tricians were all acquainted with it. Aristotle treats of self-evident principles in many parts of his works, particularly in the fourth book of his Metaphysics, and in the first book of his latter Analytics. He calls them Axioms or Dignities, Principles, and Common Sentiments; and says of them, "That they are known by their own evidence †; that except some first principles be taken for granted, there can be neither "reason nor reasoning; that it is impossible that every truth should admit of proof, otherwise proof "would extend in infinitum, which is incompatable

66

66

*

Αξιώματα, Αρχαι, κοιναι δόξαι Λέγω δε ἀποδεικτικώς, και τους κοινάς δόξας, ἐξ ὧν άπαντες δεικνυεσι· οιον, ὅτι πᾶν αναγκαιον ἢ φαναι, ἢ ἀποφάναι·. καὶ ἀδυνατον άμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι.

Metaphys. lib. 3. cap. 2.

+ Analytic. lib. 2. cap. 16.Of these first principles, a Frenck Peripatetic, who wrote about the beginning of the last century, expresses himself thus: "Ces principes portent le nom de communs, non "seulement parce qu'ils servent à plusieurs sciences, mais aussi parce que l'intelligence en est commune à tous. On les appelle aussi dig"nitez, et notions communes : à scavoir, dignitez, quasi comme dignes "entre toutes les autres qu'on y adiouste foy, à cause de la grande "excellence de leur clartè et evidence; et notions communes, pour

કે

ce qu'ils sont si connus, qu' aussi tost que la signification des ter26 mes dont ils sont composez est entenduë, sans discourir ny argumenter davantage dessus, chacun entend naturellement leur verite ; "si ce n'est quelque hebeté privé de raison; lequel je revoye 66 Aristote, qui pronounce, que ceux qui doutent, qu'il faut reverer "les Dieux, ou aymer les parents, meritent d'estre punis; et que 66 ceux qui doutent que la nege est blanche ont besoin de sons: et "à Averroes, qui dit, que ceux qui ne scauroient distinguer ce qui est connu par soy d'avec ce qui ne l'est pas, sont incapables de 66 philosopher; et que ne pouvoir con oistre ces principes, procede "de quelque defaut de nature, on de peu d'exercice, ou d'une mau"vaise accoustumance enracinée.”

Corps de toute la Philosophie de Theophraste Bouju, p. 79. † Μηδεν γαρ τιθέντες, είναι ότι το διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ὅλως λόγον.

Arision. Mciaphys. 1o. 2. cap. 6.

"with its nature *; and that if ever men attempt to prove a first principle, it is because they are igno rant of the nature of proof t."

The word Reason is used in several different senses. 1. It is used to signify that quality of human nature which distinguishes man from the inferior animals. Man is called a reasonable being, and the brutes are said to be irrational. But the faculty of reason, taking the word in a strict sense, is perhaps not more characteristical of the nature of man, than his moral faculty, or his imagination, or his power of artificial language, or his risibility. Reason, in this acceptation seems to be a general name for all the intellectual powers, as distinguished from the sensitive part of our constitution. 2. Every thing that is called truth is said to be perceived by reason: by reason, we are said to perceive, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; and we are also said to perceive, by reason, that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be. But these truths are of different kinds; and therefore the energies of understanding, to which they are referred, ought to be called by different names. 3. The power of invention is sometimes ascribed to reason. LOCKE tells us, that it is reason which discovers and arranges the several intermediate proofs in an argument; an office,

Όλως μεν γαρ άπαντον ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν είναι, τις άπειρον γαρ αν βαδίζειν ώσε μηδ' έτως είναι αποδειξιν.

Aristot. Metaphys. lib. 4. cap. 4. + Αξίασι δι ὲ τῖτο ἀποδεικνύναι τινες δὲ ἀπαιδευσίαν· ἔσι γαρ ἀπαιδευσία, di το μη γινώσκειν τινων δεν ζητειν ἀποδειξιν, € τινων κ δέ.

Ib. Ibid.

I cite these authorities, that I may not be supposed to affect either an uncommon doctrine, or uncommon modes of expression.

