IX

WAR AND ECONOMICS IN HISTORY AND IN

THEORY1

Each generation must write its own history of past events, in order to interpret them in terms corresponding to its needs. New conditions give rise to new problems, and these to new conceptions; and when we turn again to examine the past, we put to it questions never before asked. Since the middle of the century, when the victory of parliamentary government in western Europe was finally assured, without, however, accomplishing the marvelous results expected of it, the question as to the best form of government has come to have mainly an academic interest, while the contests of actual politics have more and more turned upon questions of social and economic policy. This shifting of the center of interest has been followed by a corresponding change in the character of historical writing, culminating in the rise of the new school 2 in which political constitutions are considered as results rather than causes, and attention is devoted chiefly to the economic factor in history. Such a change in the point of view must necessarily alter the perspective of history, giving more prominence to such phenomena as have an important bearing on economic development.

That war belongs to this category seems altogether beyond dispute. If it be true that all great events are due in large part to economic causes, and react in turn upon economic conditions,

1 Edward VanDyke Robinson, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XV, pp. 581622.

2

Represented in different ways by men so unlike, yet having so much in common, as Schmoller, Lamprecht, Ashley, Bücher, Loria, and Rabbeno. Cf. Lamprecht's Alte und neue Richtungen in der Geschichtswissenschaft, and the admirable review entitled " Features of the New History," by Earle Wilbur Dow, in the American Historical Review for April, 1898.

then surely it will no longer suffice to dismiss this subject with the customary lamentations about the horrors and waste of war, nor even with some more or less probable estimates of the cost of particular wars. The time has certainly come when an investigation is needed, to show, if possible, the relation of war as an institution to the economic conditions prevailing in the several stages of civilization.

I

Among tribes subsisting on the products furnished spontaneously by nature, war is the normal condition. The reason is, in the main, economic. The scarcity and precariousness of the food supply render much land necessary to support each family. Unless climatic conditions absolutely prevent an increase of population, the hunting grounds of the several tribes are of necessity extended until they overlap; and so arises a war of extermination, whose issue is the destruction of the least efficient social organization and the restoration of the equilibrium between population and food supply. At this stage of economic development war is not only a business enterprise but the only conceivable business enterprise, the only means by which a vigorous tribe may procure for itself an increased food supply. Nevertheless, a victorious tribe cannot expand without breaking up into smaller tribes, for the economic condition forbids men to dwell in large groups. This state of things thus tends to perpetuate itself. Individual tribes may rise or fall, but the old way of life goes on unchanged. How, then, does civilization ever emerge from this vicious circle?

This is a question not yet satisfactorily answered, though M. Tarde's imitation theory, and the culture myths of all races which have learned the secret of an artificial food supply, would indicate that individual initiative played a leading part in the great transformation. But the most brilliant genius could do no more than apply to the satisfaction of an existing need something contained in or suggested by his environment. And it is characteristic of human nature not to try a new plan until the old one has utterly failed. What, then, were the circumstances which resulted in the creation of an artificial food supply?

It is evident that before this could happen the natural food supply must have proved insufficient, and the usual remedy in such cases, war, must have failed to bring relief. At first glance both these conditions would appear to exist among tribes worsted in battle, and one is tempted to think he has discovered another of the uses of adversity. But in savage warfare the defeated party is seldom left with any surplus population; and, even when their numbers again increase or the tribe is forced back into a less productive country, the creation of an artificial food supply is effectually hindered by their inability to defend themselves or their possessions. Instead of seeking to increase their resources, they set about limiting the increase of population by a systematic extension of the practices of infanticide and "senicide," which exist among all savages but reach their fullest development among tribes unable to make head against their neighbors. It is not, therefore, among the conquered that the origin of the new industrial system must be sought; nor yet among the conquerors, if they have been able by conquest adequately to supply their needs. It is rather among tribes whose equality of strength or inaccessible location prevents a decisive victory that the creation of an artificial food supply becomes a necessity and hence a fact; and the same rule holds good concerning most of the subsequent steps in economic progress. In other words, industrial development is the result of strenuous competition, of which war is the most acute form.

