the proportion of the spinal column to the arms, legs, hands, foot. As to the skull, Huxley terms the differences "truly immense."

In the gorilla the face, formed mostly of the massive jaw-bones, predominates over the brain-case, in the man the proportions are reversed. In the man the occiput foramen is behind the centre of the base of the skull, giving the head the erect posture; in the gorilla it is in the posterior third of that base. In the man the skull is comparatively smooth, brow prominences project little; while in the gorilla, vast crests are developed from the skull, and the great brow-ridges overhang the cavernous orbits, like great pent-houses.

In the comparative sizes of the brain cavity the contrast is still more marked. The capacities of the highest and lowest human skulls yet measured, are respectively one hundred and fourteen and sixtytwo cubit inches; gorilla highest and lowest thirty-four and one-half and twenty-four cubit inches. The capacity of the brain-case of the man is about thrice that of the gorilla. Says Huxley, "It may be safely said that an average European child of four years old, has a brain twice as large as that of an adult gorilla." And this comparative diversity of brain capacities is greatly enhanced when it is remembered that a "full grown gorilla is probably nearly twice as heavy as a Bosjes man, or as many a European woman." This makes the brain of man (when the weight of body is counted) to that of the gorilla as six to one (about).

Summing up his comparison of the gorilla and man, Huxley says:

I find that those who endeavor to teach what Nature so clearly shows us in this matter, are liable to have their opinions misrepresented and their phraseology garbled, until they seem to say that the structural differences between man and the highest apes are small and insignificant. Let me take this opportunity, then, of distinctly asserting, on the contrary, that they are great and significant; that every bone of a gorilla bears marks by which it might be distinguished from the corresponding bone of a man; and that in the present creation, at any rate, no intermediate link bridges over the gap between Homo and Troglodytes. It would be no less wrong than absurd to deny the existence of this chasm.

Some attempt to link man to the ape anatomically, by means of ancient human bones, and specially by the Engis skull, and the Neanderthal skeleton. The Engis skull was found five feet under the surface, in undisturbed osseous breccia, with teeth of the rhinoceros, horse, hyæna and bear, indicating great antiquity; the age of the Neanderthal bones is not indicated by their site, but are regarded ancient. These crania, some claim, help to grade down the chasm

between the man and the ape. But, says M. Geoffroy St. Hilaire, "Much greater differences exist between the different specimens of well characterized varieties of to-day, than between the fossil Engis cranium, and that of one of those varieties selected as a term of comparison." And says Huxley:

Its contours and measurements agree very well with those of some Australian skulls which I have examined. On the other hand, its measurements agree equally well with those of some European skulls. And, assuredly, there is no mark of degradation about any part of its structure. It is, in fact, a fair average human skull, which might have belonged to a philosopher, or might have contained the thoughtless brains of a savage.

And of the Neanderthal bones, Huxley says:

Although the most pithecoid of human crania yet discovered, yet its large brain capacity would alone suggest that the pithecoid tendencies, indicated by this skull, did not extend deep into the organization; and this conclusion is borne out by the dimensions of the other bones of the skeleton, which show that the absolute height and relative proportions of the limbs were quite those of a European of middle stature. In no sense, then, can the Neanderthal bones be regarded as the remains of a human being, intermediate between man and the apes. In conclusion, I may say, that the fossil remains of man hitherto discovered, do not seem to me to take us appreciably nearer to that lower pithecoid form, by the modification of which he has probably become what he is.

And the great naturalist, at his wit's end to find the missing linksthe go-between-to bridge the chasm from man to the ape, needful for the support of the Darwinian hypothesis, closes his book with the yet unanswered cry for help:

Where, then, must we look for primeval man? Was the oldest homo sapiens pliocene or miocene, or yet more ancient? In still older strata do the fossilized bones of an ape more anthropoid, or of a man more pithecoid, than any yet known, await the researches of some unborn palæontologist? Time will show. But, in the meanwhile, if any form of the doctrine of progressive development is correct, we must extend by long epochs the most liberal estimate that has yet been made of the antiquity of man.

Thus at present the vast chasm between the man and the brute stands unbridged; nor have the discoveries of palæontology been able to bring the two appreciably nearer.

To the new and unbridged beginning anatomical in man must be

added other new beginnings-language, law, social relations, governance of reason, moral nature, power of progress intellectually, morally. Here Huxley confesses "the divergence of the human and simian stirps is immeasureable and practically infinite"-a wide chasm truly.

1. Language. Some claim articulate speech to be the "grand distinctive character" of man. Although some kinds of birds utter (by being taught) articulate sounds, yet this is not intelligent speech; and these imitation sounds have been taught them by man. In man, then, is the absolute beginning, among terrestrial creatures, of articulate speech; with no bridging by transitional efforts at articulate speech, nor anatomical contrivances for speech to any previous brute form. There is a vast deal involved in this new beginning.

2. Governance by reason. Without denying wholly reason to brutes, yet this may be claimed: instinct governs the brute, instinct impelling from blind impulse in the organization, or from outward circumstances. On the other hand, in man reason is the governor, instinct the servant; here is voluntary conscious choosing among motives with intelligent thought of a purpose, as usual method of action. New, this, among terrestrial creatures.

