PAGE 118 XLII. Of Youth and Age..1612; slightly enlarged 1625...... 171 1612; slightly enlarged 1625...... 173 XLIV. Of Deformity.........1612; somewhat altered 1625... 175 ...... LI. Of Faction......................... .1597; much enlarged 1625...... 199 LII. Of Ceremonies and Respects...1597; enlarged 1625... 201 LIII. Of Praise ...... 1612; enlarged 1625.................. ESSAYS. 1. OF TRUTH. WHAT is truth? said jesting' Pilate, and would not stay for an answer.2 Certainly there be that delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to fix a belief; affecting3 free-will in thinking as well as in acting. And though the sects of philosophers of that kind1 be gone, yet there remain certain discoursing wits, which are of the same 5 1 Festing] In derision. Lat. derisor, as a mocker. 2 And would not stay, &c.] John xviii. 38, 'Pilate saith unto him, What is truth? And when he had said this, he went out,' &c. 4 The sects, &c.] The Pyrrhonists, or Sceptics, and the disciples of their historian Sextus Empiricus. Discourse 5 Certain discoursing wits] Individual arguing minds. often signified the power, or process, of deriving knowledge by conclusion from premises, as distinguished from intuition. Hence Milton, P. L. v. 487-9, speaks of 'Reason discursive or intuitive.' Bishop Reynolds, in his treatise On the Passions (1640), ch. xxxvii., speaking of different means and powers of knowing, says, ‘In regard of perfection, [there is] Intuitive knowledge, as that of angels, whereby they know things by the view, and Discursive, as that of men, whereby we know things by ratiocination.' Again, ch. xl., 'As it [the will] hath not judgment to discover an end, so neither hath it discourse to judge of the right means whereby that may be attained.' Compare Shakspeare, Hamlet, iv. 4, 'Sure, He that made us with such large discourse, looking before and after;' and Chillingworth's Religion of Protestants, B veins,' though there be not so much blood in them as was in those of the ancients. But it is not only the difficulty and labour which men take in finding out of truth, nor again, that when it is found, it imposeth upon2 men's thoughts, that doth bring lies in favour; but a natural, though corrupt, love of the lie itself. One of the later school of the Grecians1 examineth the matter, and is at a stand to think what should be in it, that men should love lies, where neither they make for pleasure, as with poets; nor for advantage, as with the merchant; but for the lie's sake. But I cannot tell :5 this Pref. 3, 'An understanding man, and one that can distinguish between discourse and sophistry;' and again, 12, 'What is discourse, but drawing conclusions out of premises by good consequence?' So in Ford's Lady's Trial, iii. 3, ‘We through madness frame strange conceits in our discoursing brains.' Discourse of reason was a familiar phrase. Thus, in Massinger's Unnatural Combat, ii. 1, 'It adds to my calamity that I have discourse of reason.' So Bacon himself, in the Advancement, I., 'Martin Luther, conducted, no doubt, by a higher providence, but in discourse of reason, finding,' &c. ; and Shakspeare— 'O Heaven! a beast, that wants discourse of reason, 1 Of the same veins] Of the same humour or disposition. The vena ingenii of Horace suggested this, Od. ii. 18, 'Ingenî benigna vena.' So in Art. Poet., 409 2 Imposeth upon] 'Ego nec studium, sine divite venâ, Nec rude quid possit, video, ingenium.' Lays restraint upon. 3 Love of the lie itself] Rev. xxii. 15, ‘And whosoever loveth and maketh a lie.' Jerem. v. 31, 'The prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means, and my people love to have it so.’ One of the later school, &c.] Here one signifies a certain philosopher. Lat. quidam. Bacon perhaps refers to the New Academy. Aldis Wright thinks he probably refers to the Philopseudes of Lucian. 5 I cannot tell] Lat. Nescio quomodo, I know not how it is. This was anciently a common meaning of the expression. Thus, in Shakspeare's K. Rich. III. i. 3— same truth is a naked and open day-light, that doth not show the masques, and mummeries, and triumphs' of the world half so stately and daintily2 as candle-lights. Truth may perhaps come to the price of a pearl, that showeth best by day; but it will not rise to the price of a diamond or carbuncle, that showeth best in varied lights. A mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure. Doth any man doubt, that if there were taken out of men's minds vain opinions, flattering hopes, false valuations, imaginations as one would, and the like, but it would leave the minds of a number of men poor shrunken things, full of melancholy and indisposition, and unpleasing to themselves? One of the Fathers, in great severity, called poesy vinum dæmonum, because it filleth the imagination, and yet it is but with the shadow of a lie. But it is not the lie that passeth through the mind, but the lie that sinketh in and settleth in it, that doth the hurt, such as we spake of before. But howsoever these things are thus in men's depraved judgments and affections, yet truth, 4 'I cannot tell :-the world is grown so bad That wrens make prey where eagles dare not perch.' 1 Triumphs] This word denoted processional pageants and other festal shows exhibited by torchlight. In Shakspeare's 1 K. Henry IV. iii. 3, Falstaff, referring to the red nose of Bardolph, says to him, 'O, thou art a perpetual triumph, an everlasting bonfire-light!' The title of Bacon's 37th Essay is 'Of Masques and Triumphs.' 2 Daintily] Nicely; prettily. As one would] According to one's wishes. One of the Fathers, &c.] Bacon very often quoted from memory, and his verbal memory was often at fault. It has not been ascertained that any of the Fathers calls poetry vinum dæmonum, the wine of devils; but Jerome, in one of his letters to Damasus, says, 'Dæmonum cibus est carmina poetarum,' and Augustine, in his Confessions, i. 16, calls poetry 'vinum erroris.' In the Advancement, II., our author says, 'Did not one of the Fathers, in great indignation, call poesy vinum dæmonum, because it increaseth temptations, perturbations, and vain opinions?' 5 Howsoever] Howsoever it be that. which only doth judge itself,' teacheth, that the inquiry of truth, which is the love-making or wooing of it, the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it, and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it,—is the sovereign good of human nature.2 4 The first creature of God, in the works of the days, was the light of the sense; the last was the light of reason; and his sabbath work ever since is the illumination of his Spirit. First he breathed light upon the face of the matter, or chaos; then he breathed light into the face of man; and still he breatheth and inspireth light3 into the face of his chosen. The poet that beautified the sect that was otherwise inferior to the rest, saith yet excellently well, It is a pleasure to stand upon the shore, and to see ships tossed upon the sea; a pleasure to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle and the adventures thereof below: but no pleasure is comparable to the standing upon the vantageground of truth (a hill not to be commanded, and where the air is always clear and serene), and to see the errors, and wanderings, and mists, and tempests, in the vale below:5 1 Only doth judge itself] Is the only judge of its own merit. 2 Teacheth, &c.] The Truth, which is the Word of God, teaches that seeking after Truth, finding it, and having our thoughts, words, and deeds as the offspring of our love of it, is the 'summum bonum,' or supreme good, of man. 3 Inspireth light] That is, the light of Truth. ↑ The poet, &c.] The poet here meant is Lucretius, and the sect of which he was an ornament is that of Epicurus, a Greek philosopher, who taught that pleasure is the 'summum bonum' of human nature. 5 It is a pleasure, &c.] This is from Lucretius, De Rerum Naturâ, ii. I, but is a very loose paraphrase of the original. Towards the close of Bk. I. of the Advancement there is another adaptation of the passage. The following are the words of Lucretius : 'Suave mari magno, turbantibus æquora ventis, |