they are as transitory hieroglyphics, and are to hieroglyphics as words spoken are to words written, in that they abide not; but they have evermore, as well as the other, an affinity with the things signified; as Periander, being consulted with how to preserve a tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger attend and report what he saw him do; and went into his garden and topped all the highest flowers: signifying that it consisted in the cutting off and keeping low of the nobility and grandees. Ad placitum," are the characters real before mentioned, and words: although some have been willing by curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning, to have derived imposition of names from reason and intendment; a speculation elegant, and, by reason it searcheth into antiquity, reverent; but sparingly mixed with truth, and of small fruit. This portion of knowledge, touching the notes of things, and cogitations in general, I find not inquired, but deficient. And although it may seem of no great use, considering that words and writings by letters do far excel all the other ways; yet because this part concerneth, as it were, the mint of knowledge, (for words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits, as moneys are for values, and that it is fit men be not ignorant that moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver,) I thought good to propound it to better inquiry.

Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them hath produced the science of Grammar: for man still striveth to reintegrate himself in those benedictions, from which by his fault he hath been deprived; and as he hath striven against the first general curse by the invention of all other arts, so hath he sought to come forth of the second general curse, which was the confusion of tongues, by the art of grammar: whereof the use in a mother-tongue is small, in a foreign tongue more, but most in such foreign tongues as have ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned only to learned tongues. The duty of it is of two natures; the one popular, which is for the speedy and perfect attaining languages, as well for intercourse of speech as for understanding of authors; the other philosophical, examining the power and nature of words, as they are

1

the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy between words and reason is handled "sparsim," brokenly, though not entirely; and therefore I cannot report it deficient, though I think it very worthy to be reduced into a science by itself.

Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the consideration of the accidents of words; which are measure, sound, and elevation or accent, and the sweetness and harshness of them; whence hath issued some curious observations in rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we consider it, in respect of the verse and not of the argument: wherein though men in learned tongues do tie themselves to the ancient measures, yet in modern languages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses as of dances: for a dance is a measured pace, as a verse is a measured speech. In these things the sense is better judge than the art;

"Cœnæ fercula nostræ

Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis."2

And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and unfit subject, it is well said, "Quod tempore antiquum videtur, id incongruitate est maxime novum."

For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alphabets, but may be in words. The kinds of ciphers, besides the simple ciphers, with changes, and intermixtures of nulls and non-significants, are many, according to the nature or rule of the infolding, wheelciphers, key-ciphers, doubles, &c. But the virtues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are three; that they be not laborious to write and read; that they be impossible to decipher; and, in some cases, that they be without suspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write "omnia per omnia;"4 which is undoubtedly possible with a proportion quintuple at most of the writing infolding to the writing infolded, and no other restraint whatsoever. This art of

ciphering hath for relative an art of deciphering, by supposition unprofitable, but, as things are, of great use. For suppose that ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of them which exclude the decipherer. But in regard of the rawness and unskilfulness of the hands through which they pass, the greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest ciphers.

In the enumeration of these private and retired arts, it may be thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences, naming them for show and ostentation, and to little other purpose. But let those which are skilful in them judge whether I bring them in only for appearance, or whether in that which I speak of them, though in few marks, there be not some seed of proficience. And this must be remembered, that, as there be many of great account in their countries and provinces, which, when they come up to the seat of the estate, are but of mean rank and scarcely regarded; so these arts, being here placed with the principal and supreme sciences, seem petty things: yet to such as have chosen them to spend their labours and studies in them they seem great matters.

For the method of tradition, I see it hath moved a controversy in our time. But as in civil business, if there be a meeting, and men fall at words, there is commonly an end of the matter for that time, and no proceeding at all; so in learning, where there is much controversy, there is many times little inquiry. For this part of knowledge of method seemeth to me so weakly inquired as I shall report it deficient.

Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in logic, as a part of judgment: for as the doctrine of syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of judgment upon that which is invented, so the doctrine of method containeth the rules of judgment upon that which is to be delivered; for judgment precedeth delivery, as it followeth invention. Neither is the method or the nature of the tradition material only to the use of knowledge, but likewise to the progression of knowledge : for since the labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of knowledge, the wisdom of the tradition is that which inspireth the felicity of continuance and proceeding. And therefore

the most real diversity of method is of method referred to use, and method referred to progression: whereof the one may be termed magistral, and the other of probation.

The latter whereof seemeth to be "via deserta et interclusa." For, as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of contract of errror between the deliverer and the receiver: for he that delivereth knowledge desireth to deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not as may be best examined; and he that receiveth knowledge desireth rather present satisfaction than expectant inquiry; and so rather not to doubt than not to err: glory making the author not to lay open his weakness, and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength.

But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same method wherein it was invented; and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet, nevertheless, 66 secundum majus et minus," a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of his knowledge and consent; and so transplant it into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots; but if you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips; so the delivery of knowledges, as it is now used, is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots-good for the carpenter, but not for the planter. But if you will have sciences grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you look well to the taking up of the roots of which kind of delivery the method of the mathematics, in that subject, hath some shadow; but generally I see it neither put in use nor put in inquisition, and therefore note it for deficient.

