindly with me, and has redeemed me from the utter folly in which I was all my life when I concerned myself with philosophy, judged everything by intellect, and composed many books. At the close of my days I have made the acquaintance of a Jewish sage, who has proved to me the truth of the Mosaic Law by signs and proofs, by means of the names of God. . . . Therefore, my dear pupil Alexander, let not my books lead thee or thy companions astray. If it lay in my power, I would collect all my writings and destroy them, for I know that I shall be punished by God for sinning and making others sin. . . . No one should read my books nor study them. Inquiry is iniquity and philosophy a lie, but I sinned unknowing. I would rather be strangled than that my books should spread. . . . I write this, knowing that before it reaches thee I shall be dead. Peace to you from Aristotle who goes to his everlasting home." Aristotle was evidently an apt student, for no sooner did he adopt Judaism than he seems to have acquired a most happy facility in writing Hebrew and in making appropriate quotations from the Bible. Other references might be given, though they are all more or less to the same effect as those already transcribed. But Joseph Ibn Caspi (1330), the commentator of Maimonides, is so important a personage in 2 Prep. Evangel., ix. 5. 1 Against Apion, i. 1, 22. 3 Archives Israelites, 1848, p. 173. + Chain of Tradition, fol. 83. |