was placed. His tongue refused to obey the behest of his will, and he could articulate only one word at a time, and that with extreme difficulty. It was some time before anyone was permitted to see him, but he rallied again; and when it was deemed safe for his friends to visit him, many availed themselves of the opportunity. He recognised his early associates more quickly than those of later years. He would look at the latter inquisitively for some time before he made signs that he knew them. Some of these interviews were deeply affecting. The sympathy of an old and valued friendship broke up the fountains within, and the inward commotion was manifested in loud sobbing and floods of tears.

The following touching incident deserves a special notice. A few days before his death, a young man called to see him, who stated that he was anxious to pay his respects and to acknowledge his obligation to the invalid. He said, "Mr. Pugh was kind to me. When I was a poor boy, hungry and badly clothed, he found me in the street in Tunstall, and took me into his house, and gave me food and good advice; and this he repeated until I got into work. His kindness and good advice led me to seek the Lord. I was converted and joined society, and have been in constant work since, and am able to do a good share towards maintaining our family, in which are several sisters almost helpless." He then inquired if it was usual for the friends to pray with Mr. Pugh. Being told that some did, he knelt down and prayed for his benefactor in the most pointed and earnest manner. Wherever Mr. Pugh's name is known, let this memorial of him be related. It was a kindly deed, which might have perished in black oblivion, so far as our knowledge of it is concerned. But it appears in this place to remind us that nothing is lost, nothing is wasted.

It appears to us a singular feature in Mr. Pugh's affliction that for a month before his death he was unable to recognise his little daughter. He was deeply attached to her, and had been heard to say, that he thought to be bereft of her would be more than he could endure. But strange to say, it seemed that she was the only acquaintance he forgot, or that he did not recognize. No matter how she fondled him, or by what endearing names she called him, he took no notice of her. The all-merciful God spared him the agonizing ordeal of parting with her, and thus she was completely forgotten.

But he was now rapidly approaching the end of his journey. His attendants perceived that each ten or fourteen days he changed for the worse. During the eleven weeks of his affliction they could only imperfectly commune with him, by looks and signs. In his more wakeful and collected moments the expression of his eye was strikingly significant. But they were not able in every instance to divine his meaning, either by his looks or by the sign of his hand.

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Sometimes he made great efforts to speak, and the struggle was so intense that it gave his countenance the most agonised aspect. When they failed to comprehend his meaning, or to conjecture the real cause of his anxiety, Mr. Pritchard would promise to attend to any matter of an official or family nature. Then he would compose himself again and sleep. On one occasion, three or four days before he fell into his final stupor, the expression of his countenance, the motion of his hand, the agitation of his whole frame, the renewed efforts to communicate his meaning in words, were very striking, and inspired all who witnessed those signs with great concern to know the meaning of them. But it was all in vain. Mr. Pritchard renewed his promise, and wished him not to let any of the affairs of this life trouble him, but to rest satisfied that all would be attended to. On the Saturday before his death he made expressive signs with his hands for some one to be called in. On asking, "Is it Pritchard you want ?" he quickly assented. Mr. Pritchard was soon at his bedside and asked him various questions respecting the state of his mind, his prospects of heaven, and whether the doctrines he preached and the Saviour in whom he believed were his stay and comfort then; to which he most significantly signed in the affirmative, and looked remarkably calm and pleasant. During prayer he appeared exceedingly devout, and those present who observed him said his sign responses were very impressive. In his wakeful intervals during that and the following day his eyes were raised heavenward, and he remained in silent communion with the Father of Spirits. And now we must bid him a long farewell. The avenues through which he conversed with us are closed. The earth recedes. This is our last glimpse of him for the present, and like Moses on the top of Pisgah, we see him alone with God.

About one o'clock on Tuesday morning a sudden change passed over him, his eyes closed, he became insensible, and his breathing indicated the approach of death. He sank rapidly through the day, and on Tuesday morning, January 31st, 1871, with a smile on his countenance, he departed to be with Christ. On the 4th February, in the midst of great lamentation, devout men carried him to his grave.

And now he sleeps as soundly as though he had lived his threescore years and ten, and had completed his proposed task, or as though he had not taken with him the secret he longed to disclose., And it is the same to him now, whether or not we con his history, or know his worth. To us it seems an unspeakable loss that he left no record of his work behind. It may be that the reading of his life would have been a spur to the industrious student, and would have prompted him to emulate one that was a successful minister of Jesus Christ. But notwithstanding the lack of a written memorial, he has given to us a noble example-an example of

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cheerful devotedness to work, of self-sacrifice, of modesty, of humility; and these are the rare qualities out of which true greatness comes. It matters not to him, whether or hum of human applause is heard above his grave; the voice of Fame will never reach his ears. He elected that the chronicle of his deeds should perish. He was content to walk into the dread eternity without the multitude gazing after him and applauding his work. In fact he loved the praise of God better than the praise of men, and when going forth alone to meet the last foe he committed his life and his work to Him that judgeth righteously. JOSEPH SHENTON.

ART. II. SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY.

SECOND PAPER.

