is a mere abstraction, no one, I should think, will deny. What shall we say, then, to the representation of the angel Gabriel, that this Prince of Persia or this Prince of Greece, or both, that is, this mere abstraction-this mere generality-this simple notion of an accident without a subject-was the proper coordinate, but opposing, principle, or as the Greek language would express it, the avriaToxov, of himself and Michael? the proper antagonist with whom they had both been contending for twenty-one years past or more, before this interview with Daniel, and with whom they should have to contend for some time, more or less, to come, even after this interview with the prophet? Will it be maintained that Gabriel is not a person, or that Michael is not a person? And if not, how can it be contended that the proper antagonist principle of both, or of either of them, can be other than a person also? For what can be the coordinate of a person, as such, but a person, as such? or of an abstraction as such, but an abstraction as such? We have an example of this distinction, and an argument in point to the proper use of terms with reference to it, at 2 Cor. vi. 14, 15: where St. Paul is contrasting the most opposite things together, and strictly coordinate or avriσToixa-yet some of them in the abstract, others in the concrete. Tis μετοχή, says he, δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ ; τίς δὲ κοινωνία φωτὶ πρὸς σκότος ; ἢ τίς μερὶς πιστῷ μετὰ ἀπίστου; Here we have one abstract conception opposed to another, each to its proper correlative, considered as contraries; but all as abstract alike. But when he proceeds to subjoin, τίς δὲ συμφώνησις Χριστῷ πρὸς Βελίαρ; he opposes a real person to a real, and no longer an abstraction to an abstraction: for that Christ is an actual person, there can be no doubt, and that Beliar opposed to him, is the same, will be as little disputed, when it

is considered that in the language of St. Paul, and indeed of the Christians of the time, Beliar is but another name for Satan. The natural inference, then, from the particular language of the Angel in Daniel should be, that the Prince of the kingdom of Persia, or the Prince of Greece, must be as much an individual person and a real agent, as himself or Michael ; and that if himself and Michael were not only real, but superhuman beings, the Prince of Persia and the Prince of Greece were real and superhuman beings also for as reality in general can be properly opposed to nothing but reality in general, on the one hand; so reality of a particular kind can be properly opposed only to a corresponding reality, on the other. Tried by this rule, as a real or personal agent can have only a real or personal antagonist, and an individual personal agent only an individual personal antagonist; so a spiritual or transcendental, but personal agent, can have only a spiritual or transcendental, though personal opponent.

And as to the doctrine of tutelar or guardian angels, without venturing to express a decided opinion of my own upon it, or entering on a discussion which I consider to be foreign to the present question, I cannot help observing, that in calling it an abominable doctrine, the bishop has used too harsh a term; and in charging it with a direct tendency to polytheism, to idolatry, or to angel-worship, he charges it with consequences to which it is not justly liable. For it was never intended by this doctrine, as far as I understand it, to take the government of the universe out of the hands of the one great Lord and Master of all, or to transfer to the creature, however dignified and exalted, the honour which is due to the Creator. It was never intended by it to teach or inculcate the belief of any

thing, but what was presumed to be of God's own appointment, if it had any existence, and therefore to be as agreeable to his will, as consistent with his perfections, and no disparagement to his rights. The question is, after all, a question of scripture testimony, or what the word of God itself has revealed upon this subject. We know far too little of the nature and constitution of the invisible world, to undertake to pronounce of ourselves, beyond what is written, whether there is, or there is not, any foundation for the doctrine of guardian angels, intrusted with the charge of particular portions of the works of God. We may rest assured, indeed, that there is an invisible world, which has its proper inhabitants; and that those inhabitants have their proper employments; and that myriads of intelligent agents, much superior to mankind, are night and day employed on the service of the God of Sabaoth, and doing his will, in a variety of ways, of which we can form no conception at present; and each, we may presume, in some appropriate manner of his own, without interfering with the same duty on the part of another. We may rest assured, that if the administration of the Divine government, and the purposes of the Divine providence, are carried on and promoted by means of instruments, and subordinate agents, in the visible world, it cannot be contrary to the Divine nature and attributes, that something like the same rule should prevail in the invisible. We may rest assured, at least, that if God is a God of order in his church, and a God of order in nature, and a God of order in the moral and civil world, he cannot be a God of disorder in the spiritual world; and that if an harmonious distribution of parts and offices, a due subordination and dependance of one thing upon another, and a general concurrence of individual functions and

individual agencies, to the good of the whole, prevail to a wonderful degree among his works upon earth; they prevail, in all probability, much more perfectly and much more wonderfully among his creatures in heaven.

If any weight is to be allowed to the concurrent belief of Christians, especially when it can be traced back to the primitive and apostolical times of Christianity itself; it would be easy to shew, by a production of passages from the writings of ecclesiastical men, that the persuasion of the existence not only of presiding national or tutelary, but even of individual guardian angels, prevailed in the church from a period of so remote an antiquity, that the first origin of the persuasion can with no show of reason be attributed either to Gentile or to Jewish superstition, as the bishop supposes, (neither of which, at that time, can be justly considered to have been capable of influencing the church,) nor to any thing but a kind of apostolical sanction for it, the memory of which had been preserved by tradition. It is not true, as the bishop contends, that this notion was borrowed first by the rabbis from the Gentiles; and then by the Christians from the rabbis. We find it recognised by Christian writers, who were incapable of Gentile prejudices, and abominated in particular the whole system of pagan superstition and polytheism; and knew nothing of rabbinical or cabbalistic traditions, which at that time had probably no existence. It is very certain, too, that whether right or wrong in itself, the Fathers who inculcate this doctrine, believed they had scriptural authority for it, in the Septuagint version of Deuteronomy xxxii. 8, to which text they most frequently appeal in confrmation of it : ὅτε διεμέριζεν ὁ ὕψιστος ἔθνη, ὡς διέσπειρεν υἱοὺς ̓Αδάμ, ἔστησεν ὅρια ἐθνῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ΑΓΓΕΛΩΝ Ocoû. The Hebrew indeed has a very different reading,

which is faithfully expressed in our English Bibles. But admit the Septuagint reading—and the doctrine of presiding or tutelar angels would seem to flow out of it without much straining to the obvious meaning of the

text.

It must be confessed, indeed, that whatever opinion we may form of the particular nature or particular employment of these two beings, who are described in the present instance, the one as the Prince of the kingdom of Persia, the other as the Prince of Javan or Greece; the manner in which they are spoken of, and the peculiar designation which is given them, as Archons or Princes, is scriptural at least, and has the sanction not only of the Old Testament in this instance, and in the instance considered from Ezekiel, but also of the New. For both St. Paul and St. Peter have taught us, that the regular phraseology of scripture in speaking of the angels, collectively, is with such denominations as these-under styles and titles denoting power and mastery, empire and supremacy, of some kind or another-thrones, (Opóvot,) principalities, (KuρióτNTES,) rules, (apxai,) authorities, (ovoíaı,) powers, (duvάues,) or the like: see Romans viii. 38: Ephesians i. 21: iii. 10: Colossians i. 15, 16: 1 Peter iii. 22. They have taught us, also, that though the angels are distinguished into good and bad, this peculiar phraseology in speaking of them is not confined to the good; the same high-sounding styles and titles are equally applied to the bad: see Ephesians vi. 12: 1 Cor. viii. 5 xv. 24: Coloss. ii. 15: from which we might justly infer, they were the common right of both, or so inherent in the angelic nature, that they could not be separated from it, even by the effects of the fall. The angels were essentially ruling and governing, or ar