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THE

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1815.

ART. I. Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. By Dugald Stewart, Esq. F. R. S. Edin. &c. &c. Vol. ii. pp. 554. Edinburgh. 1814.

WE know not whether it be owing to the very high repute which the experimental sciences have of late so deservedly acquired, or to the low estimation into which the abstract sciences would seem, as undeservedly, to have fallen: it is, however, remarkable, that, since the commencement of our labours, the present opportunity is the first which has been afforded us, of stating our sentiments in due form, upon the metaphysical heresies of our northern neighbours. The publication of Mr. Stewart's Philosophical Essays' might, perhaps, in some respects, be mentioned as an instance to the contrary; but, as the subjects of those truly eloquent disputations were not, in general, very nearly connected with any of the great and characteristical doctrines of his particular school, we hardly consider it as furnishing a just exception to our remark. Such is not the case with the volume which we have now the pleasure of recommending to the attention of our readers. In this, they will meet with a full and fair exposition of his philosophical creed, together with a very skilful attack upon those scholastic prejudices' which, he seems to think, still maintain their ground in our most celebrated seats of learning.'

Before, however, we finally abandon the articles of faith de omni inscibili et ineffabili, as by law established in the universities of this land, it may be useful to take a general survey of the doctrines which it is proposed to substitute in their stead. It is one thing to innovate and another to reform; when alterations are recommended in ancient establishments, a prudent man will take into his consideration, not only the defects which it is intended to remedy, but also the means by which the remedy is to be effected. In such cases, it is always in favour of existing institutions and old opinions that the mind should give its casting vote. Unless the changes which are proposed be plainly and incontrovertibly for the better, a man is not to be accused of bigotry for adhering to the customs and notions in which he has been brought up. On this account, we must entreat that Mr. Stewart will put a candid construction upon the

VOL. XII. NO. XXIV.

T

the freedom with which we shall examine the innovations which he wishes to introduce into the philosophy of the mind. For himself personally, and for his writings also, we entertain the highest and most unfeigned respect. We should be truly sorry to give any just cause of offence to one who wears his own faculties so meekly, great and admirable as they are; but as long as we urge our own opinions with temper, and discuss his with fairness, we trust that in other respects, a little occasional earnestness of manner will be excused by him, in favour of the deep and perilous importance which we consider some of his fundamental tenets to possess. He should remember that it is his opinions and not ours which are new, and consequently that we must be regarded rather as defending ourselves, than as making any attack upon him.

Mr. Stewart's former productions, and more particularly the volume to which the one before us is intended as a sequel, have been so long before the public, and are so very generally admired, that it would now seem to be a work of supererogation, either to describe or to praise them. On the subject of his Philosophical Essays,' we have already had occasion to deliver our opinions; and as to those which we entertain respecting his earliest and most popular production, they will be best collected in the process of our remarks upon the merits of his philosophy in general.

The volume which I now publish,' says Mr. Stewart in his advertisement, is more particularly intended for the use of academical students, and is offered to them as a guide or assistant at that important stage of their progress, when the usual course of discipline being completed, an inquisitive mind is naturally led to review its past attainments, and to propose plans for its future improvement. In the prosecution of this design, I have not aimed at the establishment of new theories, far less have I aspired to the invention of any new organ for the discovery of truth. My principal object is, to aid my readers in unlearning the scholastic errors which, in a greater or less degree, still maintain their ground in our most celebrated seats of learning; and in subjecting to free, but I trust not sceptical, discussion, the more enlightened though discordant systems of modern logicians, to accustom the understanding to the unfettered exercise of its native capacities.'

This general object, as we learn at the conclusion of his work, he has proposed to accomplish,

by aiming, in the first place, to correct some fundamental errors, in the theories commonly received with respect to the powers of intuition and reasoning; and, secondly, by illustrating some doctrines, connected with the groundwork of the inductive logic, which have been either over-looked or misapprehended by the generality of preceding writers."

