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deeply into the details of life, and enslaving | render reasons unnecessary. The practical the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against principle which guides them to their opinions the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compels all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.

on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathizes, would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one person's preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people's liking instead of one. To an ordinary man, however, his own preference, thus supported, is not only a perfectly satisfactory reason, but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of morality, taste, or propriety, which are not expressly written But though this proposition is not likely to in his religious creed; and his chief guide in be contested in general terms, the practical the interpretation even of that. Men's opinquestion, where to place the limit-how to ions, accordingly, on what is laudable or make the fitting adjustment between individ-blamable, are affected by all the multifarious ual independence and social control-is a sub-causes which influence their wishes in regard ject on which nearly everything remains to to the conduct of others, and which are as be done. All that makes existence valuable to numerous as those which determine their any one, depends on the enforcement of re- wishes on any other subject. Sometimes their straints upon the actions of other people. reason-at other times their prejudices or Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be im- superstitions: often their social affections, posed, by law in the first place, and by opinion not seldom their antisocial ones, their envy or on many things which are not fit subjects for jealousy, their arrogance or contemptuousthe operation of law. What these rules ness; but most commonly, their desires or should be, is the principal question in human fears for themselves- their legitimate or illeaffairs; but if we except a few of the most gitimate self-interest. Wherever there is an obvious cases, it is one of those which least ascendant class, a large portion of the moralprogress has been made in resolving. No two ity of the country emanates from its class inages, and scarcely any two countries, have terests, and its feelings of class superiority. decided it alike; and the decision of one age The morality between Spartans and Helots, or country is a wonder to another. Yet the between planters and negroes, between princes people of any given age and country no more and subjects, between nobles and roturiers, suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a between men and women, has been for the subject on which mankind had always been most part the creation of these class interests agreed. The rules which obtain among them- and feelings: and the sentiments thus generselves appear to them self-evident and self-ated, react in turn upon the moral feelings of justifying. This all but universal illusion is the members of the ascendant class, in their one of the examples of the magical influence relations among themselves. Where, on the of custom, which is not only, as the proverb other hand, a class, formerly ascendant, has says, a second nature, but is continually mis- lost its ascendancy, or where its ascendancy taken for the first. The effect of custom, in is unpopular, the prevailing moral sentiments preventing any misgiving respecting the rules frequently bear the impress of an impatient of conduct which mankind impose on one dislike of superiority. Another grand deteranother, is all the more complete because the mining principle of the rules of conduct, both subject is one on which it is not generally in act and forbearance, which have been enconsidered necessary that reasons should be forced by law or opinion, has been the servilgiven, either by one person to others, or by ity of mankind towards the supposed prefereach to himself. People are accustomed to ences or aversions of their temporal masters believe, and have been encouraged in the be- or of their gods. This servility, though essenlief by some who aspire to the character tially selfish, is not hypocrisy; it gives rise to of philosophers, that their feelings, on subjects perfectly genuine sentiments of abhorrence; of this nature, are better than reasons, and it made men burn magicians and heretics.

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Among so many baser influences, the general | that a human being is accountable to others and obvious interests of society have of course for his religious belief. Yet so natural to had a share, and a large one, in the direction of the moral sentiments: less, however, as a matter of reason, and on their own account, than as a consequence of the sympathies and antipathies which grew out of them: and sympathies and antipathies which had little or nothing to do with the interests of society, have made themselves felt in the establishment of moralities with quite as great force.

mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about, that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realized, except where religious indifference, which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels, has added its weight to the scale. In the minds of almost all religious persons, even in the most tolerant countries, the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves. One person will bear with dissent in matters of church government, but not of dogma; another can tolerate everybody, short of a Papist or an Unitarian; another, every one who believes in revealed religion; a few extend their charity a little further, but stop at the belief in a God and in a future state. Wherever the sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense, it is found to have abated little of its claim to be obeyed.

In England, from the peculiar circumstances of our political history, though the yoke of opinion is perhaps heavier, that of law is lighter, than in most other countries of Europe; and there is considerable jealousy of direct interference, by the legislative or the executive power, with private conduct; not so much from any just regard for the independence of the individual, as from the still subsisting habit of looking on the government as representing an opposite interest to the public. The majority have not yet learnt to feel the power of the government their power, or its opinions their opinions. When they do so, individual liberty will probably be as much ex

The likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion. And in general, those who have been in advance of society in thought and feeling, have left this condition of things unassailed in principle, however they may have come into conflict with it in some of its details. They have occupied themselves rather in inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike, than in questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a law to individuals. They preferred endeavoring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular points on which they were themselves heretical, rather than make common cause in defence of freedom, with heretics generally. The only case in which the higher ground has been taken on principle and maintained with consistency, by any but an individual here and there, is that of religious belief; a case instructive in many ways, and not least so as forming a most striking instance of the fallibility of what is called the moral sense: for the odium theologi-posed to invasion from the government, as it cum, in a sincere bigot, is one of the most un- already is from public opinion. But, as yet, equivocal cases of moral feeling. Those who there is a considerable amount of feeling ready first broke the yoke of what called itself the to be called forth against any attempt of the Universal Church, were in general as little law to control individuals in things in which willing to permit difference of religious opin- they have not hitherto been accustomed to be ion as that church itself. But when the heat controlled by it; and this with very little disof the conflict was over, without giving a com- crimination as to whether the matter is, or is plete victory to any party, and each church not, within the legitimate sphere of legal conor sect was reduced to limit its hopes to re- trol; insomuch that the feeling, highly salutaining possession of the ground it already oc-tary on the whole, is perhaps quite as often cupied; minorities, seeing that they had no chance of becoming majorities, were under the necessity of pleading to those whom they could not convert, for permission to differ. It is accordingly on this battle field, almost solely, that the rights of the individual against society have been asserted on broad grounds of principle, and the claim of society to exercise authority over dissentients, openly controverted. The great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied absolutely

misplaced as well grounded in the particular instances of its application. There is, in fact, no recognized principle by which the propriety or impropriety of government interference is customarily tested. People decide according to their personal preferences. Some, whenever they see any good to be done, or evil to be remedied, would willingly instigate the government to undertake the business; while others prefer to bear almost any amount of social evil, rather than add one to the departments of human interests amenable to governmental control. And men range themselves on

one or the other side in any particular case, | consideration those backward states of society according to this general direction of their in which the race itself may be considered as sentiments; or according to the degree of in- in its nonage. The early difficulties in the terest which they feel in the particular thing way of spontaneous progress are so great, that which it is proposed that the government there is seldom any choice of means for overshould do, or according to the belief they en- coming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of tertain that the government would, or would improvement is warranted in the use of any not, do it in the manner they prefer; but very expedients that will attain an end, perhaps rarely on account of any opinion to which otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitthey consistently adhere, as to what things imate mode of government in dealing with are fit to be done by a government. And it barbarians, provided the end be their imseems to me that in consequence of this provement, and the means justified by actabsence of rule or principle, one side is at ually effecting that end. Liberty, as a prinpresent as often wrong as the other; the in- ciple, has no application to any state of terference of government is, with about equal frequency, improperly invoked and improperly condemned.

things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against It is proper to state that I forego any adhis will, is to prevent harm to others. His vantage which could be derived to my arguown good, either physical or moral, is not a ment from the idea of abstract right, as a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be thing independent of utility. I regard utility compelled to do or forbear because it will be as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions: better for him to do so, because it will make but it must be utility in the largest sense, him happier, because, in the opinions of others, grounded on the permanent interests of a man to do so would be wise, or even right. These as a progressive being. Those interests, I conare good reasons for remonstrating with him, tend, authorize the subjection of individual or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or spontaneity to external control, only in reentreating him, but not for compelling him, spect to those actions of each, which concern or visiting him with any evil in case he do the interest of other people. If any one does otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie which it is desired to deter him, must be cal-case for punishing him, by law, or, where culated to produce evil to some one else. The legal penalties are not safely applicable, by only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury. For the same reason, we may leave out of

general disapprobation. There are also many positive acts for the benefit of others, which he may rightfully be compelled to perform; such as to give evidence in a court of justice; to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving a fellowcreature's life, or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage, things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly ac

countable to them for the injury. The latter | framing the plan of our life to suit our own case, it is true, requires a much more cautious character; of doing as we like, subject to such exercise of compulsion than the former. To consequences as may follow: without impedmake any one answerable for doing evil to iment from our fellow-creatures, so long as others, is the rule; to make him answerable what we do does not harm them, even though for not preventing evil, is, comparatively they should think our conduct foolish, perspeaking, the exception. Yet there are many verse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty cases clear enough and grave enough to justify of each individual, follows the liberty, within that exception. In all things which regard the same limits, of combination among inthe external relations of the individual, he is dividuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose de jure amenable to those whose interests are not involving harm to others: the persons concerned, and if need be, to society as their combining being supposed to be of full age, protector. There are often good reasons for and not forced or deceived. not holding him to the responsibility; but No society in which these liberties are not, these reasons must arise from the special ex- on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may pediences of the case: either because it is a be its form of government; and none is comkind of case in which he is on the whole likely pletely free in which they do not exist absoto act better, when left to his own discretion.lutely and unqualified. The only freedom than when controlled in any way in which which deserves the name, is that of pursuing society have it in their power to control him; our own good in our own way, so long as we or because the attempt to exercise control | do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or would produce other evils, greater than those impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the which it would prevent. When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgment seat, and protect those interests of others which have no external protection; judging himself all the more rigidly, because the case does not admit of his being made accountable to the judgment of his fellow-creatures.

proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compel ling each to live as seems good to the rest.

