In fine, that nothing might be wanting to the insolence with which they treated the assemblies of the people, they sometimes falsified the declarations of the number of the votes; and once they even went so far as to carry off the urns into which the citizens were to throw their suffrages*.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Subject concluded-Effects that have resulted in the English Government, from the People's Power being completely delegated to their Representatives.

BUT when the people have entirely trusted their power to a moderate number of persons,

"themselves, durst neither lift up their eyes, nor even mut"ter, in the presence of the dictator." Nec adversus dictatoriam vim, aut tribuni plebis, aut ipsa plebs, attollere oculos, aut hiscere, audebant. See Tit. Liv. lib. vi. § 16.

* The reader, with respect to all the above observations, may see Plutarch's Lives, particularly the Lives of the two Gracchi. I must add, that I have avoided drawing any instance from those assemblies in which one-half of the people were made to arm themselves against the other. I have here only alluded to those times which immediately either preceded or followed the third Punic war, as these are commonly called the best period of the republic.

affairs immediately take a widely different turn. Those who govern are from that moment obliged to leave off all those stratagems which had hitherto ensured their success. Instead of those assemblies which they affected to despise, and were perpetually comparing to storms, or to the current of the Euripus*, and in regard to which they accordingly thought themselves at liberty to pass over the rules of justice, they now find that they have to deal with men who are their equals in point of education and knowledge, and their inferiors only in point of rank and form. They, in consequence, soon find it necessary to adopt quite different methods; and, above all, become very careful not to talk to them any more about the sacred chickens, the white or black days, and the Sibylline books.-As they see their new adversaries expect to have a proper regard paid to them, that single circumstance inspires them with it :-as they see them act in a regular manner, observe constant rules, in a word, proceed with form, they come to look

*Tully makes no end of his similes on this subject, Quod enim fretum, quem Euripum, tot motus, tantas et tam varias habere putatis agitationes fluctuum, quantas perturbationes et quantos astus habet ratio comitiorum? See Orat. pro Muranâ.-Concio, says he in another place, quæ ex imperitissimis constat, &c. De Amicitiâ, § 25.

upon them with respect, for the very same reason which makes them themselves to be reverenced by the people.

The representatives of the people, on the other hand, do not fail soon to procure for themselves every advantage that may enable them effectually to use the powers with which they have been intrusted, and to adopt every rule of proceeding that may make their resolutions to be truly the result of reflection and deliberation. Thus it was that the representatives of the English nation, soon after their first establishment, became formed into a separate assembly: they afterwards obtained the liberty of appointing a president:-soon after, they insisted upon their being consulted on the last form of the acts to which they had given rise:-lastly, they insisted on thenceforth framing them themselves.

In order to prevent any possibility of surprise in the course of their proceedings, it is a settled rule with them, that every proposition, or bill, must be read three times, at different prefixed days*, before it can receive a final sanction: and before each reading of the bill, as well as at

* On some occasions, however, a bill of urgent necessity has been read three times in one day. EDIT.

its first introduction, an express resolution must be taken to continue it under consideration. If the bill be rejected in any one of those several operations, it must be dropped, and cannot be proposed again during the same session*.

The commons have been, above all, jealous of the freedom of speech in their assembly. They have expressly stipulated, as we have mentioned above, that none of their words or speeches should be questioned in any place out of their house. In fine, in order to keep their deliberations free from every kind of influence, they have denied their president the right to give his vote, or even his opinion :-they moreover have settled it as a rule, not only that the king could not send to them any express pro

* It is moreover a settled rule in the house of commons, that no member is to speak more than once in the same debate. When the number and nature of the clauses of a bill require that it should be discussed in a free manner, a committee is appointed for the purpose, who are to make their report afterwards to the house. When the subject is of importance, this committee is formed of the whole house, which still continues to sit in the same place, but in a less solemn manner, and under another president, who is called the chairman of the committee. In order to form the house again, the mace is replaced on the table, and the speaker goes again into his chair.

posal about laws, or other subjects, but even that his name should never be mentioned in the deliberations*.

But that circumstance which, of all others, constitutes the superior excellence of a government in which the people act only through their representatives, that is, by means of an assembly formed of a moderate number of persons, and in which it is possible for every member to propose new subjects, and to argue and to canvass the questions that arise,—is, that such a constitution is the only one capable of the immense advantage (of which perhaps I did not convey an adequate idea to the reader when I mentioned it before†) of putting into the hands of the people the moving springs of the legislative authority.

In a constitution where the people at large exercise the function of enacting the laws, as it is only to those persons towards whom the citizens are accustomed to turn their eyes, that is, to the very men who govern, that the assembly have either time or inclination to listen,

* If any person should mention in his speech, what the king wishes should be, would be glad to see, &c. he would be immediately called to order, for attempting to influence the debute.

† See chap. iv. of this book.