Henry VIII., his great power, 46. Was unsupported by
a standing army, 386.
Holt, judge, remarkable opinion delivered by him, 317.
Hugh Capet, the first hereditary king in France, 13. The
haughty answer of a French lord to him, 14.
Hume, Mr., a few words on the character given by him of
James II., 455.
James I., liberty begins to revive in his reign, 48. His
lofty notions concerning regal authority, ibid. Keeps his
ground against the restless spirit of the times, 454.
James II., how his dethronement was effected, 57. Was
inexcusable in his conduct, 455. Received no assistance
from his numerous army, 464.
Jesuits, how expelled from Spain, 411.
Impeachment, public, what, and its effects, 93. The king's
pardon no bar to the prosecution of an impeachment, 95.
Can it prevent the execution of the judgement? ibid.
Instances of ministers and judges impeached by the com-
mons, 93, 94, 359–62.
Imprisonment, the methods formerly used for liberating
imprisoned persons, 189. They were insufficient against
the power of the court, 190. A new force given to
them by the petition of right, ibid. Habeas Corpus act,
191.
John, king, grants the great charter, 27.
Johnson, Dr. Samuel, his opinion concerning the office of
the courts of equity, examined, 136.
Judges, independence of, 79. Their office, in criminal
causes, is only to direct the jury, and afterwards to
pronounce the law, 176. Cannot alter the mode of
punishment, 182. Instances of judges impeached, 359.
See Courts.
Judicial power, in regard to criminal matters, the neces-
sary cautions in establishing such power, 154, et seq.
Should not be trusted, especially in a free state, to any
too powerful persons or bodies, 161. Allusions to the
French courts of law, 163. See Trial. May be said
in England to be in the hands of nobody, 184. Lodged
in the people, 425.
Junius's Letters quoted, 175, 359.
Jury, how they are to shape their verdict, 175 Must de
cide both upon the fact and the criminality of it, 176.
What rules must be followed in their opinion, 177, 178.
Judge Hale's remarkable passage in that respect, ibid.
Usually pay a great regard to the judge's direction, 186.
The effect of their recommending to mercy, ibid. See
Trial and Judicial Power.
Justice, impartiality of its administration in England, 372,
436. See Law and Judicial Power.
King, his prerogative by the constitution, 61, 71, 72. The
restrictions set by law upon the exercise of the same,
75, 78, 84. He is not to interfere, nor his privy-
council, in the decision of causes either civil or crimi-
nal, 88. It is disputed whether he can remit the pro-
secution of a sentence awarded in consequence of an
impeachment, 95. Not to be named in debates, 269.
The last instance of one using his negative voice, 400.
See Crown.
Laws. See Legislation. Laws of England, 106. Diffi-
culty in procuring just ones, 247. All who can influ
ence the execution of them, are to be strictly watched,
279. A very necessary caution in framing them, 281.
Law, criminal, how strictly the letter of it is adhered to in
England, without any extension, 179, 449. Great mild-
ness of it, 187. See Punishment.
Legislative power, how formed in England, 61, et seq.
Advantages arising from its being divided, 222, et seq.
Remarkable constancy in its operations in England,
223. Not so in the ancient commonwealths, ibid. See
Parliament.
Legislation, mode of, in commonwealths, 229. Inconve-
niency of it, 231. The manner in which laws are
framed in England, 232. Advantages of the same, 235.
See Propounding. Would it be an advantage if laws
were enacted by the people at large? 246-55. See
People.
Liberty, causes of English, 20-23. Its progress, 24, et
seq. Private liberty, 99. The word much misapplied
or misunderstood, 241. A more accurate definition of
How the provisions to secure it should
be directed, 279. Singular law-doctrine in England
- concerning the liberty of the subject, 448.
Livy quoted, 252, 264, 325, 328, 331, 333, 344.
Lords, the house of, how constituted, 65. Not suffered by
the commons to frame, or even alter, a money-bill,
68, 85, Make it a standing order to reject all money
bills, to which bills of another nature have been tacked,
78, 391. Have not given up their claim in regard to
altering money bills, 85. The great pre-eminence al-
lowed them in point of ceremony over the commons,
226. Can vote by proxy, 227. Unite in a common
cause with the people against the power of the crown,
21, 50, 285, 359. Abridge their own personal privi-
leges, 367. Their impartiality in their judicial capa-
city, 370. Cannot be charged with having abused their
privilege of trying their own members, 371. Defeat
the attempts of the commons on the crown's preroga-
tive, 392. Their own attempts defeated by the com-
mons, 393. A bill is framed to limit their number, 495.
