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ded with its ten thousand worlds, the immediate object of our perception is an idea in our own minds-an idea of the starry heavens. This the philosophers seldom endeavoured to prove; but they looked upon it as being so obvious, that they took it for granted. When they did attempt to prove it, their argument was of the following kind. The mind must be present to what it sees, hears, &c. and it cannot be supposed that it goes out of the body to every thing it sees and hears. It follows, therefore, that ideas, or images of every thing it perceives, must be presented to it, in what Mr. Locke calls its chamber of presence,' in the brain, or in the sensorium. This reasoning, unfortunately, was never canvassed, and no one thought of doubting the justness of the conclusion. Dr. Reid, alarmed at the deductions which he found drawn, by Berkeley and Hume, according to the strictest logic, from these premises, began at length to question the fashionable doctrine; and he proved, in such a manner, we think, as to set the matter for ever at rest among reasonable people, that the theory of ideas, as adopted to explain the phenomena of perception, wanted both the requisites of Newton's first regula philosophandi: it was not a vera causa,-for nobody could prove the existence of these ideas in the brain, or in the sensorium;-on the contrary, all physical experience was against their existence: nor was it a cause quæ phænomenis explicandis sufficeret; for, admit ideas, and perception is as difficult, to be accounted for as before. It is as easy to conceive how the mind perceives external things, as how it perceives their images in the brain.

The theory of ideas being thus discarded, as a mere hypothesis, unfounded on fact, and serving no purpose, Dr. Reid did not proceed to invent a new hypothesis, and thence deduce his metaphysical doctrines: he went to work more philosophically. He examined attentively the phenomena of mind, and made fact the basis of his opinions.

Of these we are now to give as brief an account as we are able.

In the gradual progress of man, from infancy to maturity, remarks Dr. R. there is a certain order in which his faculties are unfolded, and this seems to be the best order we can follow in treating of them.

The external senses appear first.' Sensation, therefore, is the first faculty to be considered.

The senses of a new born infant, it is probable, are weak and

*It is hardly necessary to mention, that we are speaking of philosophical ideas. In common language idea means nothing but notion or thought, and, in that sense, no one can doubt of the existence of ideas,

imperfect. Warmth, and the satisfaction of hunger, seem at first to be its only gratifications. In a short time, it distinguishes tastes, and contemplates light with satisfaction, and then colours; afterwards it is pleased with the sound of the human voice; but it seems to be some time before it receives any sensations from smell.

Through the senses we receive all our knowledge of an external world but it is to be remarked, that no sensation can be explained in words. No one could explain what a smell is, to a person who should want the sense of smelling; and the same may be said with regard to tastes, and sounds, and colours. Nor could the sensations attending visible figure, or tangible figure, be explained to a blind man, or a man devoid of the sense of touch that is, though a blind man knows by the touch what á circle is, or what a square is, yet he can have no notion whatever of the appearance which either of them assumes to the eye. And, on the other hand, should a man be born without the sense of touch, though he would, by his sight, know distinctly what a circle is, and what a square is, yet he would know nothing of the sensations produced by the handling of either. The sensations let into the mind through any one sense, are perfectly distinct from those let into it through any other. In fact, since a sensation is nothing but seeing, hearing, &c.; to say that a man, wanting one sense, could yet understand the sensations belonging to it, would be to say, that he could smell, or see, or hear, by some other sense than that of smelling, or seeing, or hearing. This, however, is sufficiently plain.

Of the qualities in bodies producing these sensations in us, some are what Dr. Reid calls occult, and other philosophers, secondary: i. e. qualities of which we know nothing farther than that they do, we know not in what way, produce such sensations in us. No one can define a colour, or a smell, otherwise than as a certain quality of body which produces a certain sensation in us. We can go no farther. There are other qualities of bodies, however, of which we know more; which we can define and make subjects of our reasoning. Such are solidity, extension, figure, and others. The immediate effect, indeed, of any one of these upon the sense is a sensation, which, as we have just observed of all sensations, is not to be explained to any one wanting the appropriate sense. But there is something farther. Having obtained the sensation of figure, for instance, by the eye, we acquire the notion of what it is in body; we define it, and make it an object of the understanding; so that, without possessing our original sensations, a blind man might yet enter into our definition, and make figure equally an object of his understanding. Indeed, by his own sensations of touch, he would himself arrive at a similar definition. And therefore, it has

always appeared to us, that Mr. Locke, having proposed this question, Whether a blind man, who had been accustomed to handle a cube and sphere, and was able to distinguish them accurately by touch, would, on the recovery of his sight, be able, without touching them, to distinguish them by the eye?-in deciding in the negative, answers wrong. It appears to us, we say, that he would be able to distinguish them by the eye. The blind man, arguing from his sensations of touch, has arrived at the same definitions of a straight line and a right angle, as a common man has, arguing from the sensations of sight. Thence he gets the same definition of a square, and thence the same definition of a cube. What hinders that, upon the recovery of his eyes, he should not, as well as another, get his old definitions of a straight line and a right angle, of a square and a cube, from his sensations of sight, or, which amounts to the same thing, recognise the subjects of his definitions among those sensations?

In the same manner, a blind man may have notions of all the primary qualities of bodies, the notions of which we receive by means of the sight. They will, indeed, be accompanied in his mind, with sensations different from those which accompany them in ours, with sensations of solidity, probably, or of heat and cold, instead of colour,-but still they will be essentially the same.

