shows the same anxious care in the editor to keep up the character of the work as in every way the fullest and most serviceable History of the compendious class. The new matter incorporated adds 60 pp. to the size of the part as it stood in the sixth edition of 1883. A numerical statement of this kind, however, gives little notion of all that the editor has done for the book. While the additions are chiefly made in the fourth section devoted to the present generation, but are also considerable in the first which treats of the period of transition from the middle age, there are important changes in something more than the form of the second section. It was a serious defect of the book in English eyes that Hobbes and others were made a mere appendage to Bacon, and again Berkeley and others a mere appendage to Locke. The defect is now made good. Hobbes is set in the forefront of a new independent paragraph; Berkeley gets the like recognition, which was so clearly his due; and there is besides a special paragraph given to English Deism, before the old one given to the 18th century moralists headed by Shaftesbury. The paragraph-division remains what it was in the third section-from Kant to Beneke; but in the fourth there has been the same desire as in the second to give more distinctive prominence to philosophical movements that are—or in as far as they are-distinct. One can but admire the extraordinary industry, joined with discrimination, of the editor in his efforts to omit no bibliographical references of importance; on the philosophical journals especially he has kept his eye to excellent purpose and effect. It must be added that occasionally (as on p. 197) something is left to be desired in the accuracy with which titles of English books are printed. Der Ursprung der Sprache im Zusammenhange mit den letzten Fragen alles Wissens. Eine Darstellung, Kritik u. Fortentwicklung der vorzüglichsten Ansichten von Dr. H. STEINTHAL, &. o. Professor für Sprachwissenschaft an der Universität zu Berlin, &c. Vierte, abermals erweiterte Auflage. Berlin: F. Dümmler, 1888. Pp. xx., 380. This edition is not a little altered from the third of 1877 (see MIND ii. 276), but is hardly at all extended, as that one was so greatly beyond what went before it. The additions have reference to the recent linguistic work (from 1876), and occupy more than a hundred pages, for which room is found chiefly by curtailing the account of Geiger which made so prominent a feature of the third edition. They fall under four heads. (1) The evidence, especially that of the Schipka-jaw, for a speechless race of men in the far prehistoric past, is discussed at length (pp. 264-81). (2) Noiré's writings (from 1877) are subjected to a criticism not more trenchant than they need (pp. 281-319). (3) Wundt's views, as set out both in occasional and systematic form, are appreciatively considered (pp. 319-50). Finally (4), the position of the author and his school is declared, in relation also to other contributions to linguistic theory made within the last decade (pp. 350-80). If there is a certain discontinuity in the contents of the book, due to the manner in which it has been from time to time recomposed, there is certainly no want of freshness and vigour of treatment either in the new or in the older parts. Die praktische Philosophie und ihre Bedeutung für die Rechtsstudien. Ein Beitrag zur Reform unserer Universitäten von Dr. EDUARD FECHTNER. Wien: A. Hölder, 1888. Pp. 87. This, like Prof. Angiulli's book noticed in No. 51, p. 459, is a plea for assigning to philosophy a central position in the higher education. Dr. Fechtner, starting from Mill's saying as to the purpose of the university, quoted also by Prof. Angiulli, goes on to protest against recent projects of reform that aim at dividing up university-education more and more into specialties without any bond of union. The true bond of union, he contends, is philosophy; and now that specialising has been carried so far, there is more need of philosophy than ever. It is the interests of the faculty of law that the author has chiefly in view. After insisting (with much support from distinguished jurists) on the importance of philosophy in general and ethics in particular for the scientific study of jurisprudence, he discusses in a last section (pp. 72-87) the question of the "philosophical propedeutic" in the Austrian Gymnasia. Here he finds himself supported in some of his special contentions by Dr. Meinong (see MIND X. 624), and in his general view of the place due to philosophical propedeutic in modern German education by Dr. Paulsen (MIND X. 812). He himself proposes to add ethics to the psychology and formal logic now taught in the Gymnasia, and would find a place for it by diminishing the mass of miscellaneous information which tends too much in modern education to replace the disciplinary subjects. Die holländische Philosophie im neunzehnten Jahrhundert. Eine Studie von G. VON ANTAL. Utrecht: C. H. E. Breijer, 1888. Pp. 112. A detailed historical study of philosophy in Holland in the 19th century. The author regards Dutch philosophy as tending to an intermediate position between "the idealistic philosophy of Germany and the empiristic philosophy of England". "In the first half of the century it is idealistic, in the second empiristic, or—if the expression is preferred -positivistic." RECEIVED also: J. Rickaby, Moral Philosophy, Lond., Longmans, pp. viii., 376. C. H. Hinton, A New Era of Thought, Swan Sonnenschein, pp. xvi., 217. Scientific Romances, vii., viii., ditto, pp. 22, 17. A. J. Bell, Whence comes Man? W. Isbister, pp. 353. F. M. Müller, Lectures on the Science of Thought, Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co., pp. vi., 95, 28 (App.). E. Pellis, La Philosophie de la Mécanique, Paris, F. Alcan, pp. 185. J.