The great importance of that bill generally overlooked,
502. See Parliament and Peers.
Lyttelton, lord, quoted, 314.
Machiavel's History of the republic of Florence, quoted,
Magna Charta, remarkable extensiveness and impartiality
of the provisions of, 336.
Marlborough, duke of, easily dismissed from his employ-
ments, 214, 405.
Martial courts, a remarkable dispute between one and
a court of law, 459.
Martial law must be universal, where the authority of the
government is supported by a standing army, 443.
Members of the house of commons, their personal privi-
leges, 366. Instances of some punished by their own
house, 367. See Commons.
Military power, a cause of anxiety to those sovereigns
whose authority is supported by it, 443. Cannot in
such case be subjected to the civil power, 458. Not
necessary to support the power of the crown in Eng-
land, 456. The surprising subjection of it to the civil
power in England, 457, 479. See Crown.
Minister, equally interested with other subjects in main-
taining the laws concerning personal security, 285.
discarded one in other countries, the cause of some
anxiety or jealousy to the government, 408. Not so in
England, ibid.
Monarchies, revolutions generally concluded in them by
provisions for the advantage of great men and leaders,
not of the people, the same as in commonwealths, 335,
396. The executive power of the crown in all ancient
or modern monarchies, wanting that peculiar stability of
the English crown, 384. Not secured otherwise than
by standing armies, 385. The monarchs are afraid of
powerful subjects, 407. Cannot do without some arbi-
trary means of asserting their authority, 418. Very
jealous of the liberty of the press, and, perhaps, are
really obliged to be so, 421. Extremely averse, out of
fear for their own security, to calling popular assem-
blies, 425. Respect of persons in the administration
of justice cannot be prevented in them, 437. Anxious
precautions taken in them in regard to the military
power, 442. Their law-doctrine concerning the exe-
cutive authority of the government, 447. The military
superior to the civil power, 458.
Money-bills. See Taxation.
Montesquieu, quoted, 292, 469.
More's Utopia quoted, 292.
Obedience, passive, an absurd doctrine, 60.
Ostracism, an arbitrary unjust expedient, but, perhaps, ne-
cessary in the republic of Athens, 418.
Oxenstiern, chancellor, his words to his son, 522.
Parliament, English, the constitution of, 61-70. How to
be convoked, 63, 86. Proceedings in parliament not
to be questioned in any other place or court, 97. The
secret bent of that assembly to forbear invading the pre-
rogative of the crown, 401. Cautious conduct of the
three branches towards each other, 524. See Commons
and Crown.
Parliaments, French, great weight of, 163. Difficult to be
managed by the crown, ibid. How Louis XV, dismissed
that of Paris, 409. Precautions taken by the next king
in restoring it, 429. See France.
Parliamentary History of England, a superficial observa-
tion of its authors, 338.
Pardon, the prerogative of, lodged in the king, 72.
Cannot
be pleaded as a bar to an impeachment being carried on,
94. Often granted on the recommendation of a jury,
186.
Peers, how to be tried, 179. Have few real personal pri-
vileges above the subject, 369. See Lords.
People, how misled by favourites or demagogues, 200.
How influenced or deceived by the magistrates or great
men in commonwealths, 251. Should act through re-
presentatives, 256. Should entirely delegate the legis-
lative authority to these, 259. How, and in what cir-
cumstances only, the right of resistance may be usefully
exerted by them, 320. See Commonwealths and England.
May be said in England to possess both the judicial and
censorial powers, 425. The freedom they enjoy of in-
terfering in government matters, 434.
Pope, Mr., quoted, 273.
Porcia Lex de tergo civium, 274, 337.
Pramunire, writ of, 193.
Prætor, his office in Rome, 116. Assumes the office of a
judge of equity, 137. His provisions, 138. Their power
very arbitrary, 146. When first restrained, 147.
Press, liberty of the, is a real censorial power lodged in
the people, 290. Much more effectual and beneficial
than the one established in Rome, 292. A licenser ap-
pointed upon the press by the star-chamber, 294. By the
long parliament, ibid. By Charles II. and James II.,
ibid. Finally established in the year 1694, and how, 295.
A definition of it, ibid. Actions respecting the same not
to be decided without a jury, 296. How extensive its
use has become, 298. Great political advantages aris-
ing from the same, 300. Is farther useful, combined
with the other rights of the people, 304; such as the
right of election, 308. How useful a support to the
right of resistance, 318. Is not allowed in common-
wealths, or in monarchies, 421. Its being tolerated in
England to so high a degree, depends on the stability of
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