The other (pp. 3-17) records what appears to have been his latest series of "Experiments in Hypnotism," yielding further striking results as to an "intelligent automatism" active in the post-hypnotic state, which the previous series had first disclosed, and as to production of anesthesia by proximity of the operator's hand, which had been observed a good deal earlier. Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought. By JOSEPH LE CONTE, Professor of Geology and Natural History in the University of California. London: Chapman & Hall, 1888. Pp. xviii., 344. 66 In the first two parts of this book (i. "What is Evolution?” ii. "Evidences of the Truth of Evolution") the author gives an exposition of the doctrine of evolution generally, with more special reference to biological evolution. In part iii. ("The Relation of Evolution to Religious Thought," pp. 257-338) he seeks to show the consistency of the evolution-theory in its widest sense with "fundamental religious beliefs". The first two parts are not only a good exposition of the theory as now held, including its latest developments, but have some distinctive points that claim the attention of biologists. In a chapter on "The Relation of Louis Agassiz to the Theory of Evolution" (pt. i., ch. ii., pp. 32-49), the author contends that "without Agassiz (or his equivalent), there would have been no Darwin"; that the great American naturalist "laid the whole foundation of evolution, solid and broad," though he "refused to build any scientific structure on it". Without the establishment of certain laws of geologic succession' formulated by the author as (a) the law of differentiation, (b) the law of progress of the whole, (c) the law of cyclical movement--no inductive proof of the Darwinian theory would have been possible, and for the knowledge of these laws "we are mainly indebted to Agassiz". These laws are, of course, no longer to be understood as merely formal laws, but as laws of the actual process of evolution. One of the distinctive points of the author's view is "that the steps of evolution are not always uniform" (p. 239). "Causes or forces are constant, but phenomena everywhere and in every department of Nature are paroxysmal." That the transitions between species are in a manner catastrophic, being brought on by rapidly changing conditions, and thus extend over much shorter periods of time than the persistence of species in fixed forms adapted to uniform conditions, serves in part to explain the rarity of transitional forms in the geological record. What seems to be the comparative fixity of forms in recent times is explained by the tendency of specialisation to arrest successively the advance along particular lines. "Thus, throughout the whole geological history of the earth, the larger number of forms, by specialisation, become rigid and perish, while the fewer, more generalised and more plastic forms take up the march and carry it forward a step, only to be themselves specialised and fixed. . . . Now, obviously, this specialisation and respecialisation can not go on for ever." The advent of man is "in many ways a sign of the completeness of organic evolution". With man, evolution has been transferred "from the organic to the social plane, from the material to the psychical," and it seems as if, "when the cycle of human evolution culminates," organic forms will no longer be modified by natural but wholly by artificial selection" (pp. 250-1). The doctrine of evolution is brought into harmony with the requirements of religious thought by the view that "the phenomena of Nature are naught else than objectified modes of divine thought, the forces of Nature naught else than different forms of one omnipresent divine ... 66 energy or will, the laws of Nature naught else than the regular modes of operation of that divine will, invariable because He is unchangeable (p. 283). In accordance with his biological theory of " paroxysmal transitions from one form of life to another, the author holds that "there is a sort of taxonomic scale of force and matter. There are(1) the plane of elements; (2) the plane of chemical compounds; (3) the plane of vegetal life; (4) the plane of animal life; and (5) the plane of rational and, as we hope, immortal life" (p. 296). "Although energy by transmutation may take all these different forms, and thus does now circulate up and down through all these planes, yet the passage from one plane upward to another is not a gradual passage by sliding scale, but at one bound. When the necessary conditions are present, a new and higher form of force at once appears, like a birth into a higher sphere." The upward movement of energy is one of increasing "individuation". 66 According to this view, the vital principle of plants and the anima of animals are but different stages of the development of spirit in the womb of Nature: in man at last it came to birth" (p. 300). Nature is all mechanics from the outside, all mind from the inside. "For science it is all mechanics, for theology it is all mind. It is the duty of philosophy to reconcile these two opposite views" (p. 317). "This reconciliation, as far as it is possible for us, is found in a personal will immanent in Nature, and determining directly all its phenomena" (p. 321). "Immanence without pantheism, and personality without anthropomorphism," is the phrase in which the author sums up this view. The Philosophy of Religion on the Basis of its History. By Dr. OTTO PFLEIDERER, Professor in the University of Berlin. Vol. iii., translated by ALLAN MENZIES, B.D. London: Williams & Norgate, 1888. Pp. viii., 356. Referring to MIND X. 285 for Critical Notice of the German original and to xi. 587, xii. 616, for mention of former parts of the English translation, we now note the appearance of the present volume giving the first half of the second main division of the work-"Genetic-speculative Philosophy of Religion ". The other half of the division, completing the work, is already in the press and will appear shortly. The translator has, with the author's permission, added a few notes on some works bearing on mythology and early religions which have appeared since the date