two subjects, learning and virtue, and two predicates, better than riches, and better than power. A compound proposition may be resolved into several simple propositions.

8. Evidence. The grounds upon which we believe a proposition to be true, are called Evidence.

1. Evidence is of various kinds. The Evidence of Sense is when we frame a proposition according to the dictates of any of our senses: in this manner we judge that grass is green; that a trumpet gives a pleasant sound; that water is soft. It is by this, that we know and believe the daily occurrences of human life, the various histories of mankind, our various inward sensations and appetites, as, of hunger, thirst, pain, &c. The Evidence of Sense, under certain restrictions, is calculated to produce a high degree of conviction. The senses, if in a sound state, convey precisely the same information in all cases where the external causes of impressions are the same; the accuracy of our perceptions and the inferences from them, are all that is attended with difficulty.

2. The Evidence of Consciousness acquaints us with the operations of our own minds; and its accuracy must depend upon the degree of attention which has been paid to those operations.

3. The Evidence of Intuition. When the agreement or disagreement between two ideas is immediately discoverable by the bare inspection of the mind, the judgments thence obtained are called intuitive, from a word which denotes to look at or into. Thus, "That the whole is greater than any of its parts," is an intuitive judgment; nothing more being required to convince us of its truth, than an attention to the ideas of whole and part. Intuition, therefore, is no more than an immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas. In every branch of knowledge, there are some truths, which, when once understood, cannot be rejected; and these may be laid down as fundamental maxims. There are some truths, also, which are so evident, that no media of proof could be found clearer than themselves, and to which the mind necessarily assents; as, "A part is less than the whole."

4. Propositions which are intuitively evident, and made the foundation of other truths, are called Axioms; but the term is sometimes extended to those fundamental principles upon which a science depends, even if they require proof, or are derived from a very extensive round of experience and observation.

5. The Evidence of Experience is one of considerable importance. The degree of importance, however, to which it may be entitled, must principally depend on the closeness and accuracy of our observations on men and manners, on the passing events of life, and the operations of our own minds. Where the judgment is good, and the observation has been judicious and extensive, our own experience and that of others, are a good evidence for truths which lie within our reach. Nor, in this case, should the dictates of experience be disregarded, even when the grounds of it cannot be shown. These remarks particularly and chiefly apply to that experience which respects the maxims of prudence for the conduct of life.

6. The Evidence of Reasoning arises, when one truth is inferred or drawn from others by natural and just methods of agreement. Thus, if we see the prints of human feet on the sands of an unknown coast, we infer that the country is inhabited: if these prints appear to be fresh, and also below the level of high water, we infer that the inhabitants are at no great distance: if the prints are those of naked feet, we infer that these inhabitants are savages: if they are the prints of shoes, we infer that they are, in some degree, civilized. The inferences which are drawn from reasoning are termed conclusions. When the agreement or disagreement between two ideas is not readily perceived, we must have recourse to reasoning; and if by a series of proofs we can ascertain the truth proposed, so that conviction shall accompany every step of the argument, we are then able to prove our assertion, and the proposition is said to be demonstrable, and the train of reasoning is called a Demonstration. When we affirm, for instance, "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," whoever understands the terms used, perceives, at the first glance, the truth of what is asserted, nor can he bring himself to believe the contrary. But, if we say, "This world had a beginning," the assertion is indeed equally true, but it does not shine forth with the same degree of evidence. We find great difficulty in conceiving how the world could be created out of nothing, and are not brought to a full assent to the assertion, until, by reasoning, we arrive at a clear view of the absurdity involved in the contrary supposition. Hence, this proposition is of the kind we call demonstra

ble, as its truth, though not immediately perceived, may yet be made evident, by means of other truths more known and obvious, from which it follows as a necessary consequence. The knowledge obtained by demonstration is what we properly term science, because, in every step of argument, it carries its own evidence with it.

7. Testimony is a most important source of evidence. It is the only means by which we learn the existence of persons, facts, or things, which do not come under our own immediate observation, and of which we have no direct proof.

