Mind, Том 13Oxford University Press, 1888 A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. |
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Стр. 3
... further that in moments of agony ( as happens too before unconsciousness in swooning and under anaesthetics ) it is most doubtful if Ego or non - Ego exists . Of course the phrases we must use imply what exists at our phrase - making ...
... further that in moments of agony ( as happens too before unconsciousness in swooning and under anaesthetics ) it is most doubtful if Ego or non - Ego exists . Of course the phrases we must use imply what exists at our phrase - making ...
Стр. 6
... pleasant expansion . Again in some pleasures , e.g. , of smell , it is often impossible to verify a tension . Further pleasures and pains are not wholly relative . And lastly , if expansion per se were pleasant , 6 F. H. BRADLEY :
... pleasant expansion . Again in some pleasures , e.g. , of smell , it is often impossible to verify a tension . Further pleasures and pains are not wholly relative . And lastly , if expansion per se were pleasant , 6 F. H. BRADLEY :
Стр. 8
... further that this is usual . But where the idea fails , there contraction is not noticed . It becomes bare contraction and ceases at once to give pain . And I would press this strongly against the doctrine that expansion per se can be ...
... further that this is usual . But where the idea fails , there contraction is not noticed . It becomes bare contraction and ceases at once to give pain . And I would press this strongly against the doctrine that expansion per se can be ...
Стр. 9
... Further , what represents a pain must be a pain , and so again with pleasure . It is not true that the idea of the greater pleasure or greater pain must itself be a stronger pleasure or pain ( MIND ix . 289 ) , but to think of a pain or ...
... Further , what represents a pain must be a pain , and so again with pleasure . It is not true that the idea of the greater pleasure or greater pain must itself be a stronger pleasure or pain ( MIND ix . 289 ) , but to think of a pain or ...
Стр. 10
... Further it is familiar that , in passing from one sensation to another , the first is used in idea to interpret the second , so that our stan- dard may be nothing but our last experience . Hence , judging by the difference which ...
... Further it is familiar that , in passing from one sensation to another , the first is used in idea to interpret the second , so that our stan- dard may be nothing but our last experience . Hence , judging by the difference which ...
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absolute action activity actual Alcan analysis apperception Aristotle become called causation cause ceteris paribus character combination conception conclusion connexion consciousness Descartes desire determined distinction doctrine effect element ethical existence experience explain expression external fact feeling free-will Hedonism Hegel Herbart heteronymous human idea ideal identity implies individual inference J. S. Mill judgment Kant kind knowledge Laura Bridgman Leibniz logical Martineau mathematics matter means ment mental merely metaphysical method MIND xii moral nature Neo-Kantianism Neo-Scholasticism objective thought operation origin pantheism perception phenomena philo philosophy physical pleasure and pain position positive sciences possible present principle Prof psychical psychology Pyrrho question realised reality reason recognised regard relation result Scholasticism scientific seems sensation sense social society space suppose Syllogism symbols term theory thing tion true truth unity universal volition whole words
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Стр. 122 - My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of facts ; but why this should have caused the atrophy of that part of the brain alone on which the higher tastes depend, I cannot conceive.
Стр. 141 - What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope?
Стр. 552 - THERE was a child went forth every day, And the first object he look'd upon, that object he became, And that object became part of him for the day or a certain part of the day, Or for many years or stretching cycles of years.
Стр. 15 - So far as I am aware, no attempt has been made to agitate coarse sand.
Стр. 591 - God; that is, a Divine mind and will, ruling the Universe, and holding moral relations with mankind.
Стр. 410 - The will is in every action a law to itself, only expresses the principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as an object itself as a universal law. Now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality, so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same.
Стр. 59 - Were this the fit place, some pages might be added respecting a possible future social type, differing as much from the industrial as this does from the militant — a type which, having a sustaining system more fully developed than any we know at present, will use the products of industry neither for maintaining a militant organization nor exclusively for material aggrandizement ; but will devote them to the carrying on of higher activities.
Стр. 445 - JUD^EUS ; or, The Jewish Alexandrian Philosophy in its Development and Completion. By James Drummond, LL.D., Principal of Manchester New College, Oxford. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth.
Стр. 92 - We have said (he remarks) that man can never give a sufficient account of what his unconditional good is, because he cannot know what his capabilities are till they are realised. This is the explanation of the infirmity that has always been found to attach to attempted definitions of the moral ideal. They are always open to the charge that there is employed in the definition, openly or disguisedly, the very notion which profession is made of defining.
Стр. 15 - If we substitute for the word Pleasure the equivalent phrase — a feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there...