Though this doctrine is anything but new and, to some persons, may have the air of a truism, there is no doctrine which stand more directly opposed to the general tendency But there is a sphere of action in which soci- of existing opinion and practice. Society ha ety, as distinguished from the individual, has, expended fully as much effort in the attemp if any, only an indirect interest; compre- (according to its lights) to compel people t bending all that portion of a person's life and conform to its notions of personal, as of socia conduct which affects only himself, or if it excellence. The ancient commonwealth also affects others, only with their free, vol- thought themselves entitled to practice, an untary, and undeceived consent and partici- the ancient philosophers countenanced, th pation. When I say only himself, I mean di- regulation of every part of private conduct b rectly and in the first instance: for whatever public authority, on the ground that the Stat affects himself, may affect others through had a deep interest in the whole bodily an himself; and the objection which may be mental discipline of every one of its citizens grounded on this contingency, will receive a mode of thinking which may have been a consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the missible in small republics surrounded b appropriate region of human liberty. It com-powerful enemies, in constant peril of bein prises, first, the inward domain of conscious-subverted by foreign attack or internal con ness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the motion, and to which even a short interval most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought relaxed energy and self-command might s and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and easily be fatal, that they could not afford t sentiment on all subjects, practical or specu- wait for the salutary permanent effects lative, scientific, moral, or theological. The freedom. In the modern world, the greate liberty of expressing and publishing opinions size of political communities, and above al may seem to fall under a different principle, the separation between spiritual and tempor since it belongs to that part of the conduct of authority (which placed the direction of men an individual which concerns other people; consciences in other hands than those whic but, being almost of as much importance as controlled their worldly affairs), prevented the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great an interference by law in the details great part on the same reasons, is practically private life; but the engines of moral repre inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle sion have been wielded more strenuous requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of against divergence from the reigning opini

in self-regarding, than even in social matters; | as might have been expected. Those grounds, religion, the most powerful of the elements when rightly understood, are of much wider which have entered into the formation of application than to only one division of the moral feeling, having almost always been gov-subject, and a thorough consideration of this erned either by the ambition of a hierarchy, part of the question will be found the best inseeking control over every department of hu- troduction to the remainder. Those to whom man conduct, or by the spirit of Puritanism. nothing which I am about to say will be new, And some of those modern reformers who have may therefore, I hope, excuse me, if on a subplaced themselves in strongest opposition to the ject which now for three centuries has been religions of the past, have been noway behind so often discussed, I venture on one discussion either churches or sects in their assertion of the right of spiritual domination: M. Comte, in particular, whose social system, as unfolded in his Système de Politique Positive, aims at establishing (though by moral more than by legal appliances) a despotism of society over the individual, surpassing anything contemplated in the political ideal of the most rigid disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers.

Apart from the peculiar tenets of individual thinkers, there is also in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over the individual, both by the force of opinion and even by that of legislation; and as the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society, and diminish the power of the individual, this encroachment is not one of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and more formidable. The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power; and as the power is not declining, but growing, unless strong barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief, we must expect, in the present circumstances of the world, to

see it increase.

a

more.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION.

THE time, it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any defence would be necessary of the 'liberty of the press' as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government. No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed, against permitting a legislature or an executive, not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear. This aspect of the question, besides, has been so often and so triumphantly enforced by preceding writers, that it needs not be specially insisted on in this place. Though the law of England on the subject of the press, is as servile to this day as it was in the time of the Tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force against political discussion, except during some temporary panic, when fear of insurrection drives ministers and judges from their propriety;* and, speaking generally, it is not,

* These words had scarcely been written, when, as if to give

them an emphatic contradiction, occurred the Government Press Prosecutions of 1858. That ill-judged interference with the liberty of public discussion has not, however, induced me my conviction that, moments of panic excepted, the era of

to alter a single word in the text, nor has it at all weakened

pains and penalties for political discussion has, in our own

country, passed away. For, in the first place, the prosecutions were not persisted in; and, in the second, they were never, properly speaking, political prosecutions. The offence chargin-ed was not that of criticising institutions, or the acts or persons of rulers, but of circulating what was deemed an immoral

doctrine, the lawfulness of Tyrannicide.

It will be convenient for the argument, if, instead of at once entering upon the general thesis, we confine ourselves in the first stance to a single branch of it, on which the principle here stated is, if not fully, yet to If the arguments of the present chapter are of any validity, a certain point, recognized by the current there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and disopinions. This one branch is the Liberty of cussing, as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered. It would, therefore, be Thought: from which it is impossible to sepa- irrelevant and out of place to examine here, whether the docrate the cognate liberty of speaking and of trine of Tyrannicide deserves that title. I shall content myself with saying that the subject has been at all times one of writing. Although these liberties, to some the open questions of morals; that the act of a private citizen considerable amount, form part of the polit-in striking down a criminal, who, by raising himself above the ical morality of all countries which profess re-law, has placed himself beyond the reach of legal punishment ligious toleration and free institutions, the or control, has been accounted by whole nations, and by some grounds, both philosophical and practical, oned virtue; and that, right or wrong, it is not of the nature of which they rest, are perhaps not so familiar assassination, but of civil war. As such, I hold that the instito the general mind, nor so thoroughly appre-punishment, but only if an overt act has followed, and at ciated by many even of the leaders of opinion, least a probable connection can be established between the act

of the best and wisest of men, not a crime, but an act of exalt

gation to it, in a specific case, may be a proper subject of

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