8. The essential conditions for the truth of testimony are, 1st, That the witnesses are competent, both with respect to character and natural abilities, have had adequate opportunities for obtaining accurate information, and thus could not possibly be deceived themselves; and, 2nd, That they have no intention to deceive others. If, therefore, we can show that the witnesses were of good character, and of competent understanding; that they could not by possibility be deceived themselves, nor have any desire or motive to deceive others, but that every motive which could operate was against their persisting in their testimony, we have every condition which is requisite for the full and firm conviction of the truth of their testimony.

Now if we apply these Rules to the testimony which supports the histories contained in the New Testament, we find that it is confirmed by each of them.

1. All the principal and most remarkable facts recorded in the New Testament, are of such a nature, that no man, who had the use of his faculties, could possibly be deceived. Healing the maimed, feeding the hungry, giving sight to the blind, raising the dead, are things of the truth of which every man would be capable of judging. These things were done openly, in the presence of hundreds and of thousands, many of whom were declared enemies, and would seek every opportunity to deny the facts, if they had not occurred.

2. That the men testifying these facts were men of veracity, will be evident from the following consideration. In all their writings, there is such an artless simplicity, that the facts are merely related and left to speak for themselves; and their tendency is so plainly favourable to virtue, and so strongly opposed to vice, that it is impossíble to imagine the writers were themselves wicked men and impostors. Nothing can be conceived more strange or incredible, than that the very first book that was ever published in the world, containing a perfect system of morality,-and the book which has, in fact, introduced more virtue among men than any other, should have been written by impostors.

3. The Testimony of the Apostles brought no worldly advantage to themselves, but, on the contrary, persecution, misery, and death.

4. The Jewish and Roman magistrates were unable to detect any contradiction, fraud, or delusion, among the thousands of witnesses whom they examined, which they certainly would have done, if real miracles had not been wrought.

5. The testimony of the first Christians is also confirmed by what is recorded concerning their numbers, their sufferings, and their constancy, by the heathen historians; especially by Tacitus, Suetonius, and Pliny.

The sum of what has been stated is this; that the evidences in favour of Christianity are so strong and satisfactory, that they must bring full and clear conviction to every unprejudiced inquiring mind.

9. Of Words. As single words frequently stand for several ideas, it sometimes happens that one man makes a word include more or fewer ideas than another does. In this case, there will be danger of mistake between them; for, though they make use of the same name, they do not mean the same object. It is proper, therefore, that in argument, or in communicating our knowledge to others, we should, at the very commencement of our subject, particularly attend to the definition of names whenever it is necessary; that is, we should clearly explain what we mean by the principal words which form the subject of our discourse, and always affix the same ideas to the words thus defined, unless we

give due notice of the alteration. There are two kinds of definition; the definition of words, and the definition of things.

10. The Definition of Words. A definition of a word is an explanation in what sense the word is used, or what idea or object we mean by it, and which may be expressed by any one or more of the properties, effects, or circumstances of that object, so as sufficiently to distinguish it from other objects.

Thus, if I were to explain what I mean by the word air, I should say, it is that thin matter, which we are continually inhaling or exhaling; or, it is that fluid body in which the birds fly a little above the earth; or, it is that which immediately encompasses the globe of earth and water. So, if I would explain what I meant by the word light, I might say, it is that medium whereby we see the colours and shapes of things; or, it is that which distinguishes the day from the night. These are called the definitions of the name.

Thus, in defining a name, it is not necessary that we should explain the essence or nature of the thing; for any manner of description that will sufficiently acquaint another person what we mean by such a word, is a sufficient definition for the name. A synonymous word, or a mere negation of the contrary, or sometimes a grammatical explication, is sufficient for this purpose; thus, I might explain a sphere, by saying it is a globe; a triangle, a figure that has three angles; an oval, that which has the shape of an egg; an asthma, a difficulty of breathing.

11. The Definition of Things. The Definition of a thing, is the explanation of its general nature, and those specific properties which distinguish it from every other thing.

12. An acquaintance with the Classification of objects is necessary in the business of defining things.

13. In comparing a large number of objects together, if I find that they all agree in some one particular, I class them together, and call the collection a Genus. On farther examination, if I observe, that though all these objects agree in some one particular, yet that they differ in others, I divide them, according to their resemblance to one another, into smaller parcels, and call these smaller parcels Species. On still farther examination, each one of these species may become a genus, because the individuals comprehended under it will admit another division. And thus we may divide and subdivide as long as there are common properties in which a few individuals or species agree.