-J. Gourd, Le Phénomène, ditto, pp. 447. F. Picavet, L'Histoire de la Philosophie, ce qu'elle a été, &c., ditto, pp. 48. A. Döring, Philosophische Güterlehre, Berlin, R. Gaertner, pp. xi., 438. E. Reich, Schopenhauer als Phil. der Tragödie, Wien, C. Konegen, pp. 139. E. H. Schmitt, Das Geheimniss der Hegelschen Dialektik, ditto, pp. xiv., 144. H. Siebeck, Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen, 2te Aufl., Freiburg i. B., J. C. B. Mohr (P. Siebeck), pp. viii., 279. P. Natorp, Einleitung in die Psychologie, ditto, pp. 129. A. Krause, Das nachgelassene Werk Immanuel Kant's, Frankfurt a. M. u. Lahr, M. Schauenburg, pp. xvii. 213. NOTICE Will follow. VIII-NOTES. THE PAPAL CONDEMNATION OF ROSMINI. As was announced at the end of the last No. of MIND, forty propositions of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati's have quite recently been condemned at Rome. According to the Decree, dated the 14th December, 1887,1 most of the propositions are taken from posthumous works of the author. Some of them may therefore be considered as the expression of ideas not sufficiently matured. Nothing is more unjust (as J. de Maistre says somewhere, à propos of similar publications of Bossuet's) than to judge of a man's opinions by what has been published after his death. It is well that the fact was mentioned in the Decree; though, of course, the Congregation whose task it was to review and examine the works had nothing to do with the fact of their being posthumous; nor, indeed, with anything at all except the doctrines contained therein. Of the forty propositions, only twenty-three have any philosophical interest. The first six relate to Rosmini's innate idea of Being and its relation to the Divine Substance. From Nos. viii. to xiii. we find propositions chiefly relative to the distinction of beings. Nos. xiv. to xvii. refer to creation; No. xviii. apparently denies freedom of will in God; No. xix. seems to confound the Divine Word with a sort of materia invisa'; and the rest of the propositions up to No. xxiv. relate to psychological questions. 6 Mr. Davidson, in his valuable work, Rosmini's Philosophical System, repeatedly states that the utmost care had been taken that the system should not lead to Pantheism. Rosmini "admits, indeed, that his ideal Being is an appurtenance (appartenanza) of the Absolute Being (Theosophy, i., §§ 455, &c., &c.), and that if this being were to put forth its own activity, and so complete and terminate itself, we should see God; but he adds, until this happen. . . we can only say... that in this life, certa, quamvis adhuc tenuissima forma cognitionis, attingimus Deum'. The self-manifest being, communicated to man, is not God” (Rosmini's Phil. Syst., p. 206). Notwithstanding these assurances, if we take the following six propositions as they stand in the Decree, we can easily imagine that the Roman Congregation was afraid. It may well have thought that, in the language of the Jesuit F. Liberatore (Inst. Phil., ii., p. 367), "this system gives a handle to Pantheism," ansam præbet Pantheismo: and that was enough to condemn it. A Catholic system of philosophy must be beyond suspicion. 2 "i. In ordine rerum creatarum immediate manifestatur humano intellectui aliquid divini in se ipso, hujusmodi nempe quod ad divinam naturam pertineat." How, we may ask, is this "aliquid divini" to be understood?—as a figure, or in its proper signification? "ii. Cum divinum dicimus in natura, vocabulum istud ‘divinum' non usurpamus ad significandum effectum non divinum causæ divinæ ; 1 Published at length in The Tablet newspaper, March 24th. 2 What F. Liberatore says on the subject is well worth reading. The principal objections to Rosminianism are urged with a good deal of moderation, seldom to be met with when he encounters other adversaries. neque mens est nobis loqui de divino quodam, quod tale sit per participationem." Not So there is, according to Rosmini, something really divine in nature, "in ordine rerum creatarum," immediately manifested to man. manifested as divine, for then we should see God, and Rosmini, as we have said, energetically denies that. Still it is "aliquid divini," and it is "divinum natura," and this signifies neither springing from a Divine Cause,' nor even 'partaking of the Divine nature'. What does it then signify? 66 6 iii. In natura igitur universi (id est, intelligentiis quæ in ipsa sunt) aliquid est cui convenit denominatio divini, non sensu figurato, sed proprio. Est actualitas non distincta a reliquo actualitatis divinæ.' This actuality is in the minds of men, part of their thoughts; since it appears to them as the idea of indeterminate Being, which makes up the whole tissue of mental activity. For "iv. Esse indeterminatum, quod procul dubio notum est omnibus intelligentiis, est divinum illud quod homini in natura manifestatur. "v. Esse quod homo intuetur, necesse est ut sit aliquid entis necessarii et æterni, causæ creantis, determinantis ac finientis omnium entium contingentium: atque hoc est Deus." The abstract indeterminate idea of Being is something of God; on the other hand, this same idea is part of the mind of man. Rosmini says that this is not God. But it is an appurtenance of the Divine Nature, and divine in its nature itself. And we can only say it is not God, because we do not know it as such: for in God there are no parts, and (at least objectively speaking) if something divine be