In these times, however, when it is become a custom with princes to keep those numerous armies, which serve as a pretext and means of oppressing the people, a state that would maintain its independence is obliged, in a great measure, to do the same. The parliament has therefore thought proper to establish a standing body of troops (amounting to about thirty thousand men), of which the king has the command.

But this army is only established for one year; at the end of that term, it is (unless re-established) to be ipso facto disbanded; and as the question, which then lies before parliament, is not, whether the army shall be dissolved, but whether it shall be established anew, as if it had never existed, any one of the three branches of the legislature may, by its dissent, hinder its continu

ance.

Besides, the funds for the payment of these troops are to be paid by taxes that are not established for more than one year*: and it becomes likewise necessary, at the end of this term, again

*The land-tax and malt-tax.

[It was ordained in 1798, that the land-tax should be made perpetual; subject to complete redemption and purchase, by the transfer of stock. EDIT.]

to establish them*. In a word, this instrument of defence, which the circumstances of modern times have caused to be judged necessary, being capable, on the other hand, of being applied to the most dangerous purposes, has been joined to the state by only a slender thread, the knot of which may be slipped, on the first appearance of dangert.

* It is also necessary that the parliament, when it renews the act against mutiny, should authorise the different courts-martial to punish military offences and desertion. It can therefore refuse the king even the necessary power of military discipline.

To these laws, or rather conventions, between king and people, I will add the oath which the king takes at his coronation; a compact which, if it cannot have the same precision as the laws above mentioned, yet, in a manner, comprehends them all, and has the farther advantage of being declared with more solemnity.

The archbishop or bishop shall say, "Will you solemnly "promise and swear to govern the people of this kingdom "of England, and the dominions thereto belonging, ac"cording to the statutes of parliament agreed on, and the "laws and customs of the same?" The king or queen shall say, "I solemnly promise so to do."

Archbishop or bishop." Will you, to your power, cause "law and justice, in mercy, to be executed in all your judgements?"-King or queen. "I will.”

Archbishop or bishop" Will you, to the utmost of your "power, maintain the laws of God, the true profession of

But these laws, which limit the king's authority, would not, of themselves, have been sufficient. As they are, after all, only intellectual barriers, which the king might not at all times respect; as the check which the commons have on his proceedings, by a refusal of subsidies, affects too much the whole state to be exerted on every particular abuse of his power; and lastly, as even this check might in some degree be eluded, either by breaking the promises which have procured subsidies, or by applying them to uses different from those for which they were appointed; the constitution has besides supplied the commons with the means of immediate opposition to the misconduct of government, by giving them a right to impeach the ministers.

It is true, the king himself cannot be arraigned before judges; because if there were any that could pass sentence upon him, it would be they,

"the gospel, and the protestant reformed religion esta"blished by the law? And will you preserve unto the "bishops and clergy of this realm, and to the churches "committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges

as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of "them?"-King or queen. "All this I promise to do."

After this, the king or queen, laying his or her hand upon the holy gospels, shall say, " The things which I have here "before promised I will perform and keep: So help me "God!"--and then shall kiss the book.

and not he, who must finally possess the executive power; but, on the other hand, the king cannot act without ministers; it is therefore those ministers, that is, those indispensable instruments, whom they attack.

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If, for example, the public money has been employed in a manner contrary to the declared intention of those who granted it, an impeachment may be brought against those who had the management of it. If any abuse of power is committed, or in general any thing done contrary to the public weal, they prosecute those who have been either the instruments or the advisers of the measure*.

But who shall be the judges to decide in such a cause? What tribunal will flatter itself that it can give an impartial decision, when it shall see, appearing at its bar, the government itself as the accused, and the representatives of the people as the accusers?

It is before the house of peers that the law has directed the commons to carry their accusation; that is, before judges, whose dignity, on the one hand, renders them independent, and who, on

* It was upon these principles that the commons, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, impeached the earl of Orford, who had advised the treaty of partition, and the lord chancellor Somers, who had affixed the great seal to it.

the other, have a great honour to support in that awful function, where they have all the nation for spectators of their conduct.

When the impeachment is brought to the lords, they commonly order the person accused to be imprisoned. On the day appointed, the deputies of the house of commons, with the person impeached, make their appearance: the impeachment is read in his presence; counsel are allowed him, as well as time to prepare for his defence; and, at the expiration of this term, the trial goes on from day to day, with open doors, and every thing is communicated in print to the public.

But whatever advantage the law grants to the person impeached for his justification, it is from the intrinsic merits of his conduct that he must draw his arguments and proofs. It would be of no service to him, in order to justify a criminal conduct, to allege the commands of the sovereign; or, pleading guilty with respect to the measures imputed to him, to produce the royal pardon *. It is against the administration itself

* This point, in ancient times, was far from being clearly settled. In the year 1678, the commons having impeached the earl of Danby, he pleaded the king's pardon in bar to that impeachment: great altercations ensued, which were terminated by the dissolution of that parliament. It was afterwards enacted (Stat. 12 & 13 W. III. c. 2.), “that