Whether the next stage shall be pastoral or agricultural depends on the environment. In an open country, where there are animals suitable for domestication, the tribe will become pastoral; without such animals, or in a broken forest land, it becomes agricultural. Other things being equal, the change to pastoral life is the more easy and natural. The food supply obtainable from a given area being greatly increased, the population is multiplied in like proportion. And whereas the hunting existence scatters the population, the pastoral life tends to greater concentration through the need of mutual protection for the herds, and to social and political consolidation through the development of a patriarchal organization. For this reason, while

hunting tribes are limited to guerrilla warfare, the numbers, discipline, mobility, and readily transported food supply of pastoral peoples enable them to undertake distant expeditions and to make conquests on a grand scale. These things are, moreover, forced upon them by the economic limitations inherent in their mode of life. War is eventually as much an economic necessity for pastoral as for hunting tribes. Population depends upon herds, and herds upon accessible pasturage. But, owing to the rapid increase of population due to the greater regularity and comfort of their life as compared with hunting tribes, the limit of safety is soon passed. In this condition the least failure of pasturage, from drought or other cause, drives them forth into distant lands with the suddenness and violence of a tidal wave. This is the explanation of the periodically recurring Völkerwanderungen which have swept over the earth, destroying and founding empires.

When hemmed in by impassable barriers or invincible enemies, pastoral tribes, under the pressure of an increasing population, slowly become agricultural. The latter case was illustrated in the Germans beyond the Roman lines; of the former, examples may be found in Egypt, Chaldea, China, Peru, and Mexico, which early became centers of agriculture less because of their natural fertility since in most of them irrigation was necessary- than because of their inaccessibility. They were so fenced about by mountains and deserts that the inhabitants were thrown back on their own resources to maintain the increasing population. Moreover, for the same reason, they were largely protected against hostile raids during the early period of agricultural development, when the people, scattered upon the land, fall an easy prey to every marauder.

Inaccessibility would thus appear to be as advantageous for the origin of a civilization based on agriculture as accessibility is for its continued development. Nevertheless, even in the most sheltered lands, the necessity of self-defense finally leads to division of labor and to social differentiation. A temporary form of this division was the arrangement found among the Suevi, by which the men alternately tilled the land and went out to war.

The next step is the development of a permanent military class. The system of castes is an economic necessity at the stage of development when the family is the only possible school of practical arts. It is equally "an inevitable incident accompanying a certain stage of military expansion." And it is likewise the result of conquest which produces slaves and subjects to be exploited for the benefit of the ruling race, —a result whereof Sparta is the classical example. All three causes were operative in antiquity, especially in the Oriental world. The great empires which flourished there all rested on a more or less clearly defined system of castes; and in all of them conquest was not only the origin but also the chief end of the state. Under the circumstances no other object was possible; for the lack of scientific knowledge and the rigidity of the social system narrowly limited the division of labor and rendered not only agriculture but even manufacturing relatively unproductive. It was inevitable, therefore, that the natural increase of population should cause the law of decreasing returns to be keenly felt. Where should relief be sought if not in conquest, in the booty and tribute of subject peoples? To this all nations instinctively turned.

It is not less true, therefore, of agricultural than of shepherd nations, that war ultimately becomes an economic necessity. For the time comes when foreign lands must be drawn upon to feed the people, and, in the absence of international division of labor, the only possible means to this end is war. The development of commerce on a grand scale and the use of a money economy do not remove all the causes tending to war; but they open up the possibility - barring commercial rivalries of a peaceful expansion. And this was neither possible nor conceivable in a natural economy such as characterized the Orient. This fact alone explains the predominant rôle of conquest in the ancient world.1

II

In passing from the Oriental nations to Greece we obtain a glimpse into a condition of things infinitely more primitive.

1 Cunningham, Western Civilization in its Economic Aspects, pp. 13, 14, 24–38.