of the last German edition. Memory, its Logical Relations and Cultivation. By F. W. EDRIDGEGREEN, M.B., B.S. (Durham); Member of the Royal College of Surgeons (Eng.); Licentiate of the Royal College of Physicians (Lond.). London: Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1888. Pp. iv., 274. The author's doctrine of memory forms part of a physiological and psychological doctrine that has much in common with phrenology, although the special assumptions of phrenologists are rejected (pp. 35-9). "The mind," in his view, "is made up of a number of faculties, each of which responds to certain impressions, and influences the mind as a whole to seek after those impressions and to avoid their negatives (p. 48). The brain is "a multiple organ," and each of its parts is the seat of a mental faculty. A classification of "the faculties of the mind," chiefly drawn from phrenology, is given on pp. 66-7. Memory, according to the theory developed, is "a definite faculty, and has its seat in the basal ganglion of the brain, separate from, but associated with, all the other faculties of the mind " (p. 3). The optic thalami and the corpora striata are "the seats of sensory and motor memory respectively" (p. 205). Arguing from cases where there has been "loss of memory of impressions received within a certain period of time unaccompanied by "loss of function of any of the faculties," the author concludes that "the theory that the memory occupies the same portion of brain as the perception is not tenable" (pp. 47-48). Part i. (pp. 1-217) contains the theory and many illustrative anecdotes. Part ii. (pp. 218-271) gives rules for the cultivation of the memory, "sensory" and "motor". Leibniz's New Essays concerning the Human Understanding. A Critical Exposition by JOHN DEWEY, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan, Professor (Elect) of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Minnesota. ("Griggs's Philosophical Classics," No. 7.) Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co., 1888. Pp. xvii., 272. No piece of work was more wanted or was better worth doing for this useful series (as to the aims and compass of which see MIND No. 51, p. 432) than that which Prof. Dewey has here executed; and, considering his subject, he has shown nothing but good judgment in treating it with a freedom of method, in respect of sidelong view, not adopted by writers of the previous volumes. It is hardly possible, or would be useless if possible, to give a simply "critical exposition" of the Nouveaux Essais by the side of the other "masterpieces of German thought" which the series covers; yet there is no other which it more, or in a way even so much, should interest the English student to understand. In explaining the famous controversial treatise, Prof. Dewey has to keep his eye at once on Locke, against whom it is directed, and on the manifold occasional (none of them systematic) expositions of Leibniz's characteristic ideas, which are all through implied but seldom expressly declared in the Nouveaux Essais. The result is that he manages to make of the volume a very welcome guide to the comprehension of Leibniz generally -welcome because affording a most useful supplement, as regards the main conceptions of his philosophy, to the account (excellent as that in many respects was) given by Dr. Theodore Merz in the volume contributed some years ago (see MIND ix. 316) to "Blackwood's Philosophical Classics". We may return to Prof. Dewey's exposition in fulfilling- it is hoped before long-a half-promise made in No. 50, p. 312, to give some detailed account of the important new material for the understanding of Leibniz's relations to Locke lately brought forward by C. J. Gerhardt. Of this material Prof. Dewey does not seem to have had the opportunity of making use. The Aryan Race, its Origin and its Achievements. By CHARLES MORRIS. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co., 1888. Pp. vi., 347. The author has very well succeeded in his purpose of giving a brief outline of the history of the Aryan race as ascertained by philologists and anthropologists. The narrative is characterised by directness of movement and grasp of the subject as a whole. His speculations about the primitive home of the Aryans and about the origin of the Aryan race have some originality. There are interesting remarks (see, for example, p. 296) on the possible influence of climate and physical surroundings in the production of racial types. The short chapter (ch. ix., pp. 215-242) on "The Age of Philosophy "deals more with the preparation in mythology for philosophical speculation than with philosophy itself; but this is in accordance with the general plan of the book. De la Classification des Sciences. Étude logique par ADRIEN NAVILLE, Professeur à l'Académie de Neuchatel. (Extrait de la Critique philosophique.) Genève-Bale: H. Georg, 1888. Pp. 46. 66 The author divides the sciences into three groups: "(1) The sciences of the real or sciences of beings. History. (2) The sciences of the necessary conditions of the possible or sciences of laws. Theorematic. (3) The sciences of the ideal or of the rules of activity. Regulative sciences." A scientific law, as established in the theorematic sciences, affirms that given such and such a term, another term necessarily follows. The effective sequence of a particular term is established when it is known by historical science that such and such a term was present in the beginning. Thus "historical laws," whether laws of physical development or of human history, are properly speaking not scientific laws but "general facts"; and their explanation depends on two factors—(1) laws of nature, (2) a certain collocation, among many possible ones, of determinate elements. By supposing a different original collocation of elements therefore, we can, without absurdity, represent to ourselves in the past a history different from real history". As the real is a part (and only a part) of the possible, so also is the ideal. Being a different part, it is the object of a separate science. "The science of the ideal is the exposition of those rules of which the practice would assure the