3. Esthetics. Here is a new beginning, very marked, a new element in the terrestrial creature, appreciation and enjoyment of beauty-beauty of color, perspective, proportion, adaptation, movement, landscape, language, form, morals (I reject Darwin's sexual selection proof of the aesthetic in the brute).

4. Law. Social governance, by intelligent, freely-accepted, promulgated law, is a new beginning.

5. The moral idea.—In man is the first recognition of right and wrong, duty, guilt. The dog slinking away with (apparent) marks of shame, has no idea of guilt; but simply fear of the displeasure of his master instinctively impels him to flee, flee the punishment he has been accustomed to find connected with his act.

Darwin derives the moral sense from the "social instincts," and thus the social instincts lead the animal to take pleasure in the company of its fellows, have sympathy for and a wish to serve them; when the enduring, always present instinct (the social), from sudden impulse of a transient impulse (e. g., hunger), is overridden, on reflection dissatisfaction is felt, as is felt in any unsatisfied instinct; when language came into use, expression would be given to public opinion; this would intensify the voice of the social instinct; then, also, habit would intensify that voice; finally, obedience to this instinct (the social) is felt to be obligatory. This is Darwin's genesis of the

moral idea.

The imperious word ought [he says] seems merely to imply the consciousness of the existence of a persistent instinct, either innate or partly acquired, serving him as a guide, though liable to be disobeyed. We hardly use the word ought in a metaphorical sense when we say hounds ought to hunt, pointers to point, and retrievers to retrieve their game. If they fail thus to act, they fail in their duty, and act wrongly.

Let it be that the "ought" and the "ought not❞ have arisen as here claimed; very certain it is, analysis now reaches no such basis of such imperatives. Further; this theory, as every other utilitarian theory of the moral idea, misses that which is its essence- the absolute conception of rightness, wrongness, wholly separate from thought of welfare, either of individual or community; indeed, so far as seen, in the face of that welfare the moral imperative issues its mandate and is obeyed approvingly. This idea of "oughtness" is an element in thought utterly diverse from "welfare," it is utterly unique, stands alone in the categories of thought, and is infinitely more significant to the man than his conception, when he says it is the "duty" of his "hound to hunt, his pointer to point, or his retriever to retrieve its game.'

6. Religion. This element, when fully developed, embraces the categories: a Creator; accountability to that Creator; a future life; a future assize, rewards, and punishments. In the lowest savage people the religious sentiment scarcely rises above an indefinite dread of some supernatural power; perhaps no outward religious rites are used. "It is not much to say," remarks Sir J. Lubbock, "that the horrible dread of unknown evil hangs like a thick cloud over savage life, and embitters every pleasure." So Darwin: "The belief in unseen or spiritual agencies seems to be almost universal with the less civilized races." Here we have, doubtless, the religious sentiment in its germ; something, then, the religious sentiment, universally in man. A new beginning this-no dread of the supernatural, no thought of reward and punishment in an after life, no thirsting for a knowledge of and intercourse with God, in the ridged brain-case of the gorilla.

President Chadbourne ("Instinct ") claims that the fact that young children so easily acquire the knowledge of God—abstractly a difficult idea—is evidence of "some special adaptability" of the ideas relating to God, to the human mind. This "special adaptability," he places in a religious "instinct" in man, helping man on by its conception and impulse towards the perfection of his being, the religious supply, as instinct in the brute, helps it to the perfection of its being, impelling towards the provided supply.

In the religious element we have an utterly new beginning in man, with no glimmerings of it in any previously known terrestrial creature.

V. Other objections to Darwinism.

We ought now to see living transition forms between species, etc.; the vegetable and the animal forms ought to be a hodge-podge, instead of the well-defined species, etc., which we now find.

If only "one primordial form" was created, with power of developing by natural selection into the human form, why now any low forms? Why not all human, or nearly so?

A single individual possessing some favoring peculiarity, would, in the wild state, be very unlikely to produce a race with such peculiarity. When races or varieties are produced under domestication by breeders, not only is some one animal chosen most marked with the desired peculiarity, but is carefully crossed with one most resembling it, and then from the progeny are chosen and crossed with each other those individuals most marked in the peculiar trait, and so on. But let the one peculiar favored individual in the wild state cross, as the Darwinian hypothesis necessitates, with the ordinary forms of the herd or flock, producing thus offspring less marked with the peculiarity than itself; these again cross with the common form, and so on; the tendency would not be to perpetuate, but utterly obliterate the peculiar characteristic of the original peculiarly marked individual. And this is just the result seen to-day, when any marked varieties, e. g., of horse, hog, pigeon, are thrust out into the wild state-they invariably revert to a uniform type, and that type, by the wondrous power of atavism, the type of the original stock.

Some species there are, of very complex adaptations to their peculiar conditions of existence and modes of life; any one of these adaptations of instinct, organ, function missing, the species must have perished; these adaptations must have all appeared coetaneously with each other and with the species; the individual of the species could not have waited during an "indefinite period" for any one of these sine qua non adaptations to be developed. Take only two examples, the kangaroo and the honey-bee. In the honey-bee

There is an instinct for gathering honey, and, answering to it, an instrument just fitted for drawing it up from the nectaries of flowers. There is also a sack for holding it, and for producing certain changes in it. There is an instinct for storing this honey, and a substance secreted (by a peculiar function of the body) that can be molded into cells to hold it. There are instruments given for using the substance to