tain subsidies; and in these days, when every thing is rated by pecuniary estimation,-when gold is become the great moving spring of affairs, it may be safely affirmed, that he who depends on the will of other men, with regard to so important an article, is (whatever his power may be in other respects) in a state of real dependence.

This is the case of the king of England. He` has, in that capacity, and without the grant of his people, scarcely any revenue. A few hereditary duties on the exportation of wool, which (since the establishment of manufactures) are become tacitly extinguished; a branch of the excise, which, under Charles the Second, was annexed to the crown as an indemnification for the military services it gave up, and which, under George the First*, was fixed at seven thousand pounds; a duty of two shillings on every ton of wine imported; the wrecks of ships of which the owners remain unknown; whales and sturgeons thrown on the coast; swans swimming on public rivers; and a few other feudal relics, now compose the whole appropriated revenue of the king, and are all that remain of the ancient inheritance of the crown.

*The author ought to have said, George the Second.

The king of England, therefore, has the prerogative of commanding armies, and equipping fleets; but without the concurrence of his parliament he cannot maintain them. He can bestow places and employments; but without his parliament he cannot pay the salaries attending on them. He can declare war; but without his parliament it is impossible for him to carry it on. In a word, the royal prerogative, destitute as it is of the power of imposing taxes, is like a vast body, which cannot of itself accomplish its motions; or, if you please, it is like a ship completely equipped, but from which the parliament can at pleasure draw off the water, and leave it aground,—and also set it afloat again, by granting subsidies.

And indeed we see, that, since the establishment of this right of the representatives of the people, to grant or refuse subsidies to the crown, their other privileges have been continually increasing. Though these representatives were not, in the beginning, admitted into parliament but upon the most disadvantageous terms, yet they soon found means, by joining petitions to their money-bills, to have a share in framing those laws by which they were in future to be governed; and this method of proceeding, which at first was only tolerated by the king, they after

wards converted into an express right, by declaring, under Henry the Fourth, that they would not, thenceforward, come to any resolutions with regard to subsidies, before the king had given a precise answer to their petitions.

In subsequent times we see the commons constantly successful, by their exertions of the same privilege, in their endeavours to lop off the despotic powers which still made a part of the regal prerogative. Whenever abuses of power had taken place, which they were seriously determined to correct, they made grievances and supplies (to use the expression of Sir Thomas Wentworth) go hand in hand together; which always produced the redress of them. And in general, when a bill, in consequence of its being judged by the commons essential to the public welfare, has been joined by them to a money-bill, it has seldom failed to pass in that agreeable company*.

* In mentioning the forcible use which the commons have at times made of their power of granting subsidies, by joining provisions of a different nature to bills that had grants for their object, I only mean to show the great efficiency of that power, which was the subject of this chapter, without pretending to say any thing as to the propriety. of the measure. The house of lords have even found it necessary (which confirms what is said here) to form, as it were, a confederacy among themselves, for the security of:

CHAPTER VII.

The same Subject continued.

BUT this force of the prerogative of the commons, and the facility with which it may be exerted, however necessary for the first establishment of the constitution, might prove too considerable at present, when it is requisite only to support it. There might be the danger, that, if the parliament should ever exert their privilege to its full extent, the prince, reduced to despair, might resort to fatal extremities; or that the constitution, which subsists only by virtue of its equilibrium, might in the end be subverted.

Indeed, this is a case which the prudence of parliament has foreseen. They have, in this respect, imposed laws upon themselves and, without touching the prerogative itself, they have moderated the exercise of it. A custom has for a long time prevailed, at the beginning of every reign, and in the kind of overflowing of affection

their legislative authority, against the unbounded use which the commons might make of their power of taxation; and it has been made a standing order of their house, to reject any bill whatsoever to which a money-bill has been tacked.

which takes place between a king and his first parliament, to grant the king a revenue for his life; a provision which, with respect to the great exertions of his power, does not abridge the influence of the commons, but yet puts him in a condition to support the dignity of the crown, and affords him, who is the first magistrate in the nation, that independence which the laws ensure also to those magistrates who are particularly intrusted with the administration of justice*.

This conduct of the parliament provides an admirable remedy for the accidental disorders of the state. For though, by the wise distribution of the powers of government, great usurpations are become in a manner impracticable, nevertheless it is impossible but that, in consequence of the continual (though silent) efforts of the executive power to extend itself,

* The twelve judges.-Their commissions, which in former times were often given them durante bene placito, now must always "be made quamdiu se bene gesserint, and "their salaries ascertained; but, upon an address of both "houses, it may be lawful to remove them."-Stat. 13. Will. III. c. 2. In the first year of the reign of his present majesty, it was moreover enacted, that the commissions of the judges should continue in force notwithstanding the demise of the king; which has prevented their being dependent, with regard to their continuation in office, on the heir-apparent.