rally at this day? Then it must be tried by something extrinsical to the question, and whatsoever you can call to judgment, reason must still be your solicitor and your advocate and your judge; only reason is not always the law, sometimes it is, for so our blessed Saviour was pleased to say, "Why of yourselves do you not judge that which is reasonable?" For so dikatov there is used,' that which is fitting and consonant to reason;' and in proportion to this it was, that so much of the religion of Jesus was clothed with parables, as if the theorems and propositions themselves were clothed with flesh and blood, and conversed after the manner of men, to whom reason is the law and the rule, the guide and the judge, the measure of good and evil for this life, and for that which is to come. The consequent is this:

53. He that says thus, 'This doctrine is against the word of God, and therefore it is absurd and against reason,' may, as it falls out, say true; but his proposition will be of no use, because reason is before revelation, and that this is revealed by God, must be proved by reason. But,

54. He that says, 'This is absurd, or this is against reason, therefore this is against the word of God,' if he says true in the antecedent, says true in the consequent, and the argument is useful in the whole, it being the best way to interpret difficult scriptures, and to establish right senses, and to confute confident heresies. For when both sides agree that these are the words of God, and the question of faith is concerning the meaning of the words, nothing is an article of faith, or a part of the religion, but what can be proved by reasons to be the sense and intentions of God. Reason is never to be pretended against the clear sense of Scripture, because by reason it is that we came to perceive that to be the clear sense of Scripture. And against reason, reason cannot be pretended; but against the words of Scripture produced in a question, there may be great cause to bring reason; for nothing seems plainer than those words of St. James, "Above all things, my brethren, swear not at all;" and yet reason interposes and tells us, that plain words must not be understood against plain reason and plain necessity for if oaths before magistrates were not permitted and allowed, it were necessary to examine all men by torLuke, xii. 57.

ture; and yet neither so could they so well be secured of truth as they can by swearing. What is more plain than the words of St. Paul &? Νεκρώσατε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν, τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς,

66

Mortify (or kill) your members, that are upon the earth;" and yet reason tells us, that we must not hurt or destroy one limb; and wherever the effect would be intolerable, there the sense is still unreasonable; and therefore not a part of faith, so long as it is an enemy to reason, which is the elder sister, and the guide and guardian of the younger.

55. For as when the tables of the law were broken by Moses, God would make no new ones, but bade Moses provide some stones of his own, and he would write them over: so it is in our religion;—when God with the finger of his Spirit writes the religion and the laws of Jesus Christ, he writes them in the tables of our reason, that is, “in the tables of our hearts."-Homo cordatus,' 'a wise, rational man,' sober, and humble, and discursive, hath the best faith: but the ǎTOTO (as St. Paul calls them) " the unreasonable," they are such who "have no faith "," for the Christian religion is called by St. Paul λoyiǹ λarpɛía, “a reasonable worship;" and the word of God is called by St. Peter', yáλa λoyikòv adoλov, "the reasonable and uncrafty milk;" it is full of reason, but it hath no tricks, it is rational, but not crafty, it is wise and holy: and he that pretends there are some things in our religion, which right reason cannot digest and admit, makes it impossible to reduce atheists, or to convert Jews and heathens. But if reason invites them in, reason can entertain them all the day.

And now to the arguments brought against the use of reason; the answers may easily be gathered from the pre

mises:

56. To the first I answer, that reason is the eye of the soul in all things, natural, moral, and religious; and faith is the light of that eye, in things pertaining to God; for it is true, that natural reason cannot teach us the things of God: that is, reason instructed only by this world, which St. Paul calls "the natural man,"-cannot discern the things of the Spirit, for they are " spiritually discerned :" that is, that they are taught and perceived by the aids of God's Spirit, by revelation and divine assistances and grace: but though

Coloss. iii. 5.

h2 Thess. iii. 2.

1 1 Pet. ii. 2.

natural reason cannot, yet it is false to say that reason cannot; for reason illuminated can perceive the things of God; that is, when reason is taught in that faculty, under that master, and by those rules which are proper for spiritual things, then reason can do all its intentions.

57. To the second I answer, that therefore humility and piety are the best dispositions, to the understanding the secrets of the Gospel.

(1.) Because these do remove those prejudices and obstructions which are bars and fetters to reason; and the humble man does best understand, because the proud man will not inquire, or he will not labour, or he will not understand any proposition that makes it necessary for him to lay aside his employment or his vanity, his interest or his vice.

(2.) These are indeed excellent dispositions to understanding, the best moral instruments, but not the best natural: if you are to dispute against a heathen, a good reason will sooner convince him than an humble thought; if you be to convert a Jew, an argument from the old prophets is better to him than three or four acts of a gracious comportment.