The execution of such a design as this would certainly seem to promise us more instruction than amusement; we are, however, by

no

no means sure whether a perusal of his work itself, is not likely to disappoint, in this respect, our expectation. Mr. Stewart possesses so much general literature, and writes with such peculiar animation, that he seldom fails to seize the attention of his readers, even at those times, when he may happen to be least successful in forcing their conviction. In the present instance, we know not whether it be owing to the predominance of those scholastic errors' which we acquired in one of the celebrated seats of learning' to which our author alludes; but it is certain, the perusal of his volume has by no means effected our conversion to many of the leading doctrines which it contains. It has not, indeed, altered the very high opinion which we have ever entertained as to the great talents and attainments of its author; but it is no less true, that we closed it with an additional conviction upon our minds, that the method of considering his subject, which Mr. Stewart has so long and so very ably advocated, will, most assuredly, never lead him to any useful and practical results.

As far as this opinion is prospective, of course our readers will consider it as a mere conjecture, until they shall have listened to the reasons upon which we conceive it to be founded. But with respect to the past, the unproductiveness of that plan of metaphysical investigation, which our author, in the volume before us, so fully explains, and which it has been the labour of his long and active life to recommend, would seem to be no longer a matter of opinion, but a fact, so demonstrated as to be much more easily accounted for than denied. For, putting the labours of Dr. Reid and other writers out of the question, let us estimate those of Mr. Stewart alone a writer of the most powerful and various talent-and yet, after forty years' exclusive application, both private and professional, to the study before us, how disproportioned are the results, either with the capacity or the perseverance which he so eminently possesses! This is a question which is not to be decided by the opinion of Mr. Stewart, nor, indeed, of any others, who, like him, are regularly enlisted into his favourite science, but by that of the literary world in general: the only impartial tribunal in such a case as this. For, although we willingly admit, that as to the question of what may be accomplished in the natural history of the human mind, the generality of persons are by no means competent to form a sound opinion; yet, with respect to what has been accomplished, we know not that a better criterion need be sought for, than the concurring voice of those, who neither have, nor can have, any interest whatever upon the subject, except that which its actual utility may have inspired. How unfavourable a verdict has been passed by this supreme tribunal, upon the labours, not of Mr. Stewart only, but, with the exception perhaps of Mr. Locke,

upon the labours of the whole body of metaphysical writers, it is almost unnecessary to point out. Not only is it commonly thought, that no useful and assignable knowledge is to be gained from the study, as it now stands, but the study itself is abstractedly considered as a losing speculation, and whatever leisure or talent we embark in it, is set down almost universally by others, as lost, both to society and ourselves. This last opinion is pushed, no doubt, much beyond what the premises from which it is taken will fairly warrant; but we cannot help considering the premises themselves as being sufficiently proved, not only by the uniform sentiment which the world in general entertains upon the subject, but by the very confession of those who have written professedly to refute it.

The great end of all knowledge is generally said to be power; the power which metaphysical science, according to Mr. Stewart's view of the subject, appears to promise, is that of counteracting the many inconveniences which result from the imperfectness of language, and from the ignorance in which we still are, as to the nature and extent of those powers, both speculative and active, upon a knowledge of which our improvement, whether as rational or as moral beings, so materially depends. The first effect of any solid success of this nature, we are taught to believe, would not only soon make itself perceived in amended systems of education, and in the correction of many speculative errors, but even the historian and the statesman would find new facilities, from the more perfect acquaintance which they would acquire, with the real nature of those, whom it is their business to describe or to govern. In vain, however, should we attempt to trace the advancement of metaphysical science, by tracing the improvements to which, in this point of view, it has been subservient; and if we express any impatience at the tardiness of its promised fruits, and complain that instead of being led forwards to useful and intelligible objects, the mind is merely turned round and round upon its own axis, till it becomes giddy with the motion, we are immediately reminded of the imperfection of language, of the difficulty of the subject, of the fugitive nature of its objects, of the weakness of our faculties; thus silencing our complaints by repeating to us the subjects of them, and explaining the want of success which has hitherto attended the science, by merely enumerating the many obstructions which it is the very business of it to remove.

Those who are well acquainted with the history of human knowledge, and with the state in which the philosophy of the mind now is, will not so much feel surprized at this sort of language as they will lament the causes of it. When the experimental sciences were in the same stage of their progress, Bacon describes those who were then employed about them, as giving utterance to the disap

pointed