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FRENCH LAND ON THE ISLE OF WIGHT. 221

general action, however, was not brought on*; and, on the following day, the French admiral thought it better to try his fortune by land. There could be no likelier

way, he reasoned, to make the king of England send his fleet out, than to lay waste the country with fire and sword under his eyes; and if no such effort were made for the relief of his subjects, then the admiral hoped that discontent might move the people to insurrection. Accordingly, a descent was made upon the Isle of Wight in three places. Pietro Strozzi landed in one part, near a little fort which had annoyed the galleys: it was abandoned on the approach of his force, and his people killed some few of the retreating garrison, and burnt the houses round about. Another division was commanded by the sieur de Tais, who was general of the foot soldiers, and by the baron de la Garde: they landed without resistance; but had not penetrated far into the country before the inhabitants made head against them, taking possession of ground where they could attack the enemy to advantage, and when they retired were safe from pursuit, unless the enemy followed in disorder, and exposed themselves to farther loss. This detachment, therefore, obtained no success: the captains Marsay and Pierrebon, who commanded the third, were both wounded; and their party found it advisable to retreat with all speed to their ships. Meantime the troops who had been left on board, seeing the flames that Strozzi had kindled, and that there were no enemies on the adjacent shore, landed without leave to take their pleasure, and come in for a share of the pillage: they got among the hills, were attacked there by horse and foot, and driven back to the coast: there, under protection of the ships, they rallied, and being reinforced, again advanced against

Du Bellay says, "that the prior of Capua (one of the 'Strozzi) turned upon the row-barge that pursued him, and that, upon this movement of his, not only three vessels but the whole English fleet retired, when M d'Annebault was on the point of giving the signal for battle." But in the State Papers, Russell says, "The king hath determined that my lord ad miral shall give them battle if they abide." He adds, "that seventeen of their galleys came in the order of battle to the fight, of the which one was sunk, and the ships began to retire, which I believe will not come again." (P. 794.) The event justified his expectation.

the islanders, who in their turn retreated, till, having crossed a river, they broke down the bridge, and defied farther pursuit. The admiral then recalled his people, and held counsel how to proceed.*

But it was not an ordinary council of war that was held on this occasion: the admiral summoned all the pilots, captains, and sailors to a public meeting, that the nature of the coast might be better investigated, and the best means devised for overcoming the difficulties which it presented to their intended enterprise. He represented to them their great superiority in the number of ships, and also in the courage of their people, and what a benefit such a victory as they were sure of obtaining, if they could only get at the enemy, would be to the king and to the realm of France. Officers and men de

clared themselves all ready for the attempt; but the sea captains and the pilots affirmed that it could not be made without evident ruin the channel by which they must enter, they said, would not admit of more than four ships abreast, and might, therefore, easily be defended by the enemy, who could oppose to them an equal number. It could only be entered by favour of the wind and tide; but if any thing impeded the foremost ships, those which followed would be driven against them by the force of the current. Moreover, the battle must be fought near the shore, consequently they would be exposed to a fire from thence; and if they could succeed in laying the English ships aboard, and grappling them, the force of the tide would carry them ashore together. Here it was proposed by some one, that, to avoid this danger, they should anchor as soon as they had closed with the enemy: to this the pilots replied, that their cables might be cut; and that even if they were not cut, the danger would be quite as great; for the nature of the tide was such that it always made the prow of the vessels turn towards it, and thus their ships would expose the poop to the enemy, instead of presenting to them the prow or the broadside. They

* Du Bellay, 218-224.

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added, also, that were they to cast anchor, the ship could not immediately be brought to, and if it strained it would either slip the anchor or break the cable: therefore it would be necessary to give out the cable little by little, and so arrest the ship's way; but while this, was doing, they might touch the ground, and be lost.*

To these representations no reply was attempted. The admiral and the captains, however, would not yield to them without farther investigation, fearing, it is said, that the pilots, who were unanimous in their opinion, had for cowardly motives magnified the difficulties and dangers of the attempt. Three pilots and three captains, therefore, were sent to sound the channel in the night, and measure its breadth, and ascertain what facilities for defence the English would derive from the nature of the port. These persons, on their return, confirmed all that had been stated at the public council; and they added, that the entrance of the channel was so winding, that a strange ship could hardly enter without a pilot, even though coming in peace, and with no apprehension of being opposed. All thought, then, of attacking the English fleet at Portsmouth was abandoned. It was then debated whether they should make for the coast of Picardy, to co-operate with the army there, and prevent the enemy from throwing succours into Boulogne; or if they should establish themselves in the Isle of Wight, and fortify themselves there, which would be to the great damage of the realm of England. The chiefs who supported this latter proposal argued, that having ance got possession of the Isle of Wight, they might easily make themselves masters of Portsmouth, which was one of the finest harbours in England; by this means they should put the English to an incredible expense, seeing that it would be necessary for them continually to keep up a force both by sea and land to make head against an enemy who was thus established. The passage to Spain and Flanders would then be secure ; and in time the island itself might be cultivated so as to