(3.) Sometimes by way of blessing and reward, God gives understanding to good persons, which to the evil he denies; but this which effects any thing by way of divine blessing, is not to be supposed the best natural instrument. Thus the divines say, that the fire of hell shall torment souls, "tanquam instrumentum divinæ voluntatis," as the instrument in the hand of a voluntary and almighty agent, but not as a thing apportioned properly to such an event,-for the worm of conscience is more apt to that purpose.

(4.) And when we compare man with man, so it is true that the pious man should be sooner instructed than the impious, 'cæteris paribus;' but if we compare discourse and piety, reason and humility, they excel each other in their several kinds, as wool is better than a diamond, and yet adiamond is to be preferred before a bag of wool; they operate to the same purpose of understanding in several manners: and whereas it is said in the argument, that "the doctrine of the cross was foolishness to the Greeks," it is true, but nothing to the present question. For therefore it was foolishness to them, because they had not been taught in the secrets of God, they

were not instructed how God would, by a way so contrary to flesh and blood, cause the spirits of just men to be made perfect. And they who were wise by Plato's philosophy, and only well skilled in Aristotle, could do nothing in the schools of Jesus, because they were not instructed in those truths by which such proceedings were to be measured; but still, reason is the great wheel, though according as the motion was intended, new weights must be proportioned accordingly.

58. The third objection presses upon the point of duty, and because the Scripture requires obedience of understanding, and submitting our most imperious faculties, therefore reason is to be excluded:' to this I answer, that we must submit our understanding to God, is very true, but that is only when God speaks. But because we heard him not, and are only told that God did speak, our reason must examine whether it be fit to believe them that tell us so; for some men have spoken falsely, and we have great reason to believe God, when all the reason in the world commands us to suspect the offerings of some men; and although we ought, for the greatest reasons, submit to God, yet we must judge and discern the sayings of God, from the pretences of men; and how that can be done without using our reason in the inquiries of religion, is not yet discovered; but for the obedience of understanding, it consists in these particulars:

The Particulars in which Obedience of Understanding consists.

59. (1.) That we submit to God only and not to man; that is, to God wherever it appears reasonable to be believed that he hath spoken,-but never to man, unless he hath authority from reason or religion to command our conformity.

60. (2.) That those things which, by the abuse and pretence of reason, are passed into a fictitious and usurped authority, make no part of our religion; for because we are commanded to submit our understanding to God, therefore we must "call no man master upon earth;" therefore it is certain that we must not believe the reports or opinions of men against a revelation of God. He that communicates with holy bread only, and gives not the chalice to all God's people that require the holy communion, does openly adhere to

a fond custom and authority of abused men, and leaves the express, clearest, undeniable institution of God.

61. (3.) When reason and revelation seem to disagree, let us so order ourselves, that so long as we believe this to be a revelation, no pretence or reason may change our belief from it if right or sufficient reason can persuade us that this is not a revelation,-well and good; but if reason leaves us in the actual persuasion that it is so, we must force our reason to comply with this, since no reason does force us to quit this wholly; and if we cannot quit our reason or satisfy it, let us carry ourselves with modesty, and confess the revelation, though with profession of our ignorance and unskilfulness to reconcile the two litigants.

62. (4.) That whatsoever is clearly and plainly told us, we obey it, and rest in it, and not measure it by the rules of folly and weak philosophy, or the sayings of men, in which error may be ingredient; but when things are unequal, that is, when we can doubt concerning our reason, and cannot doubt concerning the revelation, we make no question, but prefer this before that.

63. (5.) That in particular inquiries, we so order ourselves as to make this the general measure, that we never do violence to the word of God, or suspect that, but resolve rather to call ourselves liars, than that religion should receive detriment; and rather quit our arguments than hazard an article; that is, that when all things are equal, we rather prefer the pretence of revelation, than the pretences of reason, for the reverence of that and the suspicion of this. Beyond this we can do no more.

64. To the fourth I answer, that it is true, reason is fallible; or rather to speak properly, ratiocination, or the using of reason, is subject to abuse and deception; for reason itself is not fallible; but if reason, that is, reasonings, be fallible, so are the pretences of revelation subject to abuse; and what are we now the nearer? Some reasons are but probable, and some are certain and confessed, and so it is in the sense of scriptures, some are plain and need no interpreter, no discourse, no art, no reasonings, to draw out their sense; but many are intricate and obscure, secret and mysterious; and to use a fallible reasoning to draw out an obscure and uncertain sense of Scripture, is sometimes the best way we