realisation of the best that is possible." If these rules could be adequately formulated, all persons would be obliged to accept them theoretically, though the practice of them would still be free. The problem of the particular" sciences of the ideal" is to determine the best ends, and, with the aid of the historical sciences and the sciences of laws, to select those ends that are realisable and to show how they can be realised. The "sciences of the ideal" or "regulative sciences" are divided into (1) "sciences regulative of invention," and (2) "sciences regulative of knowledge". The first group includes the "theory of good ends and of their hierarchy" (morals), and the "theory of means or theory of arts". The "arts" are divided into (a) those that aim at producing an immediate satisfaction (æsthetics, theory of play), (b) those that aim at the production of utility (theories of industry, medicine, eloquence, education, politics, &c.). Logic," the science regulative of knowledge" or "of other sciences,' is also included in the classification as a science of the ideal," because "if (theoretical) science does not transform the object that it studies, it at least transforms the mind itself. Science, like art, has for aim and for result an amelioration of reality; the reality that is ameliorated is here the intelligence." 66 (La Psychologie de l'Enfant.) L'Art et la Poésie chez l'Enfant. Par BERNARD PEREZ. Paris F. Alcan, 1888. Pp. vii., 308. Some remarks in the second edition of M. Perez's L'Education Morale dès le Berceau (MIND xiii. 301) may have led his readers to hope that he would treat separately the subject of the aesthetic sense in children. This he has now done in the present volume, which, like his former works, is at the same time a study in the psychology of childhood and a practical treatise on education. The titles of its chapters are:-i. "Le goût de la parure"; ii. "Le sentiment de la nature"; iii. "Le sentiment de la nature (suite): la grâce et le sublime: les fleurs, les vallées, les montagnes, la mer"; iv. L'art de plaire: politesse, babil, coquetterie"; v. "La musique"; vi. "Le dessin"; vii. "La tendance dramatique"; viii. "La lecture"; ix. "La composition littéraire ". These titles by themselves give an idea of the varied psychological interest 66 characteristic of this as of the author's former studies of childhood. A few points of theoretical interest may first be selected for mention. M. Perez notices, as other observers have done, that children pay attention only to the salient features of landscape (pp. 78-9) and that they are not spontaneously "animists" (pp. 45-6). That which is absolutely constant in nature, he finds, does not at first become the object of their æsthetic emotions. Novelty is required to arouse æsthetic interest; and in the case of the heavenly bodies this interest is aroused by changes of position (p. 42). "Language and vocal music are in the beginning one and the same thing, the expression of less determinate feelings." It is only towards the age of four that the separation between the speaking and the singing voice is completely effected (pp. 148-9). In the reproduction of sounds, motor images and excitations play the chief part (p. 152). In the recognition of objects and in the first attempts at drawing, form and not colour is the essential thing (pp. 179, 205). A position on which M. Perez much insists is that "the most important factor of the aesthetic feeling is sympathy. . . . Human interest, that is the root and the crown of observation" (p. 59). The feelings aroused by external nature and, still more, by music, are not at first the strictly aesthetic feelings, but a vague emotional excitement. This, M. Perez thinks, has its dangers; and as a means of preventing over-excitation of the sensibilities, he suggests training of the intellectual element in the appreciation of art. To teach children music, instead of merely letting them hear it, for example, fulfils this purpose. M. Perez frequently returns to the question whether important intellectual differences between the sexes are observable in children, and is inclined to answer in the negative. His practical conclusion here is " Give the two sexes the same education, an education of liberty, of good sense and of measure, and each of them will profit by it in its own manner" (p. 135). His tendency in detail, however, is towards more minute supervision than seems altogether consistent with this precept. The condemnation of dolls and fairy tales, remarked on by Mr. Pollock in his review of the first edition of L'Education Morale dès le Berceau (MIND vi. 281) does not reappear, but the suggestion that it is desirable to moralise Punch and Judy (p. 225) betrays the same tendency to over-regulation. Less attention is devoted to the beginnings of the literary sense in children than to the beginnings of the feeling for natural beauty and for music. In the chapter on reading we miss the varied psychological observations that give so much interest to the earlier part of the book; and it is here especially that the tendency to excessive regulation is noticeable. Two sentences may be quoted in illustration. "Ainsi les lectures des enfants sont toutes contrôlées, discutées, expliquées, indirectement réglées" (p. 265). "Heureux les enfants dont les lectures sont surveillées, partagées, contrôlées! (p. 307). Yet, while he would check the unprompted reading of children, M. Perez is all for making literary education less severe. would teach historical facts, for example, by a kind of dramatic games. He also proposes a method of "forming the young writer" by setting him to write compositions on himself and his own occupations and thoughts instead of on the customary subjects for rhetorical exercises. The art of literary composition, he thinks, might thus be learnt by children" en se jouant". To all this exception may be taken on several grounds, but especially on these two. First, according to what M. Perez has said with reference to music, is not the proper way of obviating the dangers that lurk in indiscriminate reading-unfavourable, as he considers it, to "reason and abstract judgments "—to give He |