that the impeachment is carried on; it should therefore by no means interfere: the king can neither stop nor suspend its course, but is forced to behold, as an inactive spectator, the discovery of the share which he may himself have had in

"no pardon under the great seal should be pleaded in bar "to an impeachment by the house of commons."

I once asked a gentleman, very learned in the laws of this country, if the king could remit the punishment of a man condemned in consequence of an impeachment of the house of commons: he answered me, The tories will tell you the king can, and the whigs, he cannot. [There is no reason to doubt the king's power in this respect, though the policy of such a measure may well be disputed. EDIT.] But it is not perhaps very material that the question should be decided: the great public ends are attained when a corrupt minister is removed with disgrace, and the whole system of his proceedings unveiled to the public eye.

[Another disputed point was, whether an impeachment was so far affected by a dissolution, as to render it necessary for the commons to institute de novo a similar inquiry, if they earnestly wished to bring a delinquent to justice.— This point was fully debated in 1790, in the case of Mr. Hastings; and the majority of the commons, influenced by the arguments of the ablest speakers of both parties, decided for the continuance of an impeachment from one parliament to another, not as an innovation but as an ancient point of constitutional practice, calculated to prevent the undue interference of the crown in favour of an accused individual, or a guilty minister. EDIT.]

the illegal proceedings of his servants, and to hear his own sentence in the condemnation of his ministers.

An admirable expedient! which, by removing and punishing corrupt ministers, affords an immediate remedy for the evils of the state, and strongly marks out the bounds within which power ought to be confined: which takes away the scandal of guilt and authority united, and calms the people by a great and awful act of justice: an expedient, in this respect especially, so highly useful, that it is to the want of the like that Machiavel attributes the ruin of his republic.

But all these general precautions to secure the rights of the parliament, that is, those of the nation itself, against the efforts of the executive power, would be vain, if the members themselves remained personally exposed to them. Being unable openly to attack, with any safety to itself, the two legislative bodies, and by a forcible exertion of its prerogatives, to make, as it were, a general assault, the executive power might, by subdividing the same prerogatives, gain an entrance, and, sometimes by interest, and at others by fear, guide the general will, by influencing that of individuals.

But the laws which so effectually provide for

the safety of the people, provide no less for that of the members, whether of the house of peers, or that of the commons. There are not known in England either commissaries who are always ready to find those guilty whom the wantonness of ambition points out, or those secret imprisonments which are, in other countries, the usual expedients of government. As the forms and maxims of the courts of justice are strictly prescribed, and every individual has an invariable right to be judged according to law, he may obey without fear the dictates of public virtue. Lastly, what crowns all these precautions, is, its being a fundamental maxim, "That the free"dom of speech, and debates and proceedings "in parliament, ought not to be impeached or " questioned in any court or place out of par"liament *."

The legislators, on the other hand, have not forgotten that interest, as well as fear, may impose silence on duty. To prevent its effects, it has been enacted, that all persons concerned in the management of any taxes created since 1692, commissioners of prize, navy, victualling-office, &c. comptrollers of the army accounts, agents for regiments, the clerks in the different offices

*Bill of Rights, Art. 9.

H

of the revenue, persons holding any new office under the crown (created since 1705), or having a pension under the crown during pleasure, or for any term of years, are incapable of being elected members. Besides, if any member accepts an office under the crown, except it be an officer in the army or navy accepting a new commission, his seat becomes void; though such member is capable of being re-elected.

Such are the precautions hitherto taken by the legislators, for preventing the undue influence of the great prerogative of disposing of rewards and places; precautions which have been successively taken, according as circumstances have shown them to be necessary; and which, we may thence suppose, are owing to causes powerful enough to produce the establishment of new ones, whenever circumstances shall point out the necessity of them *.

*Nothing can be a better proof of the efficacy of the causes that produce the liberty of the English, than those victories which the parliament from time to time gains over itself, and in which the members, forgetting all views of private ambition, only think of their interest as subjects.

Since this was first written, an excellent regulation has been made for the decision of controverted elections. Formerly the house decided them in a very summary manner, and the witnesses were not examined upon oath. But, by an act passed a few years ago [in 1770, under the auspices of

CHAPTER IX.

Of private Liberty, or the Liberty of Individuals. WE have hitherto treated only of general liberty, that is, of the rights of the nation as a nation, and of its share in the government. It now remains that we should treat particularly of a thing without which this general liberty, being absolutely frustrated in its object, would be only a matter of ostentation, and even could not long subsist, I mean the liberty of individuals.

Private liberty, according to the division of the English lawyers, consists, first, of the right of property, that is, of the right of enjoying exclusively the gifts of fortune, and all the various

Mr. Grenville, whose son, lord Grenville, has since improved it -EDIT.], the decision is left to a jury, or committee, of fifteen members, formed in the following manner. Out of the members present, who must not be less than one hundred, forty-nine are drawn by lots: out of these, each candidate strikes off one alternately, till there remain only thirteen, who, with two others, named out of the whole house (one by each candidate), are to form the committee. In order to secure the necessary number of a hundred members, all other business in the house is to be suspended, till the above operations are completed.