24

which, according to the common use of words, is to
be referred, not to reason, but to imagination. 4. Rea-
son, as implying a faculty not marked by any other
name, is used by those who are most accurate in dis-
tinguishing, to signify that power of the human mind
by which we draw inferences, or by which we are
convinced, that a relation belongs to two ideas, on
account of our having found, that these ideas bear
certain relations to other ideas.
faculty which enables us, from relations or ideas that
are known, to investigate such as are unknown; and
without which we never could proceed in the dis-

In a word, it is that

Xcovery of truth a single step beyond first principles or intuitive axioms. And it is in this last sense we are to use the word Reason in the course of this inquiry.

The term Common Sense has also several different significations. 1. Sometimes it seems to be synonymous with prudence. Thus we say, that a man has a large stock of common sense, who is quick in perceiving remote consequences, and thence instantaneously determines concerning the propriety of present conduct. 2. Common Sense, in certain instances, seemeth to be confounded with some of the powers of taste. We often meet with persons of great sagacity in most of the ordinary affairs of life, and very capable of accurate reasoning, who yet, without any bad intention, commit the most egregious blunders in regard to decorum; both saying, and doing what is offensive to their company, and inconsistent with their own character; and this we are apt to impute to a defect in common sense. But it seems rather to be owing to a defect in that kind of sensibility, or sympathy, by which we suppose ourselves in the situa

tions of others, adopt their sentiments, and in a man-
ner perceive their very thoughts; and which is indeed
the foundation of good breeding. It is by this se
cret, and sudden, and (to those who are unacquaint-
ed with it) inexplicable communication of feelings,
that a man is enabled to avoid what would appear
incongruous or offensive. They who are prompted
by inclination, or obliged by necessity, to study the
art of recommending themselves to others, acquire a
wonderful facility in perceiving and avoiding all pos-
sible ways of giving offence: which is a proof, that
this kind of sensibility may be much improved by
habit: although there are, no doubt in respect of this,
as well as of all other modifications of perception,
original and constitutional differences in the frame of
different minds. 3. Some men are distinguished by
an uncommon acuteness in discovering the characters
of others they seem to read the soul in the counte-
nance, and with a single glance to penetrate the deep-
est recesses of the heart. In their presence the hypo-
crite is detected, notwithstanding his specious outside;
the gay effrontery of the coxcomb cannot conceal his
insignificance; and the man of merit appears conspi
cuous under all the disguises of an unassuming and
ungainly modesty. This talent is sometimes called
Common Sense; but very improperly. It is far from
being common; it is even exceedingly rare: it is to be
found in men who are not remarkable for any other
mental excellence and we often see those who in a-
ther respects are judicious enough, quite destitute of
it. 4. Neither ought every common opinion to be
referred to common sense.
Modes in dress, religion,
and conversation, however absurd in themselves, may

* See Smith's Theory of moral sentiments. sect. 1.
D

suit the notions or the taste of a particular people: but none of us will say, that it is agreeable to common sense, to worship more gods than one; to believe that one and the same body may be in ten thousand different places at the same time; to like a face the better because it is painted, or to dislike a person because he does not lisp in his pronunciation. Lastly, The term Common Sense hath in modern times been used by philosophers, both French and British, to signify that power of the mind which perceives truth, or commands belief, not by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresistable impulse; derived neither from education nor from habit, but from nature; acting independently on our will, whenever its object is presented, according to an established law, and therefore not improperly called Sense; and acting in a similar manner upon all, or at least upon a great majority of mankind, and therefore properly called Common Sense. It is in this signification that the term Common Sense is used in the present inquiry.

That there is a real and essential difference between these two faculties: that common sense cannot be accounted for, by being called the perfection of reason, nor reason by being resolved into common sense, will perhaps appear from the following remarks. 1. We are conscious, from internal feeling, that the energy of understanding which perceives intuitive truth, is different from that other energy which unites a conclusion with a first principle, by a gradual chain of intermediate relations. We be

* Transubstantiation.

+ For the circumstances that characterise a Sense, see Dr Gerard's Essay on Taste, part 3. sect. 1. Note.