identical with any human idea, then God is also identical with it. Further, it is said that this aliquid divini is the same essence in God and in the creature that possesses the idea: "vi. In esse quod præscindit a creaturis et a Deo (quod est esse indeterminatum) atque in Deo (esse non indeterminato, sed absoluto) eadem est essentia ". It is impossible to convict Rosmini of Pantheism, after what he has written against that doctrine; but when, in spite of his evident orthodoxy, his system brings him to use such expressions as these, no wonder that people should suspect the system. Next come (leaving out proposition vii., which is theological) the theses which treat of the distinction of beings, beginning with "viii. Entia finita quibus componitur mundus resultant ex duobus elementis, id est ex termino reali finito et eo esse initiali quod eidem termino tribuit formam entis". According to F. Liberatore, Rosmini "alia de idea entis prædicat, quibus videri possit idea illa constitui tanquam aliquid Deo et mundo superius, quod deinceps in utrumque convertatur". And though the univoce of Rosmini is explained by Mr. Davidson very satisfactorily in a foot-note (Ros. Phil. Syst., p. 344), it comes quite natural for us to take the "initial being" as the supreme genus, under which God and the creature come as two distinct species, contrary to what St. Thomas says in his Summa contrà Gentiles, i. 24, “Quod Deus non sit in aliquo genere". "ix. Esse, objectum intuitionis, est actus initialis omnium entium. Esse initiale est initium tam cognoscibilium quam subsistentium; est pariter initium Dei, prout a nobis concipitur, et creaturarum. "x. Esse virtuale et sine limitibus est prima ac simplicissima omnium entitatum, adeo ut quælibet alia entitas sit composita, et inter ipsius componentia semper et necessario sit esse virtuale. Est pars essentialis omnium omnino entitatum, utut cogitatione dividantur." What is here meant by "Esse virtuale et sine limitibus"? The Infinite, or the Indeterminate Being? Both are "sine limitibus". If the first is meant, we find that all finite beings have the Infinite as a component part; which would be very heterodox. If the second, then God is composite ("adeo ut quælibet alia entitas sit composita"), which is hardly superior in orthodoxy to the first meaning. Space fails for proper developments, but I cannot leave out the following propositions on the same subject: : "xii. Finita realitas non est, sed Deus facit eam esse, addendo infinitæ realitatæ limitationem. Esse initiale fit essentia omnis entis realis. Esse quod actuat naturas finitas, ipsis conjunctum, est recisum a Deo." To limit infinitude is self-contradictory. If the "esse initiale" is divine, and is my essence, then my essence ought also to be divine. How are we to understand this "recisum a Deo," if God is a being absolutely without parts? You cannot cut anything off from a mathematical point. According to Rosmini, creation consists of three operations: the first is abstraction, and the second imagination; the third is the synthesis or union of the " esse initiale" (produced by abstraction) with the "esse reale finitum" (produced by imagination). "xiv. Divina abstractione producitur esse initiale, primum finitorum entium elementum; divina vero imaginatione producitur reale finitum, seu realitates omnes quibus mundus constat. "xv. Tertia operatio Esse Absoluti mundum creantis est divina synthesis, id est, unio duorum elementorum: quæ sunt esse initiale commune omnium finitorum entium initium, atque reale finitum, seu potius diversa realia finita, termini diversi ejusdem esse initialis. Qua unione creantur entia finita." The next two propositions are of less importance; we may pass to— "xviii. Amor quo Deus se diligit etiam in creaturis, et qui est ratio qua se determinat ad creandum, moralem necessitatem constituit, quæ in ente perfectissimo semper inducit effectum: hujusmodi enim necessitas tantummodo in pluribus entibus imperfectis integram relinquit libertatem bilateralem ". Here it is pretty plainly stated that God was morally obliged to create; and that this moral obligation did not leave Him practically free. Compare what Rosmini, quoted by Mr. Davidson, says (Ros. Phil. Syst., p. 320):-" Being infinitely loves being. This love leads it to love being in all the modes in which it is lovable, in which it can be loved... This love is the creative act. It therefore creates for itself, through the expansion of life, a lovable finite object, and this is the world. In order to create this world, it must first conceive it, both because this creative principle is intelligence, and because that cannot be loved which is not known; second, it must realise it, because, if it were not real in itself, the object of love would not exist, but would merely be possible, and what is loved, seen in its possibility, is desired to exist. Hence the two elements (Theosophy, i. § 460). This passage seems to point to the same conclusion as the Latin proposition; less explicitly, however. But any assertion against the freedom of God towards His creatures was naturally regarded, to use the words of the Decree, as one of those propositions that "veritati Catholicæ haud consonæ videbantur". It is hardly necessary to mention proposition xix., which says, “Verbum (that is, the Divine Word) est materia illa invisa ex qua, ut dicitur Sap., xi. 18, creatæ fuerunt res omnes universæ ". The expression appears to illustrate the system very thoroughly; but the Church was not to be expected to let it pass. Rosmini was roughly handled by the Jesuits; but many Protestant divines would handle roughly anyone |