ages, nations, and climates. Of all our modern sceptical notions, this seemed to me one of the most dangerous. For my own satisfaction, and for the sake of those whom it is my duty to instruct, I have been at great pains to examine it; and the examination has turned out to my entire satisfaction. But the materials I have collected on this subject are far too bulky to be inserted here. The sceptical arguments are founded, not only on mistakes concerning the nature of virtue, but also on some historical facts misrepresented, and on others so equivocal, and bare of circumstances, that they really have no meaning. From the number of historical, as well as philosophical disquisitions, which I found it necessary to introduce, the inquiry concerning the universality and immutability of moral truth, which I thought to have comprised in a few pages, soon swelled into a treatise. I meant to have finished it some years ago; but have hitherto been prevented by a number of unforeseen accidents.

5. Of probable truth, a superior being may think differently from us, and yet be in the right. For every proposition is either true or false; and every probable past event has either happened, or not happened, as every probable future event will either happen or not happen. From the imperfection of our faculties, and from the narrowness of our experience, we may judge wrong, when we think that a certain event has happened, or will happen: and a being of more extensive experience, and more perfect understanding, may see that we judge wrong; for that the event in question never did happen, nor ever will. Yet it does not follow, that a man may either prudently or rationally distrust his probable notions as fallacious. That

which man, by the constitution of his nature, is determined to admit as probable, he ought to admit as probable; for, in regard to man, that is probable truth. Not to admit it probable, when at the same time he must believe it to be so, is mere obstinacy: and not to believe that probable, which all other men who have the same view of all the circumstances, believe probable, would be ascribed to caprice, or want of understanding. If one in such a case were refractory, we should naturally ask, How comes it, that you think differently from us in this matter? have you any reason to think us in a mistake? is your knowledge of the circumstances from which we infer the probability of this event, different from ours? do you know any thing about it, of which we are ignorant ? If he reply in the negative, and yet persist in contradicting our opinion, we should certainly think him an unreasonable man. Every thing, therefore, which to human creatures seems intuitively probable, is to be accounted one of the first principles of probable human knowledge. A human creature acts an irrational part when he argues against it; and if he refuse to acknowledge it probable, he cannot, without contradicting himself, acquiesce in any other human probability whatsoever.

It appears from what has been said, that there are various kinds of intuitive certainty; and that those who will not allow any truth to be self-evident, except what has all the characteristics of a geometrical axiom, are much mistaken. From the view we have given of this subject, it would be easy to reduce these intuitive certainties into classes; but this is not necessary on the present occasion. We are here treating of the nature and immutability of truth as perceived

by human faculties. Whatever intuitive proposition man, by the law of his nature, must believe as certain, or as probable, is, in regard to him, certain or probable truth; and must constitute a part of human knowledge, and remain unalterably the same, as long as the human constitution remains unaltered. And we must often repeat, that he who attempts to disprove such intuitive truth, or to make men sceptical in regard to it, acts a part as inconsistent with sound reasoning, and as effectually subversive of all human knowledge, as if he attempted to disprove truths which he knew to be agreeable to the eternal and necessary relations of things. Whether the Deity can or cannot change these truths into falsehoods, we need not seek to determine, because it is of no consequence to us to know. It becomes us better to inquire, with humility and reverence, into what he has done, than vainly, and perhaps presumptuously, into what he can do. Whatever he has been pleased to establish in the universe, is as certainly established, as if it were in itself unchangeable and from eternity; and, while he wills it to remain what he made it, is as permanent

as his own nature.

CHA P. II.

The preceding theory rejected by sceptical writers.

WE

E have seen, that mathematicians and natural philosophers do, in effect, acknowledge the distinction between common sense and reason, as above explained; admitting the dictates of the former as ultimate and unquestionable principles, and never attempting either to prove or to disprove them by reasoning. If we inquire a little into the genius of modern scepticism, we shall see, that there a very different

plan of investigation has been adopted.

This will

best appear by instances taken from that pretended philosophy. But first let us offer a few general remarks.

SECTION I.

General Observations. Rise and Progress of Modern Scepticism.

1. HE Cartesian philosophy is to be considered THE as the ground-work of modern scepticism. The source of LOCKE's reasoning against the separate existence of the secondary qualities of matter, of BERKELEY's reasoning against the existence of a material world, and of HUME's reasoning against the existence both of soul and body, may be found in the first part of the Principia of DES CARTES. Yet nothing seems to have been further from the intention of this worthy and most ingenious philosopher, than to give countenance to error, irreligion, or licentiousness. He begins with doubting; but it is with a view to arrive at conviction: his successors (some of them at least) the further they advance in their systems, become more and more sceptical; and at length the reader is told, to his infinite pleasure and emolument, that the understanding, acting alone, does intirely subvert itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition whatsoever.

The first thing a philosopher ought to do, according to DES CARTES, is to divest himself of all prejudices, and all his former opinions; to reject the evidence of sense, of intuition, and of mathematical demonstration; to suppose that there is no God, nor

See Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. p. 464.

heaven, nor earth; and that man has neither hands, nor feet, nor body ;-in a word, he is to doubt of every thing of which it is possible to doubt, and to be persuaded, that every thing is false which can possibly be conceived to be doubtful. Now there is only one point of which it is impossible to doubt, namely, That I, the person who doubts, am thinking. This proposition, therefore, I think, and this only, may be taken for granted; and nothing else whatsoever is to be believed without proof.

What is to be expected from this strange introduction? One or other of these two things must necessarily follow. This author will either believe nothing at all, or if he believe any thing, it must be upon the recommendation of false and sophistical reasoning *. But DES CARTES is no sceptic in his moral reasonings, therefore in his moral reasonings he must be a sophister. Let us see, whether we can make good this charge against him by facts.

Taking it for granted, that he thinks, he thence infers, that he exists; Ego cogito, ergo sum: I think; therefore I exist. Now there cannot be thought where there is no existence; before he take it for granted that he thinks, he must also take it for granted that he exists. This argument, therefore, proceeds on a supposition, that the thing to be proved is true; in other words, it is a sophism, a petitio principii. Even supposing it possible to conceive thinking without at the same time conceiving existence, still this is no conclusive argument, except it could be shewn, that it is more evident to a man that he thinks, than that he exists; for in every true proof a less evident proposition is inferred from one that is more evident.

* See the first part of this Essay.