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legal facts that the influence of law upon economics is keenly felt. Life indeed consists of a perpetual adaptation of outward forms to inner forces, and thus the economic basis of a legal system is really the important fact to the social philosopher. In practical life, however, we deal with outward forms, and thus the legal shape of the economic relations must never be lost from sight. In economics and jurisprudence there is continual action and reaction.

9. Political science and ethics. The following paragraph, entitled The Moral Value of the State, suggests the important relation of political science to ethics.

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If then we take modern social life in its broadest extent, as including not only what has become institutionalized and more or less fossilized, but also what is still growing (forming and re-forming), we may justly say that it is as true of progressive as of stationary society, that the moral and the social are one. The virtues of the individual in a progressive society are more reflective, more critical, involve more exercise of comparison and selection, than in customary society. But they are just as socially conditioned in their origin and as socially directed in their manifestation.

In rudimentary societies, customs furnish the highest ends of achievement; they supply the principles of social organization and combination; and they form binding laws whose breach is punished. The moral, political, and legal are, not differentiated. But village communities and city states, to say nothing of kingdoms and empires and modern national States, have developed special organs and special regulations for maintaining social unity and public order. Small groups are usually firmly welded together and are exclusive. They have a narrow but intense social code:- like a patriarchal family, a gang, a social set, they are clannish. But when a large number of such groups come together within a more inclusive social unity, some institution grows up to represent the interests and activities of the whole as against the narrow and centrifugal tendencies of the constituent factors. A society is then politically organized; and a true public order with its comprehensive laws is brought into existence. The moral importance of the development of this public point of view, with its extensive common purposes and with a general will for maintaining them, can hardly be overestimated. Without such organization society and hence morality would remain sectional, jealous, suspicious, unfraternal. Sentiments of intense cohesion within. would have been conjoined with equally strong sentiments of indifference, intolerance, and hostility to those without. In the wake of the formation

of States have followed more widely coöperative activities, more comprehensive and hence more reasonable principles of judgment and outlook. The individual has been emancipated from his relative submergence in the local and fixed group, and set upon his own feet, with varied fields of activity open to him in which to try his powers, and furnished with principles of judging conduct and projecting ideals which in theory, at least, are as broad as the possibilities of humanity itself.





10. Necessity for definitions and distinctions. Amos gives the following reasons for the misuse of political terms:

There are some special reasons why language is peculiarly subject in political speech and discussion to flux and vacillation of import, and therefore, why the processes of definition and explanation are peculiarly difficult. In the first place, political terms are largely in use among classes who either are habitually inexact in their use of language or who have a positive motive, good, bad or indifferent, - to be inexact themselves or to encourage inexactness in others. Popular speech is at every moment handling the common words which are, of necessity, pressed into the service of political speculation and debate. These words, therefore, carry with them, wherever they go, the looseness and variability of meaning they contract in the market place and by the domestic fireside. . .

But political terms do not merely suffer in fixity of meaning from the abuses common to words in familiar popular use. They are, furthermore, peculiarly exposed to a special liability to abuse from the practice of rhetorical argument conducted either on the public platform or in the popular legislature or in the columns of the public journal. The terms republic, democracy, aristocracy, centralization, liberty, self-government, and the like are all capable of a favorable or unfavorable use, and it can only be on a fair examination of all the circumstances of the case to which they purport to apply that the sense in which they are employed in any special case can be determined. It, unfortunately, is often for the apparent and momentary interest of the speaker or writer to wrest the meanings of political terms and to hide from the hearer or reader one of its undoubted significations, while forcing into undue prominence another.

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In the second place, political terms are liable to distortion from a cause which is the opposite of the one just described. For legal, diplomatic, and certain administrative purposes, political terms are often employed with an inflexible rigidity of meaning which is at once diverse from their lax popular use and also from the less rigid though definite signification needed by the requirements of a true political science. . . Thus it comes about that while the terms of political science are peculiarly exposed to abuse and vacillation through conversational laxity, they are likewise exposed to the risk of ambiguities owing to the simultaneous functions they perform in the technical language of law, diplomacy, and administration.

In the third place, political terms suffer in a peculiar degree from a cause which is the enemy of all fixity of meaning in terms, - incessant, though imperceptible, changes in the nature of the things and facts which they are used to denote. History is full of illustrations of this phenomenon, and sometimes the consequence is even widespread misunderstandings. This is especially the case when the people of one country try to acquaint themselves with the political condition, wants, and controversies of another country.


11. The essentials of nationality. According to Willoughby, the influences that create a spirit of national unity are as follows: 1 In Germany the word "People" has primarily and predominantly a political signification, as denoting a body of individuals organized under a single government; while the term Nation" is reserved for a collection of individuals united by ethnic or other bonds, irrespective of political combination. According to this use a Nation is an aggregate of men speaking the same language, having the same customs, and endowed with certain moral qualities which distinguish them from all other groups of like nature. . . ."


That which welds a body of individuals into a national unity is no rigid political control, but ethnic and other factors largely sentimental or psychological in character. Now when we say that it is these influences of race, religion, custom, language, and history that create a Nation, we mean that from these sources springs the feeling or sentiment that binds together a community of people, and constitutes from them a Nation. Each of these factors invites the formation of a Nation, but no one of them compels it. The essential principle is the feeling that is the result

1 Copyright, 1896, by The Macmillan Company.

of one or more of these factors. Thus, as says Renan: "A nation is a spiritual principle, resulting from the profound complications of history; a spiritual family, not a group determined by the configuration of the soil. . . . A Nation is, then, a great solidarity constituted by the sentiment of the sacrifices that have been made, and by those which the people are disposed to make. It supposes a past; it is, however, summed up in the present by a tangible fact: the consent, the clearly expressed desire of continuing the common life. . . ." According to Mill, a portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and others - which make them coöperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively." 1

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12. The idea of the nation. Numerous recent writers have emphasized the idea of the nation, and the importance of national unity and the influence of the national genius on political ideas and institutions. Burgess says :

Primarily and properly the word nation is a term of ethnology, and the concept expressed by it is an ethnologic concept. It is derived from the Latin nascor, and has reference, therefore, primarily to the relations of birth and race-kinship. . . . As an abstract definition, I would offer this: A population of an ethnic unity, inhabiting a territory of a geographic unity, is a nation.

There is, however, an objection to this definition. The nation as thus defined is the nation in perfect and completed existence, and this is hardly yet anywhere to be found. Either the geographic unity is too wide for the ethnic, or the ethnic is too wide for the geographic, or the distinct lines of the geographic unity partially fail, or some of the elements of the ethnic unity are wanting.

Further, the definition requires explanation. By geographic unity I mean a territory separated from other territory by high mountain ranges, or broad bodies of water, or impenetrable forests and jungles, or climatic extremes, - such barriers as place, or did once place, great difficulties in the way of external intercourse and communication. By ethnic unity I mean a population having a common language and literature, a common tradition and history, a common custom and a common consciousness of rights and wrongs. Of these latter the most important element is that of a common speech. It is the basis of all the

1 "Representative Government," chap. xvi.


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