N the matter of perception proper four hypotheses have been proposed for solving the problem, how intercourse of substances so opposite as mind and body can be accomplished. Some have contended for the hypothesis of Divine assistance, or of occasional causes. By this hypothesis every act in the universe is ultimately God's. He is supposed to enable the mind to perceive material substances by direct interposition. This is the Cartesian theory. It renders all human action supernatural. The Leibnitzian hypothesis is that of a pre-established harmony. This denies occasional causes and real connection between material and spiritual substances, as well as between substances in general, and explains their apparent communion from a previously decreed co-arrangement of the Supreme Being, founded on his foreknowledge of all possible souls, bodies, combinations, etc. Thus the harmony which appears to combine the soul and body is independent of any reciprocal action between the two. A third hypothesis of perception is that of a plastic medium between soul and body-a theory which annihilates itself; for how can there be a mixture of body and spirit to mediate between body and spirit, when body and spirit are sɔ diametrically opposite that they will not mix? We have next the hypothesis of physical influence, which is saved from absolute materialism and philosophical sensualism, by the theory of representative ideas.

An act of immediate knowledge is simple; there is nothing in it beyond the mere consciousness, by that which knows, of that which is known. Here consciousness is simply contemplative. On the contrary, an act of mediate knowledge is complex; for the mind is not only conscious of the act of knowing as its own modification,

but of this modification as an object representative of, or relative to, an object beyond the sphere of consciousness. In this act, consciousness is both representative and contemplative of the representation. In an immediate cognition the object is single and the term unequivocal; in a mediate cognition the object is twofold, and the term equivocal; the object known and representing being different from the object unknown, except as represented. In an intuitive act of the mind, the object known is known as actually existing. Here nothing is problematical. Everything is asserted without doubt. In a representative act, on the other hand, the object represented is unknown; therefore problematical. Further: Representative knowledge is exclusively subjective. Intuitive knowledge is either subjective or objective; for its single object may be either a phenomenon of the ego (that is, the myself—the I-the me), or of the non-ego (that is, the not myself-the not-I, or the not-me); and this intuitive knowledge of the ego or non-ego may be material or mental. An intuitive cognition is also complete and absolute, being irrespective of aught beyond the dominion of consciousness; whereas a representative cognition as an act is incomplete, being relative to, and vicarious of, an existence beyond the sphere of actual knowledge. Consciousness gives in the unity of knowledge the duality of existence-the percipient mind and the object perceived by the mind-the ego and the non-ego. Reid was a dualist, because he forsook the unity of consciousness and held the doctrine of ideas being representatives to aid the mind in perceiving something beyond, but through, the ideas themselves. In strictness of speech, Brown was a philosophical Unitarian, i.e., he held that the mind perceiving and the object perceived are one. Reid held, First: What is really perceived does exist. Second: He understands philosphers to agree that the idea or representative object, in their theory, is, in the strictest sense, immediately perceived. Third: He held with the vulgar that we have an immediate perception of the external objects themselves. Fourth: He limits consciousness to self-consciousness, and makes perception the faculty by which we are immediately cognisant of the qualities of the not-self. Reid held further, that the immediate perception of external things was convertible with their reality; that the external reality stands to the percipient mind face to face, in the same immediacy of relation which the idea holds in the representative theory of philosophers; and that perception affords equal evidence of the existence of external phenomena, as consciousness does of internal; thus, Reid was a Natural Realist.

It is important to distinguish between perception proper, and sensation proper. Sensation, properly speaking, is the mere subjective feeling-pleasant, painful, or otherwise-which we have of external objects by, or through, the senses alone. Perception

properly speaking, is the objective knowledge we have of an external reality through the senses. Though these always co-exist, they are perfectly distinct. Perception is the objective element in the complex state-the element of cognition; sensation is the subjective element-the element of feeling. These are always in the inverse ratio of each other. Those senses which have most acute feeling, as taste and smell, afford the least real perception or knowledge: while sight and hearing, which afford most knowledge, give the least pleasure or pain. Touch is regarded by Sir William as a plurality of senses. When the degree of sensation is heightened it gives less perception or knowledge than when it is lower. This is alike true respecting sight, hearing, smell, and taste. From this it follows that perception, as held by Sir W., is a far more intellectual and even spiritual act than sensation. Reid thinks the difference between primary and secondary qualities in matter is real; viz., that we have, by our senses, a direct and distinct notion or cognition of the primary, but only a relative, and therefore indistinct, notion of the secondary qualities; so that the former notion is clear, the latter obscure. All the primary qualities of matter are reduced by Sir W. to extension and solidity.

Many philosophers have rejected the testimony of consciousness to our immediate knowledge of the non-ego, or universe outside the human mind. These are principally the representationists, who raise at least five objections against the doctrine of Natural Realism, as held by Reid, and explained and developed by Sir W. It is objected that the mind must act out of itself in order to a cognition of external things; that it cannot be conscious of aught beyond its own modifications. To this Sir W. replies: Our ignorance of the how the mind is conscious of the Non-ego or external system of things does not disprove the fact of its being conscious of things outside itself. Then, if the action of every existence were limited to itself, nothing could act upon any other thing; therefore, action and re-action would be impossible. Further, these cosmothetic idealists are obliged to admit that matter acts out of itself upon mind. This first and highest ground, therefore, on which it is attempted to establish the necessity of a representative perception, is not only insufficient, but selfcontradictory. The next objection is, that mind and matter are substances separated by the whole diameter of being; but, say the objectors, what is known must be of the same nature as that which knows. Sir W. replies thus: Here is an arbitray assumption. Who can show that the knowing mind must be of the substance known? Some philosophers, as Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and sometimes Aristotle, held an opposite view. Again, each assertion is alike unphilosophical. We know a priori nothing of what can be