from that in which they were originally placed;' that it is impossible for a ship, with respect to her comforts, to possess better qualities as a proof of which the average number of sick has not exceeded five (in 590) during the whole winter; that she requires not the least repair, except caulking, which is owing to the farther shrinkage of the new plank' and Captain Devonshire adds, 'I do not think there is a stronger or more efficient ship of her class in His Majesty's service.'

These reports, we conceive, embrace all the points which are necessary to establish the superiority of Mr. Seppings's plan over that of the old principle with regard to strength, stiffness, dryness, health, and comfort; and, we may add, durability. As, however, those very qualities of strength and stiffness have given rise to an objection against the plan, as tending to injure the sailing qualities of the ship, and as we wish, in a matter of such national importance, to obviate every objection, we have a report too on this point from Captain Campbell of the Tremendous, of which the following is an extract: I do not hesitate to say that the sailing of the Tremendous is far superior to any thing I have ever seen. The extraordinary style in which she beat the Hannibal, Impetueux, Vanguard, Mars, Berwick, and indeed all the ships under my command, surprized me extremely;' and he concludes, as far as appears to me, she is as complete a man of war as can go-to sea, and the most desirable ship of her size I have met with.'

6

There is but one more test for Mr. Seppings's plan to undergobut it is a test as severe as it will be decisive-and one by which his reputation as an ingenious practical shipwright must stand or fall. Aware of having staked his professional character on the success of the experiment,' and acknowledging the liberal encouragement which he has met with from his superiors, he manfully observes that no subterfuge can avail him should any failure be found in the system.' The trial we allude to is this:-The Nelson was probably the best built ship of modern times; all possible pains were taken by Mr. Sison, the builder, that the timber put into her should be sound and well seasoned, and the workmanship of every part of her does him, and all who were employed on her, the highest credit; every possible attention was bestowed to keep her dry; and her motion into the water, when launched, was slow, easy, and majestic, without a shake or a plunge-yet the Nelson was found to have arched after launching no less than 8 inches. The Howe, now on the stocks at Chatham, and ready for launching, the sister ship to the Nelson, was built under the direction of Mr. Seppings and on his new principle. If, after launching, the Howe should be found to have broken or arched 8 inches-if she should break 6 inches-nay, if she should arch even 4 inches-we should say, the advantage

advantage gained by his diagonal riders and trussing was scarcely worth the general introduction of so great a change in the building of His Majesty's ships-but we will venture to predict that she will not break 3 inches; and if this shall be the case, the most deep-rooted prejudice, from whatever cause it may have arisen, must for ever be put to silence.

ART. VIII. 1. Erreur de Napoléon, ou Réponse à un Article du Moniteur. 12mo. pp. 34. St. Pétersbourg. 1815, 2. Sir Robert Porter's Narrative of the Campaign of Russia. 4to. pp. 282. London.

3. Relation circonstanciée de la Campagne de Russie. Par Eugène Labaume, Capitaine au Corps Royal des IngénieursGéographes, &c. &c. 8vo. pp. 404. Paris. 1814.

4. Tableau de la Campagne de Moscou en 1812.

Par René Bourgeois, Docteur en Médecine de la Faculté de Paris, &c. &c. témoin oculaire. Svo. pp. 196. Paris. 1814.

5. Campagne de Moscou, en 1812, composée d'après la Collection des Pièces officielles sur cette Campagne mémorable, où plus de trois cent mille braves Français furent Victimes de l'Ambition et de l'Aveuglement de leur Chef. Par R. J. Durdent. Quatrième édition. Svo. pp. 95. Paris. 1814.

6. Carte des Pays compris entre la Vistule, la Dwina, et le Borysthène, pour servir à l'Intelligence des quatorze premiers Bulletins. Nos. 1, 2. 4to. Paris. Le Norman. 1812. 7. Sketch of a Journal of the Retreat and Flight of the French Armies from Moscow, and the Pursuit of the Russians, to their Arrival on the Vistula. 4to. pp. 25. London. 1813. -Schulze.