So far then of sensation. But sensation does not imply perception. It is probable, we might almost say it is certain, that an infant has from his sensations no notion of an external world; he has not yet learned to infer from the sign, the thing signi fied. But, in the course of time, he touches with his hand what he sees with his eyes; he removes an object from before his eyes and finds he has lost a certain sensation of sight; he brings back the object, and recovers the sensation. Hence he naturally concludes, that the sensation and the object are connected, the former as the sign, the latter as the thing signified. He has now the perception of colour and of figure; i. e. he now knows that there always exists an external cause of those sensations which he experiences. In the same way, he learns that there are external causes of his other sensations, as hearing and smelling.

But he learns, farther, in process of time, that there exist, in one and the same external object, the causes of many of his sensations. He finds that an orange, for instance, affects him with one sensation through the eye, another through the touch, a third through the smell, and a fourth through the taste. He connects these together in his mind; and it may properly be said, that he has the perception of an external object, when, on receiving from it a sensation through any one sense, be recol

lects on the instant the sensations he would receive from it through the others.

Of the perceptions thus arising from any external object, it is to be observed, that those of sight and of touch are always contradictory; sight presenting us with but two dimensions of body, touch with three. We see a thing as long and broad: we feel it as long, broad, and thick. What to touch is a sphere, is to sight a shaded circle. What to touch is a cube, is to sight an irregular plane figure. Again, every point in an object being seen in the direction of a line passing through that point and the centre of the eye, it is obvious that the figure of the whole object is seen projected upon a plane perpendicular to the central of these lines. Hence, from the principles of projection, it follows, that except the eye be in one particular position, in a line drawn from the centre of the object perpendicular to its plane, even a plane figure presents different perceptions to sight and to touch. A circle to the touch, is an ellipse to the eye; an ellipse to the touch, may be a circle to the eye.

It is with an allusion to these, as well as to some other facts, we apprehend, that philosophers have spoken of the fallacy of the senses. If a circle can be so shaded that a person, in a certain situation, shall take it for a sphere of the same colour and diameter, we should say that his sight deceived him. No, says Dr. Reid, it seems to be a very unfavourable account of the work'manship of the Supreme Being, to think that he has given us one faculty to deceive us, to wit, our senses, and another faculty, to wit, our reason, to detect the fallacy.' How then? Your sensations told you true; you saw a certain colour, and a certain shading, and herein you were not deceived; but you were wrong in the conclusion you drew from these sensations, in imagining that it was a sphere which produced them. This appears to us very little better than an ancupium verborum, especially as the account of the workmanship of the Supreme Being' remains equally unfavourable' at last; for what matters it whether we are deceived by our sensations, or by the conclusions that we necessarily draw therefrom?

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In speaking of the fallacies, real or pretended, of the senses, Dr. Reid is obliged to notice the art of ventriloquism. The deception,' says he, 'is still greater, because more uncommon, which is said to be produced by gastriloquists, that is, persons ' who have acquired the art of modifying their voice, so that it shall affect the ear of the hearers, as if it came from another person, or from the clouds, or from under the earth.

I never had the fortune to be acquainted with any of these artists, and therefore cannot say to what degree of per'fection the art may have been carried.

I apprehend it to be only such an imperfect imitation as may deceive those who are inattentive, or under a panic.'

That the ventriloquist may perform his promised deception, two things are to be done; the voice must be made to sound as coming from a certain distance, and in a certain direction. The first of these we hold to be practicable, and, in fact, often accomplished. A sound, emitted at a distance, is indeed altered. by the time that it reaches the ear; but it is still a sound as imitable, for aught that we can see, as any other. The painter, on a canvas removed only a few feet from us, can throw his objects apparently to a very considerable distance, by a proper diminution of their dimensions and degradation of the colouring, and may even deceive an unpractised eye, as a child's at a panorama. Let any one observe as diligently the effects produced by distance upon sounds, and, if he be possessed of a good ear, and of flexible and obedient organs of voice, we have no doubt that he may aspire with success to this part of a ventriloquist's praise. As to the other thing we mentioned, we confess that it does not appear to. us equally within human powers. If our perception of the direction in which any sound comes to the ear, depends upon any thing with which we are acquainted, it is upon the direction in which the pulses of the air strike upon the ear; and this is obviously out of the power of imitation.

As far as we have had opportunities of observing, facts correspond to all this. We have heard a voice from a. distance, from. an adjoining room, from under a wine-glass, imitated with skill that might produce the most perfect deception; and, on the pretended opening of the door, or lifting-up of the wineglass, the feeble and muffled voice issued out in the common, free, and natural manner. But, whenever the direction was to be ascertained, we have found the ventriloquist fail; and, on shutting our eyes, and abstracting ourselves as much as possible from the scene before us, we have never been able to distinguish between the voices that came from above, and those that came from below; those from the right hand, and those from the left; we could only perceive that the sound was as at a distance.

If it should be asked how it comes about that the auditor is deceived, it must be observed that we cannot always very accurately distinguish the direction of every day sounds. The rumbling of a cart in the street is not unfrequently mistaken for thunder in the air; and in a room to which we are unaccustomed, we cannot always discover on which side the street lies, from the sounds that rise from it. No wonder, therefore, if a person who is to have his ear deceived, finding it deceived in one instance, should fancy it deceived also in another, especially when the ventriloquist aids that fancy by turning his head upwards or down