courage. It is this kind of reasoning that has proved so fatal to the abstract sciences. In it all our sceptical systems are founded; of it they consist; and by it they are supported. Till the abstract sciences be cleared of this kind of reasoning, they deserve not the name of philosophy: they may amuse a weak and turbulent mind, and render it still weaker and more turbulent; but they cannot convey any real instruction they may undermine the foundations of virtue and science; but they cannot illustrate a single truth, nor establish one principle of importance, nor improve the mind of man in any respect, whatsoever.

By some it may be thought an objection to the principles of this essay, "That they seem to recom"mend a method of confutation which is not strictly according to logic, and do actually contradict 6666 some of the established laws of that science."

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It will readily be acknowledged, that many of the maxims of the school-logic are founded in truth and nature, and have so long obtained universal approbation, that they are now become proverbial in philosophy. Many of its rules and distinctions are extremely useful, not so much for strengthening the judgment, as for enabling the disputant quickly to comprehend, and perspicuously to express, in what the force or fallacy of an argument consists. The ground work of this science, the Logic of Aristotle, if we may judge of the whole by the part now extant, is one of the most successful and most extraordinary effects of philosophic genius that ever appeared in the world. And yet, if we consider this science with regard to its design and consequences, we shall perhaps see reason to think, that a strict observance of

its laws is not always necessary to the discovery of truth.

It was originally intended as a help to discourse among a talkative and sprightly people. The constitution of Athens made public speaking of great importance, and almost a certain road to preferment or distinction. This was also in some measure the case at Rome; but the Romans were more reserved, and did not, till about the time of Cicero, think of reducing conversation or public speaking to rule.

The vivacity of the Athenians, encouraged by their democratical spirit, made them fond of disputes and declamations, which were often carried on without any view to discover truth, but merely to gratify humour, give employment to the tongue, and amuse a vacant hour. Some of the dialogues of Plato are to be considered in this light, rather as exercises in declamation, than serious disquisitions in philosophy. It is true, this is not the only merit even of such of them as seem the least considerable. If we are often dissatisfied with his doctrine; if we have little curiosity to learn the characters and manners of that age, whereof he has given so natural a representation; we must yet acknowledge, that as models for elegance and simplicity of composition, the most inconsiderable of Plato's dialogues are very useful and ingeni

ous.

His speakers often compliment each other on the beauty of their style, even when there is nothing very striking in the sentiment *. If, therefore, we would form a just estimate of Plato, we must regard him, not only as a philosopher, but also as a rhetorician; for it is evident he was ambitious to excel in both characters. But it appears, not to have been

See the Symposium Platonis opera, vol. 3. p. 198. Edit. Serran.

his opinion, that the practice of extemporary speaking and disputing, so frequent in his time had any direct tendency to promote the investigation of truth, or the acquisition of wisdom. The Lacedemonians, the most reserved and most silent people in Greece, and who made the least pretensions to a literary character, were, in his judgment, a nation not only of the wisest men, but of the greatest philosophers. Their words were few, their address not without rusticity; but the meanest of them was able, by a single expression, dexterously aimed, and seasonably introduced, to make the stranger with whom he conversed appear no wiser than a child *.

reduce every

The Athenians, accustomed to reduce thing to art, and among whom the spirit of science was more prevalent than in any other nation ancient or modern, had contrived a kind of technical logic long before the days of Aristotle. Their sophists taught it in conjunction with rhetoric and philosophy. But Aristotle brought it to perfection, and seems to have been the first who professedly disjoined it from the other arts and sciences. On his logic was founded that of the school-men. But they, like other commentators, often misunderstood the text, and often perverted it to the purpose of a favourite system. They differed from one another in their notions of Aristotle's doctrine, ranged themselves into sects and parties; and, instead of explaining the principles of their master, made it their sole business to comment

* Εἰ τὶς εθέλοι Λακεδαιμονίων τῷ φαυλότατῳ συγγενέσθαι, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ευρήσει αὐτὸν φαῦλον τινα φαινόμενον, ἔπειτα ὅπου ἂν τυχοι τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλε ῥήμα άξιον λόγου βραχὺ καὶ συνετραμμένον, ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκούτισης· ὥσε φαίνεως τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παιδος μηδὲν βελτίῳ.

Socrates in Plat. Protogora, vol. 1. p. 343.

on me morner. Now and then men of learning aTe vio endeavoured to revive the true Peripatetic

gay but their efforts, instead of proving success... served only to provoke persecution; and at engra ne scholastic system grew so corrupt, and at the same time so enormous in magnitude, that it became in insuperable incumbrance to the understanding, and contributed not a little to perpetuate the igarance and barbarism of those times. The chief aim or the aid logic. even in its purest form, (so far at least as it was a practical science), was to render men expert in arguing readily on either side of any question, But it is one thing to employ our faculties in searching after truth, and a very different thing to employ them equally in defence of truth and of error; and the same modification of intellect that fits a man for the one, will by no means qualify him for the other. Nay, if I mistake not, the talents that fit us for discovering truth are rather hurt than improved by the practice of sophistry. To argue against one's own conviction, must always have a bad effect on the heart, and render one more indifferent about the truth, and perhaps more incapable of perceiving it *.

To dispete readily on either side of any question, is admired by some as a very high accomplishment: but it is what any person of moderate abilities may easily acquire by a little practice. Perhaps moderate abaties are the most favourable to the acquisition of tais talent. Sensibility and penetration, the inseparable attendants, or rather the most essential parts of

See the story of Fertinax in the Rambler, No. 95: where the effects of babitual disputation, in perverting the judgment, and vig the heart, are illustrated with the utmost energy and ele

true genius, qualify a man for discovering truth, with little labour of investigation; and, at the same time, interest him so deeply in it, that he cannot bear to turn his view to the other side of the question. Thus he never employs himself in devising arguments; and therefore seldom arrives at any proficiency in that exercise. But the man of slow intellect and dull imagination advances step by step in his enquiries, without any keenness of sentiment, or ardour of fancy, to distract his attention; and without that instantaneous anticipation of consequences, that leads the man of genius to the conclusion, even before he has examined all the intermediate relations. Hence he naturally acquires a talent for minute observation, and for a patient examination of circumstances; at the same time that his insensibility prevents his interesting himself warmly on either side, and leaves him leisure to attend equally to his own arguments, and to those of the antagonist. This gives him eminent superiority in a dispute, and fits him, not indeed for discovering truth, but for baffling an adversary and supporting a system.

I have been told that Newton, the first time he read Euclid's Elements, perceived instantly, and almost intuitively, the truth of the several propositions, before he consulted the proof. Such vivacity and strength of judgment are extraordinary and indeed, in the case of mathematical and physical truths, we are seldom to expect this instantaneous anticipation of consequences, even from men of more than moderate talents. But in moral subjects, and in most of the matters that are debated in conversation, there is rarely any need of compáring a great number of intermediate relations: every person of sound judgment