duct must continually bely my profession. One thing is undeniable: your words are obscure, my feeling is not this is universally attended to, acknowledged, and acted upon; those to the majority of mankind would be unintelligible, nay, perhaps they are in a great measure so, even to yourselves.

HL

CHA P. III.

Recapitulation and Inference.

HE substance of the preceding illustrations, when applied to the principal purpose of this dis course, is as followeth ;

Although it be certain, that all just reasoning does ultimately terminate in the principles of common sense; that is, in principles which must be admitted as certain, or as probable, upon their own authority, without evidence, or at least without proof; even as all mathematical reasoning does ultimately terminate in self-evident axioms: yet philosophers, especially those who have applied themselves to the investigation of the laws of human nature, have not always been careful to confine the reasoning faculty within its proper sphere, but have vainly imagined, that even the principles of common sense are subject to the cognisance of reason, and may be either confirmed or confuted by argument. They have accordingly, in many instances, carried their investigations higher than the ultimate and self-supported principles of common sense and by so doing have introduced. many errors, and much false reasoning, into the moral sciences. To remedy this, it was proposed, as a matter deserving serious attention, to ascertain the separate provinces of reason and common sense. And because, in many cases, it may be difficult to distin

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guish a principle of common sense from an acquired prejudice; and, consequently, to know at what point reasoning ought to stop, and the authority of common sense to be admitted as decisive; it was therefore judged expedient to inquire, "Whether such reasonings "as have been prosecuted beyond ultimate principles, be not marked with some peculiar characters, by which they may be distinguished from legiti "mate investigation." To illustrate this point, the doctrines of the non-existence of matter, and the neces sity of human actions, were pitched upon as examples; in which, at least in the former of which, common sense, in the opinion of all competent judges, is confessedly violated;--the natural effects produced upon the mind by the reasonings that have been urged in favour of these doctrines, were considered ;—and the consequences, resulting from the admission of such reasonings, were taken notice of, and explained. And it was found, that the reasonings that have been urged in favour of these doctrines are really marked with some peculiar characters, which, it is presumed, can belong to no legitimate argumentation whatsoever. Of these reasonings it was observed, and proved, "That the doctrines they are intended to establish "are contradictory to the general belief of all men in "all ages;-That, though enforced and supported "with singular subtlety, and though admitted by "some professed philosophers, they do not produce "that conviction which sound reasoning never fails "to produce in the intelligent mind;-and, lastly, "That really to believe, and to act from a real be"lief of such doctrines and reasonings, must be at"tended with fatal consequences to science, to vir"tue, to human society, and to all the important in"terests of mankind."

I do not suppose, that all the errors, which have arisen from not attending to the foundation of truth, and essential rules of reasoning, as here explained, are equally dangerous. Some of them, perhaps, may be innocent; to such the last of these characters cannot belong. If wholly innocent, it is of little consequence, whether we know them to be errors or not. When a new tenet is advanced in moral science, there will be a strong presumption against it, if contrary to universal opinion: for as every man may find the evidence of moral science in his own breast, it is not to be supposed, that the generality of mankind would, for any length of time, persist in an error, which their own daily experience, if attended to without prejudice, could not fail to rectify. Let, therefore, the evidence of the new tenet be carefully examined, and attended to. If it produce a full and clear conviction in the intelligent mind, and at the same time serve to explain the causes of the universality and long continuance of the old erroneous opinion, the new one ought certainly to be received as true. But if the assent produced by the new doctrine be vague, indefinite, and unsatisfying; if nature and common sense reclaim against it; if it recommend modes of thought that are inconceivable, or modes of action that are impracticable; it is not, it cannot be true, however plausible its evidences may appear.

Some will think, perhaps, that a straighter and shorter course might have brought me sooner, and with equal security, to this conclusion. I acknowledge I have taken a pretty wide circuit. This was owing in part to my love of perspicuity, which in these subjects hath not always been studied so much as it ought to have been; and partly, and chiefly, to

my desire of confuting, on this occasion, (as I wish to have done with metaphysical controversy for ever), ás many of the most pernicious tenets of modern scep ticism as could be brought within my present plan. But the reader will perceive, that I have endeavoured to conduct all my digressions in such a manner, as that they might serve for illustrations of the principal subject.

To teach men to distinguish by intuition a dictate of common sense from an acquired prejudice, is a work which nature only can accomplish. We shall ever be more or less sagacious in this respect, according as Heaven has endowed us with greater or less strength of mind, vivacity of perception, and solidity of judgment. The method here recommended is more laborious, and much less expeditious. Yet this method, if I am not greatly mistaken, may be of considerable use, to enable us to form a proper estimate of those reasonings, which, by violating common sense, tend to subvert every principle of rational belief, to sap the foundations of truth and science, and to leave the mind exposed to all the horrors of scepticism. To be puzzled by such reasonings, is neither a crime nor a dishonour; though in many cases it may be both dishonourable and criminal to suffer ourselves to be deluded by them. For is not this to prefer the equivocal voice of a vain, selfish, and ensnaring wrangler, to the clear, the benevolent, the infallible dictates of nature? Is not this to bely our sentiments, to violate our constitution, to sin against our own soul? Is not this," to forsake the fountains of living water, and to

hew out unto ourselves broken cisterns that can "hold no water?

T

PART III.

OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

HEY who consider virtue as a subject of mere curiosity, and think that the principles of morals, and properties of conic sections ought to be explained with the same degree of apathy and indifference, will find abundant matter for censure in the preceding observations. As the author is not very ambitious of the good opinion of such theorists, he will not give himself much trouble in multiplying apologies for what, to them, may have the appearance of keenness or severity in the animadversions he has hitherto made, or may hereafter make on the principles of certain noted philosophers. He considers happiness as the end and aim of our being; and he thinks philosophy valuable only so far as it may be conducive to this end.. Human happiness seemeth to him wholly unattainable, except by the means that virtue and religion provide. He is therefore persuaded, that while employed in pleading the cause of virtue, and of true science, its best auxiliary, he supports, in some measure, the character of a friend to human kind; and he would think his right to that glorious appellation extremely questionable, if the warmth of his zeal did not bear some proportion to the importance of his cause. However suspicious he may be of his ability to vindicate the rights of his fellowcreatures, he is not suspicious of his inclination. He feels, that, on such a subject, he must speak from the heart, or not speak at all.-For the genius and manner of his discourse he has no other apology to offer and by every person of spirit, candour, and