8. Skizzen zu einer Geschichte des Russisch Französischen Krieges im Jahr, 1812. 8vo. pp. 534. Leipzig. 1814.

9. Relation impartiale du Passage de la Beresina par l'Armée Française en 1812, par un Témoin oculaire. 8vo. pp. 48.

Paris. 1814.

10. Critical Situation of Buonaparte in his Retreat out of Russia, translated from the French, with notes. 8vo. pp. 65. London.

1815.

WHEN

7HEN we consider that the Russian campaign was the period from which the final overthrow of Buonaparte may be dated, we shall not be surprized at the number of publications marshalled in array at the head of this article. We have perused them all; some, indeed, possess peculiar merit, according to the opportunities

of

of observation which the writers enjoyed. Thus Labaume's narrative principally relates the operations of the 4th corps to which he was attached as captain of engineers; the German work chiefly details what happened in the neighbourhood of Riga, though it contains some interesting anecdotes of what passed elsewhere; the historian of the Beresina, as may be expected, makes the passage of that river, and the events which took place on its banks, the great features in his publication; whilst René Bourgeois and the rest have attempted, with more or less success, to give a general outline of the whole campaign. In our sixteenth Number the reader will find some observations on the subject of the present article; to which we were led by the perusal of M. Eustaphiève's work on the Resources of Russia, which, although published in America, previously to the breaking out of the war, most strikingly foretold the exact line of conduct which would be pursued by the Emperor Alexander and his people, should Buonaparte attempt the invasion of that country.

One of the most powerful engines in the hands of him who, for a time, was lord of the ascendant in Europe, was the journal to which the pamphlet placed at the head of this article alludes. Whatever could in any degree serve to increase the slavery of the people of France, or to irritate them against the objects of the tyrant's peculiar and personal hatred, here found ready admittance; whilst every thing which might tend to open their eyes to their real state was carefully excluded.*

As our readers may not have the means of reference to the journals in which these papers appeared, we shall not apologize for laying before them such extracts as appear most worthy of obser

vation.

Extract from the Moniteur, Monday, 6th August, 1804. "Constantinople, 29th June, 'But Russia is now at peace with France, and has no more motives to break with her than she has advantages to expect from such a step. Markoff and his party have, it is true, succeeded in procuring an illtimed note to be presented at Ratisbon, in favour of the Germanic body; by dint of evasions, punctilios, and petty wranglings of every description, they have produced a degree of coldness between the two powers, whose good understanding, equally advantageous to each, had enabled Russia to play a part both new and brilliant.

"Russia can do no injury to France; with her, she can do whatever is just and noble. Russia has nothing to fear from France; nature has

* The vigilance of a tyrant seldom succeeds, however actively it may be exerted: to prove this we need only mention that Reinard, the French minister at Hamburgh, gave six Napoleons d'or for as many copies of the answer to the Moniteur; the sum was paid to Buonaparte's own bookseller, who had volunteered to publish the pamphlet in question, in a secret printing-office which he kept for Antigallican publications.

destined

⚫ destined these two powers to be friends; and whatever direction their armies may unfortunately receive from hostile counsels, neither of them will feel much interest in their undertakings.

When a power, whose capital is at the extremity of the north, and whose armies, placed on the frontiers of Persia and Tartary, are engaged in combating the Tartars and Persians, interferes on its own account, and at its own risk, in the affairs of the south of Europe, it loses sight of its true position. However powerful the monarch, however brave the soldier, they are still but men; they can do nothing beyond the limits prescribed by nature. When Russia, taking part in the concerns of the south of Europe, seconds either of the three great powers, Austria, France, or Prussia, she acts as becomes her, and is truly worthy of respect; if, on the other hand, she takes the lead in the affairs of the south of Europe, she requires the assistance of Austria, France, or Prussia: she quits her station; she is wanting to her own dignity; she is no longer herself; and she ought to know that, to raise her power above that of all other states, she is in want not of provinces, but men. A twelvemonth's war destroys more than many years of peace may produce. Peace, lasting peace, is therefore, for Russia, the surest means of attaining the objects of her ambition, and the increase of her population of supplying her most urgent want.