14. When several genera are classed together, as agreeing in some common properties, they are considered as forming a Superior Genus; and of these superior genera, a still higher may be formed, and so on till we come to that which includes all subordinate genera, and is itself included by none. This is called by logicians Genus Summum. The

genus summum thus includes several subordinate or inferior genera; and each of these may include others, and so on till we come to the lowest collection of individuals.

15. That genus, which, in the scale of classification, is next above any species or genus, is called the Proximate Genus; and that species which, in the descending scale, is next below, is called the Proximate Species. Thus, if the species is Zebra, the Genus is Horse; the Proximate Genus is Hoofed Quadruped; the next higher is Quadruped; the next is Animal; and the highest, or Genus Summum, is Being. If we make Being the genus, animal will be the proximate species; if we make Animal the genus, quadruped is the proximate species; and so in all the other

cases.

16. That property or collection of properties, by which a species is distinguished from all other species under the same genus, is called the Specific Difference; and, in like manner, the properties which distinguish the genus from all other genera under the same order or superior genus, is the Generic Difference. Thus, the species Zebra is distinguished from the other species of the horse tribe, by its having stripes on its back, and this circumstance constitutes its Specific Difference. The genus Horse is distinguished from all other hoofed animals, by its being whole hoofed; this constitutes its Generic Difference.

17. The first point necessary, then, for a Definition, is to discover the general nature in which a thing more immediately agrees with other things that most resemble it, which is called the Proximate Genus. Then we are to discover the principal attribute, quality, or property, which constitutes its essence, and in which it differs from those which most resemble it, which is called its Specific Difference. Join these together, and the definition will be completed. Thus,

A Quadruped is an Animal with four feet.

A Square is a Rectangle, having all its sides equal.

A Rectangle is a Parallelogram, having all its angles right angles.

Wine is Juice pressed from the grape.

A Bird is an Animal which flies in the air.

A Definition should be precisely adequate to the term defined; the words employed should be clearer and better known than the term defined; and though no unnecessary terms should be used, yet, in definitions intended for those who are beginning any science, it is better to err on the side of diffuseness than to employ terms which are not familiar. Thus, to define a Square, a four sided figure having all its sides equal, and all its angles right angles, is much simpler than if I said, a Square is an

equilateral rectangle. Our sole object in a Definition should be, to give a distinct, clear, and forcible representation or discrimination of the thing signified.

3. Reasoning.

1. Reasoning. When we are unable to judge of the truth or falsehood of a proposition by the mere contemplation of its subject and predicate, we are constrained to use a medium, that is, to compare each of them with some third idea; that, by seeing how far they agree or disagree with this third idea, we may be able to judge how far they agree or disagree with each other. That act of the mind by which the agreement or difference between two ideas is ascertained, by the comparison of them with a third, is called Reasoning. Or, Reasoning may be stated to be, that act of the mind which proceeds from one judgment to another, founded upon the previous one.

2. Language affords the signs by which the operations of the mind are expressed and communicated. An act of apprehension, expressed in language, is called a term; an act of judgment, a proposition; an act of reasoning, an argument; and an argument stated at full length, and in its regular form, is called a syllogism.

3. The great art of reasoning consists in finding out such intermediate ideas, as, when compared with the others in the question, will furnish evident truths; because it is only by such means that we can arrive at the knowledge of what is concealed and remote. Thus, if there are two lines, A and B, and we are ignorant whether they are equal or not, we must take a third line, C, and apply it to each of them; if it agree with both of them, then we infer that A and B are equal; but if it agree with one and not with the other, then we conclude A and B are unequal; if it agree with neither of them, there can be no comparison. So, if the question be, whether "God must be worshipped," we seek a third idea; suppose the idea of a Creator, and say, our Creator must be worshipped; God is our Creator, therefore God must be worshipped. The comparison of this third idea with the two distinct parts of the question, requires two propositions, which are called the Premises: the third proposition drawn from them is the Conclusion, in which the question itself is answered, and in which the subject and predicate are joined either in the negative or the affirmative.