WITH FREETHINKERS. EDITED BY JOHN WATTS AND ICONOCLAST. CONTAINING A SKETCH OF THE LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY OF HAMILTON, LUCRETIUS, POWELL, SOCRATES, HOLYOAKE, LONDON: AUSTIN & CO., 17, JOHNSON'S COURT, FLEET ST. We not only include Sir William Hamilton in this series, but give the first place to a sketch of the life and leading opinions of that most distinguished philosopher of the Scotch common-sense school of metaphysicians, for two reasons; one general, the other particular. We can imagine that many amongst those who venture into the fruitless mazes of metaphysics, and the somewhat clearer and more productive tracks of psychology, whether their philosophical and theological views be heterodox or sceptical, may be surprised that Sir William Hamilton should be included among "Freethinkers," even if the widest latitude be given to the expression. As far as Sir William Hamilton's personal convictions go, the inclusion of his name would be unwarrantable. But it is not on this ground that we justify its introduction. We believe, and hope to show, as far as limits so scanty for such an enterprise will permit, that certain-and especially one-of Sir William's doctrines-indeed, we might say, the whole tenor of his philosophy, for it is a self-consistent and indivisible whole-distinctly leads to no other goal than this-that the cognizable existence of God being undemonstrable, there is no moral or dutiful obligation on man to recognise his being and make him the object of his worship. We are quite mindful of the fact that Sir William, while discarding one of the old lines of argument by which the existence of God was sought to be established, clung with countervailing firmness to another, which he thought sufficient to effect the demonstration. He was himself a believer in God, though he believed it impossible that he should know God. The thesis we lay down at starting necessitates the rejection by us of the line of proof which Sir William retained, as well as an acceptance of his rejection of the old line of argumentation which he repudiated. We do not shrink from either enterprise. If we be successful, Sir William must be considered eminently and essentially a Freethinker ; having done more than any philosopher of his day-and he was undoubtedly the first of his time in Britain-to sap the ordinary bases by which the existence of God is established as the cardinal tenet of the churches and of natural theology. The general ground which in a much minor degree justifies our presentation of Hamilton in this series, would not have been accepted by us, in itself, as sufficient. But, taken in addition and cumulatively, it is worthy of notice. His questionings of received opinions, the [Second Series-Published Weekly.] daring manner in which he plunged his students and his readers into all kinds of doubt, could not fail to be highly stimulative to Freethought. Although apt to become arrogant in the heat of controversy, no philosopher ever preached in the abstract the doctrine of tolerance more prominently than he. And for the most part he never wandered from it. He even proclaimed himself rather the fellow learner than the preceptor of his students. He told them that the first lesson he had to teach them was to doubt, to doubt daringly, to doubt everything until some satisfactory foothold was gained. True it is that the foothold which he proclaimed to be satisfactory to him, is not accepted as satisfactory by us. The candour of his course, and the fine healthy encouragement to intellectual scepticism which he inculcated for twenty years at Edinburgh, are not the less admirable and memorable. 66 Theistic philosophers have been pretty evenly divided on the question of the cognizability of the Infinite by the Finite-or, in plain English, the possibility of man knowing God. Amongst those who have asserted the affirmative, the theories to account for the obvious paradox of Infinitude being known-i.e., grasped, or comprehendedby the Finite have been various. The following are the chief variations of view which have prevailed among leading metaphysicians of the century. They are given in Sir William's own words, as being a statement of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the Unconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought." * * * "These opinions may be reduced to four1st. The Unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable; its notion being only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively known or conceived." This was the opinion maintained by Hamilton himself. In other words, although he called on man to believe in God, he admitted that man could not know God. "2nd. It (the Unconditioned) is not an object of knowledge; but its notion as a regulative principle of the mind itself, is more than a mere negation of the conditioned." This was the view maintained by Kant. His view, expressed more fully, was to this effect:-man has the power of reason in two different relations-speculative reason, and practical reason. The judgment applies the principles of both. Speculative reason has to do with what man can know, practical reason with what he ought to do. To resume our quotation from Hamilton, he gives as the third representative doctrine, or theory, of the Unconditioned, that identified with Schelling's name. "3rd. It is cognizable, but not conceivable; it can be known by a sinking back into identity with the Absolute, but it is incomprehensible by consciousness and reflection, which are only of the relative and the different." The fourth view stated is that of Cousin. "It is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality." With regard to Cousin's view as compared with Hamilton's, it is only necessary to observe that, differing as they do, the two philo. sophers both affirmed that man had a necessary belief in the existence of God. We present in a condensed form Sir William's argumentation in support of this thesis. But let us first extract a single sentence from one of Sir William's Edinburgh Review articles, in which he puts the non-cognizability of Deity by man very clearly : "Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and an object of thought, known only in correlation, and mutually limiting each other: while, independently of all this, all that we know, either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only a knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of the different, of the phenomenal. The fair inference from this is, that, as the conditions of thought cannot reduce Deity to any of these categories, the Absolute is unknowable to man." We now to turn to the passage in which Sir William expounds his own natural theology, which some thinkers, such as Mr. Mansel, have found equally satisfactory with Sir William, but which seems to us to fail entirely of cogency and conviction. Our readers shall judge for themselves: "I now proceed to show you that the class of phenomena which requires that kind of cause we denominated a Deity, is exclusively given in the phenomena of mind-that the phenomena of matter, taken by themselves (you will observe the qualification, taken by themselves), so far from warranting any inference to the existence of a God, would, on the contrary, ground even an argument to his negation-that the study of the external world, taken with, and in subordination to, that of the internal, not only loses its Atheistic tendency, but, under such subservience, may be rendered conducive to the great conclusion, from which, if left to itself, it would dissuade us. "We must first of all, then, consider what kind of cause it is which constitutes a Deity, and what kind of effects they are which allow us to infer what a Deity must be. "The notion of a God is not contained in the notion of a mere first cause, for in the admission of a first cause, Atheist and Theist are at one. Neither is this notion completed by adding to a first cause the attribute of Omnipotence, for the Atheist who holds matter or necessity to be the original principle of all-that is, does not convert_his blind force into a God by merely affirming it to be all-powerful. It is not until the two great attributes of intelligence and virtue (and be it observed, virtue involves liberty)-I say, it is not until the two attributes of intelligence and virtue, or holiness, are brought in, that the belief in a primary and omnipotent cause becomes the belief in a veritable Divinity. But these latter attributes are not more essential to the Divine nature than the former. For as original and infinite power does not of itself constitute a God, neither is a God constituted by intelligence and virtue, unless intelligence and goodness be themselves conjoined with this original and infinite power. For even a creator, intelligent, and good, and powerful, would be no God, were he dependent for his intelligence, and goodness, and power, on any higher principle. On this supposition the perfections of the creator are viewed as limited and derived. He is himself, therefore, only a dependency, only a creature; and if a God there be, he must be sought for in that higher principle, from which this subordinate principle derives its attributes. Now, is this highest principle (ex hypothesi, allpowerful) also intelligent and moral, then it is itself alone the veritable Deity; on the other hand, is it, though the author of intelligence and goodness in another, itself unintelligent, then is a blind fate constituted the first and universal cause, and Atheism is arrested. |