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- the Dorian spear laid low, she
mer enemies. If the Peloponne-
th wasted every spring her corn-
ive groves with fire and sword,
th her fleets; which, if resisted,
e pre-eminent skill and bravery
bject allies revolted, but the re-
promptly quelled. The genius
d blows on her power in Thrace
dy;
but he fell in battle in the
the loss of Brasidas the Lace-
all energy and judgment. Both
the war, and in 421 a truce for
h, though ill kept, and though
arta refused to recognize it, and
y parts of Greece, protected the
vages of enemies, and enabled
is out of the proceeds of her an-
few years passed by, the havoc
ord had made in her population
Athens was full of bold and rest-
field of distant enterprise where-
es and aggrandize the state, and
partan hostility as a mere old
d wasted their territory she had
its always being in her power
or seeking to increase the trans-

ter toward which the thoughts i., sec. 144.

whelm her Pelopon in hopeless imbecili world contain the growing might of The national his great work, a disqui followed if Alexand has generally regar otism more strongly right or wrong, the rected to the consider ever age Alexander' would have furnishe as well as for those rial amalgamation of of his mind loved to d memberment of his as the dismembermen would certainly have of his power. Rome were in Sicily than time. There can be blotted out from the been attacked at the nian army, largely with triumphs over S tween her and Greec sunk into decrepitude vigor.

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The armament w

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hopeless imbecility, inviting Greek invasion; nor did th world contain the power that seemed capable of chec rowing might of Athens. if Syracuse once could be her The national historian of Rome has left us an episo reat work, a disquisition on the probable effects that wo llowed if Alexander the Great had invaded Italy. 1 as generally regarded that disquisition as proving Livy ism more strongly than his impartiality or acutenes ght or wrong, the speculations of the Roman writer cted to the consideration of a very remote possibility. T er age Alexander's life might have been prolonged, t ould have furnished full occupation for his martial a well as for those schemes of commercial grandeur ar al amalgamation of nations in which the truly great his mind loved to display themselves. With his death emberment of his empire among his generals was certa the dismemberment of Napoleon's empire among his r ould certainly have ensued if he had been cut off in th his power. Rome, also, was far weaker when the A ere in Sicily than she was a century afterward in Ale ne. There can be little doubt but that Rome would ha otted out from the independent powers of the West, en attacked at the end of the fifth century B.C. by a in army, largely aided by Spanish mercenaries, and th triumphs over Sicily and Africa, instead of the coll een her and Greece having been deferred until the la k into decrepitude, and the Roman Mars had grown

for.

The armament which the Athenians equipped again

ublic wealth eagerly lavished on well as efficiency to the expedioyage for the Sicilian shores in

at the time of the Peloponnesian democracy, tyrannizing over the and trying to gain in that island which Athens maintained along anean. In numbers and in spirit henians, but far inferior to them e. When the probability of an blicly discussed at Syracuse, and he wiser citizens to improve the and prepare for the impending war and the proposal for prepara

of the Syracusans with scornful e of their popular orators is pred many of its topics might, by a details, serve admirably for the it, which opposes the augmentahe idea of our being in any peril -nch expedition. The Syracusan lismiss with scorn the visionary g men among themselves strove and influence thrown into their t Athens knew her own interest

edition. I have almost literally tranles of the original speech.

of the moment will lieve that they woul Let us, therefore, se home manufacture. the state will know of the national hon Such assertions p counterparts find fav public. But the in landing in Sicily; a itself, instead of was in other parts of Sicil aity of their self-suffic nian yoke. But, of expedition, two only and incompetent. F skillful of the three, factious and fanatic v competent one, Lama fortunately still for h ed unrecalled and u of the Athenian arm caution and over-ca early part of the op Athenians nearly w of the Syracusans, c mentioned, almost e bay over Epipolæ, t been followed by a Alcibiades, the m

C

ieve that they would even be able to effect a disemb Let us, therefore, set at naught these reports as alto ome manufacture; and be sure that if any enemy d he state will know how to defend itself in a manne f the national honor."

Such assertions pleased the Syracusan assembly, ounterparts find favor now among some portion of the ublic. But the invaders of Syracuse came; made g anding in Sicily; and, if they had promptly attacked self, instead of wasting nearly a year in desultory o 1 other parts of Sicily, the Syracusans must have paid uty of their self-sufficient carelessness in submission to ian yoke. But, of the three generals who led the xpedition, two only were men of ability, and one was m nd incompetent. Fortunately for Syracuse, Alcibiades, killful of the three, was soon deposed from his comm actious and fanatic vote of his fellow-countrymen, and ompetent one, Lamachus, fell early in a skirmish; wh ortunately still for her, the feeble and vacillating Nicial d unrecalled and unhurt, to assume the undivided l f the Athenian army and fleet, and to mar, by altern aution and over-carelessness, every chance of success w arly part of the operations offered. Still, even under thenians nearly won the town. They defeated the r f the Syracusans, cooped them within the walls, and, mentioned, almost effected a continuous fortification fro ay over Epipolæ, the completion of which would certa een followed by a capitulation.

Alcibiades, the most complete example of genius with

exordium, in which he tried to elt must be entertained of him, s how completely his interests gh hatred of the Athenian de

ne matters which require your m the personal knowledge that o bring before you. We Athesign of subduing, first the Greek ly. Then we intended to make Carthage, and on Carthage iteded (nor did we limit ourselves intended to increase our fleet ship timber which Italy affords, military force of the conquered ge armies of the barbarians, of se regions, who are allowed to Then, when we had done all anesus with our collected force.

sea, and desolate your coasts;

sage, well reminds the reader that nferior to that of the Athenians at , very nearly conquer Carthage. ish infantry were the staple of the biades and other leading Athenians the Carthaginian system of carryWith the marvelous powers which imself with men of every class and nius, he would have been as formias Hannibal afterward was.

you ha

of all men living, i other Athenian ge endeavor to carry

your speedy inter
Sicilian Greeks a
they could at once
ance to Athens, th
Syracusans resistin
with the whole str
been beaten; they
quite impossible fo
invaders. And if t

all Sicily is theirs
· which I warned y
yourselves. You
of Peloponnesus.
men on board who

soon as they land,
all, let one of you
the chief comman
the forces that ar
hang back to come
ence of a Spartan
city than a whole
urge on them then
by showing that t

*Alcibiades here a
Spartan hearers must
alarm and indignation

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