* Du Bellay, 224-226,

feed the garrison which the king might think proper to maintain there.*

These, the French historian observes, were great utilities and worthy of profound consideration; but, on the other hand, the difficulties that occurred were not less considerable. The sieurs de Tais and de Saint Remy, and others who were versed in such matters, agreed in opinion that it would be necessary to erect three fortresses at the same time, on the spot which had been deemed best suited to that purpose: the ground was semi-circular in its form, and at the two points of the semi-circle two forts were required to defend the road and protect their own fleet; a third was necessary for lodging the troops. The cost of these works would be excessive: it would not be possible to complete them in less than three months, even if 6000 pioneers were employed; and the place being as it were in the heart of the enemy, less than 6000 soldiers ought not to be left there, but it was impossible to leave so many now, and retain enough for manning the ships. Nor were these the only objections. The fleet could not depart till the works should be in a defensible state; but it was impossible for them to remain there so long, because they had no port to secure them from the winds, neither were they victualled for such a time: the rainy and stormy season was coming on, when the ships would be in danger, and the soldiers on shore would be exposed to the effects of the weather, having no habitations to shelter them, nor tents, nor covering of any kind. These arguments had such weight that even those who were for taking possession of the isle submitted to them, and agreed that the intention must be deferred till the king's farther pleasure could be known. "For my

part," says Martin du Bellay, " without offence to the sieurs de Tais and de Saint Remy, it appears to me that, considering the desire the king had to secure himself against his enemy the king of England, and the means which he then possessed an opportunity for so Du Bellay, 226-228,

THE FRENCH WITHDRAW.

225

doing was at that time presented, which will neither easily nor soon be found again. But God orders all things as he pleases."*

This determination having been taken, a watering party was sent on shore, and the chevalier d'Aux, who commanded the Norman galleys, landed to protect them, distrusting the vigilance of the officer who had charge of the party. But he was incautious enough himself to fall into an ambush, where he was slain. On the morrow the fleet departed, coasting it towards Dover: they outstripped the galleys, having a fair wind, and, therefore, lay to for them on a part of the coast which appeared so inviting that many of the men landed without orders, and without precaution of any kind. When a good part of them had passed over some deep water by a wooden bridge, the English issued suddenly from a little fort in which they had concealed themselves, broke down the bridget, and attacked the invaders, who took to the water in their flight, to sink or swim as might betide them. The admiral now crossed the straits, and landed 4000 men and 3000 pioneers at Portet, near Boulogne; retaining still a sufficient number for the service of the fleet. The weather soon made them stand off, and make again towards the English coast. Meantime, the first care of the English had been to put Portsmouth in a defensible state §, and to lay a chain

*Du Bellay, 228-230.

+ Du Bellay calls the place Valseau, and says it is fourteen leagues from the Isle of Wight.

"Par la," says Du Bellay, "vous pouvez cognoistre qu'il pouvoit laisser en l'Isle d'Huicht lesdits 4000 hommes et 4000 pionniers, qui estoit suffisamment pour garder ladite isle, attendant nouveau refraischissement, et leur pouvoit laisser vivres (à ce que j'entendis des munitionnaires) pour un mois ou cinq sepmaines." p. 233.

"Having received your letter, whereby I perceive the king's majesty doth much marvel at the want of tools; for answer whereunto you shall understand that, as for sholves and spades, we have had some from London, but as for mattocks we have had none, which is the thing that we chiefly lack; these works cannot be done without them, the ground here is such. We have put to making to Winchestre, Southampton, and other places in these parts, many mattocks, so that I trust by Monday we shall have a good number of them; and then, God willing, there shall be as much diligence used as is possible, trusting, or it be long, that this town shall be put in that force and good order as it shall defend the enemies." -Suffolk to Paget, 1 Aug. p. 796.

"Finally, I trust before my lord admiral's departure from hence, the

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