Mind, Том 13Oxford University Press, 1888 A journal of philosophy covering epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. |
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Стр. 1
... give to points of disagreement a space out of due proportion . Those who know the subject will know both the amount of substantial agreement among psycholo- gists , and again how very little in what follows is specially mine . I must ...
... give to points of disagreement a space out of due proportion . Those who know the subject will know both the amount of substantial agreement among psycholo- gists , and again how very little in what follows is specially mine . I must ...
Стр. 8
... give pain . And I would press this strongly against the doctrine that expansion per se can be pleasant . But our view that pleasure arises from unhindered posi- tion has to meet greater difficulties . We shall be told that pleasure is ...
... give pain . And I would press this strongly against the doctrine that expansion per se can be pleasant . But our view that pleasure arises from unhindered posi- tion has to meet greater difficulties . We shall be told that pleasure is ...
Стр. 16
... give rise to conflict . Further , disap- pointment may come in , and , while weakening expectation ( proper ) , establish and aggravate the discrepancy . Hence , in all expectation may come a discord which produces pain , while , on the ...
... give rise to conflict . Further , disap- pointment may come in , and , while weakening expectation ( proper ) , establish and aggravate the discrepancy . Hence , in all expectation may come a discord which produces pain , while , on the ...
Стр. 22
... give rise to an aversion . But this will clearly not be an aspect of the original desire , but will be a new desire supervening . I may remark further that ( as was the case with desire ) the object of aversion ( as distinct from the ...
... give rise to an aversion . But this will clearly not be an aspect of the original desire , but will be a new desire supervening . I may remark further that ( as was the case with desire ) the object of aversion ( as distinct from the ...
Стр. 26
... give to the idea existence . Or take the will to recollect : here I have first an idea of the thing wanted , but not its existence ( what exists is discrepant with the content required ) ; then the result gives me psychical fact ...
... give to the idea existence . Or take the will to recollect : here I have first an idea of the thing wanted , but not its existence ( what exists is discrepant with the content required ) ; then the result gives me psychical fact ...
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absolute action activity actual Alcan analysis apperception Aristotle become called causation cause ceteris paribus character combination conception conclusion connexion consciousness Descartes desire determined distinction doctrine effect element ethical existence experience explain expression external fact feeling free-will Hedonism Hegel Herbart heteronymous human idea ideal identity implies individual inference J. S. Mill judgment Kant kind knowledge Laura Bridgman Leibniz logical Martineau mathematics matter means ment mental merely metaphysical method MIND xii moral nature Neo-Kantianism Neo-Scholasticism objective thought operation origin pantheism perception phenomena philo philosophy physical pleasure and pain position positive sciences possible present principle Prof psychical psychology Pyrrho question realised reality reason recognised regard relation result Scholasticism scientific seems sensation sense social society space suppose Syllogism symbols term theory thing tion true truth unity universal volition whole words
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Стр. 122 - My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of facts ; but why this should have caused the atrophy of that part of the brain alone on which the higher tastes depend, I cannot conceive.
Стр. 141 - What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope?
Стр. 552 - THERE was a child went forth every day, And the first object he look'd upon, that object he became, And that object became part of him for the day or a certain part of the day, Or for many years or stretching cycles of years.
Стр. 15 - So far as I am aware, no attempt has been made to agitate coarse sand.
Стр. 591 - God; that is, a Divine mind and will, ruling the Universe, and holding moral relations with mankind.
Стр. 410 - The will is in every action a law to itself, only expresses the principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as an object itself as a universal law. Now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality, so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same.
Стр. 59 - Were this the fit place, some pages might be added respecting a possible future social type, differing as much from the industrial as this does from the militant — a type which, having a sustaining system more fully developed than any we know at present, will use the products of industry neither for maintaining a militant organization nor exclusively for material aggrandizement ; but will devote them to the carrying on of higher activities.
Стр. 445 - JUD^EUS ; or, The Jewish Alexandrian Philosophy in its Development and Completion. By James Drummond, LL.D., Principal of Manchester New College, Oxford. 2 vols. 8vo, cloth.
Стр. 92 - We have said (he remarks) that man can never give a sufficient account of what his unconditional good is, because he cannot know what his capabilities are till they are realised. This is the explanation of the infirmity that has always been found to attach to attempted definitions of the moral ideal. They are always open to the charge that there is employed in the definition, openly or disguisedly, the very notion which profession is made of defining.
Стр. 15 - If we substitute for the word Pleasure the equivalent phrase — a feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there...