Answer to the Article from Constantinople.

Sept. 1804.

It must be acknowledged, morally speaking, that it is to France, Russia is indebted for the situation which she now occupies, and which cannot be denied to be of the very first order. The period -from whence this commanding and prominent position was occupied by Russia, may be dated from the commencement of that system of .tyranny and injustice, which France has established; a system of invasion, of rapine, and of oppression, which has been exercised whereever its power could reach; and above all, since it became apparent that its ambitious views were directed to no less an object than the attainment of universal monarchy.

Since that time Russia is become the shield of the weak, and Alexander, seated on his throne, has assumed the character of the protector and arbitrator of empires. Can France compel her to lay aside this dignified character? Let her not deceive herself in imagining she can; Russia is not in the situation of an actor who puts on the purple to act the part of a king; she is not an upstart, who appears what she really is not; the attitude of the lion befits her, because she possesses both his force and his dignity; she is a colossal power, whose eyes have been unsealed by the faults of others, and, viewed in her true light, a Colossus of the most formidable description. Whether Russia will unite herself to Prussia, or to Austria, whether she attaches herself to England, or stands alone, she must always be respectable, and among the first order of powers-respectable as long as she shall follow a system of justice and disinterestedness, and, that confident in her strength, she shall openly resist a plan of universal despotism, and , :

lay

lay open to the world the violation of rights the most sacred; that impious violation, which has been so well described in the strong but temperate note which was presented at Ratisbon.

It is certainly true, that the population of Russia is, compared with its extent, rather small; but this, however, admits of some explana-. tion. In the first place, the population is not equally distributed, throughout the empire; and again, there are parts of Russia which are absolutely uninhabitable. Besides, where is the necessity of augmenting the population of the country? it is the duty of a sovereign to make his people happy, but it is not so clear that it is his duty to increase the number of them. In a moral point of view war is assuredly a very great calamity; but, in a political consideration, it is sometimes a necessary evil and much good results from it.

'All this serves to prove, that a declaration of war, on the part of Russia against France, would be sufficiently formidable to encourage the German empire, now crushed by the latter power, to occupy the troops of France, and by that means, to afford an opportunity to Italy, to Switzerland, to Spain, to Portugal, to Holland, and to Hanover to shake off the Gallic yoke.

As to the project of invading England, it is an absolute chimera, a castle in the air, which can never be successful; and even if it were so, it must prove destructive to the rest of the world. England is at this moment at the highest point of elevation; she can never decline if she continue where she is, for higher she cannot be. But how can England, who only exists by her industry, and her trade, preserve her present situation unless by upholding the balance of the world? It is then the obvious interest of Russia to assist England, who, by its system, should be friendly to all nations, and to repress France, the selfish principles of whose government are inimical to the greater powers of Europe, and oppressive to the smaller.'

So much for the anticipation of the triumphs of Russia. We now come to the consideration of the subsequent publications.

The first in order, and therefore that to which the most indulgence may fairly be shewn, is by Sir Robert Ker Porter. It was published in the beginning of 1813, previously to the appearance of any other work on the subject; and before the merits of the chief: persons concerned had fallen under discussion.

The chief value of Sir Robert Porter's book consists in its official documents, and as the writer was not with the army during any part of the campaign, it is to be supposed that his information. is almost entirely derived from these sources; that his account therefore should be so correct in the general outline, and so near the truth even in the details, is certainly a strong proof of the unanimity which prevailed between the government of the country and the people, and constitutes a high eulogium on the Russian nation. The public documents proceeding from the pen of Buonaparte will not furnish equally faithful materials for the future historian.:

They