Another diversity of method there is, which hath some affinity with the former, used in some cases by the discretion of the ancients, but disgraced since by the impostures of many

1 A desert and secluded way.

2 According to its being greater or less.

vain persons, who have made it as a false light for their counterfeit merchandizes; and that is, enigmatical and disclosed. The pretence whereof is, to remove the vulgar capacities from being admitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can pierce the veil.

Another diversity of method, whereof the consequence is great, is the delivery of knowledge in aphorisms, or in methods; wherein we may observe that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a few axioms or observations upon any subject to make a solemn and formal art, filling it with some discourses, and illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into a sensible method: but the writing in aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, whereto the writing in method doth not approach.

For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid; for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of illustration is cut off; recitals of examples are cut off; discourse of connexion and order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off; so there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good quantity of observation and therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt to write aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But in methods,

"Tantum series juncturaque pollet, Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris;"

as a man shall make a great show of an art which, if it were disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods are more fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to point to action for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, and therefore satisfy; but particulars, being dispersed, do best agree with dispersed directions. And lastly, aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire farther; whereas methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they were at farthest.

1 Skill and arrangement can such charms bestow That commonplaces make a glorious show.

Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great weight, is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or by questions and their determinations; the latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning as it is to the proceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little fort or hold. For if the field be kept, and the sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller things will come in of themselves: indeed a man would not leave some important piece with an enemy at his back. In like manner, the use of confutation in the delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing; and to serve to remove strong preoccupations and prejudgments, and not to minister and excite disputations and doubts.

Another diversity of method is, according to the subject or matter which is handled; for there is a great difference in delivery of the mathematics, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and policy, which is the most immersed: and howsoever contention hath been moved touching a uniformity of method in multiformity of matter, yet we see how that opinion, besides the weakness of it, hath been of ill desert towards learning, as that which taketh the way to reduce learning so certain empty and barren generalities; being but the very husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced out and expulsed with the torture and press of the method: and therefore, as I did allow well of particular topics for invention, so I do allow likewise of particular methods of tradition.

Another diversity of judgment in the delivery and teaching of knowledge is, according unto the light and presuppositions of that which is delivered; for that knowledge which is new and foreign from opinions received is to be delivered in another form than that that is agreeable and familiar; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith, "If we shall indeed dispute, and not follow after similitudes," &c. For those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions need only but to prove or dispute; but those whose conceits are beyond popular opinions have a double

labour; the one to make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and demonstrate so that it is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations to express themselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning, and in rude times, when those conceits which are now trivial were then new, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else would men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for paradoxes, that which was offered before they had understood or judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and tropes are: for it is a rule," That whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions must pray in aid of similitudes."

There be also other diversities of methods, vulgar and received: as that of resolution or analysis, of constitution or systasis, of concealment or cryptic, &c., which I do allow well of, though I have stood upon those which are least handled and observed. All which I have remembered to this purpose, because I would erect and constitute one general inquiry, which seems to me deficient, touching the wisdom of tradition.

But unto this part of knowledge concerning methods doth farther belong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a work, but also the several beams and columns thereof; not as to their stuff, but as to their quantity and figure: and therefore method considereth not only the disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise the propositions: not as to their truth or matter, but as to their limitation and manner. herein Ramus merited better a great deal in reviving the good rules of propositions, Καθόλου πρῶτον κατὰ παντός, &c., than he did in introducing the canker of epitomes; and yet (as it is the condition of human things that, according to the ancient fables, "The most precious things have the most

For

1 This is the strictly logical or dialectic definition of a universal rule, or, as the schoolmen sometimes called it, a catholic precept; namely, that it should apply to all the parts, be independent of any other proposition, and fully express the whole meaning. Ramus thus translates it into Latin: "De omni, per se; universaliter primum." The test is also applied to the adequacy of the definition of universal terms.

pernicious keepers") it was so that the attempt of the one made him fall upon the other. For he had need be well conducted that should design to make axioms convertible, if he make them not withal circular, and "non promovent," or incurring into themselves: but yet the intention was excellent.

The other considerations of method, concerning propositions, are chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which limit the dimensions of sciences; for every knowledge may be fitly said, besides the profundity (which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it solid), to have a longitude and a latitude; accounting the latitude towards other sciences, and the longitude towards action; that is, from the greatest generality to the most particular precept: the one giveth rule how far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the province of another, which is the rule they call Kadavrò; the other giveth rule unto what degree of particularity a knowledge should descend: which latter I find passed over in silence, being in my judgment the more material; for certainly there must be somewhat left to practice; but how much is worthy the inquiry. We see remote and superficial generalities do but offer knowledge to scorn of practical men; and are no more aiding to practice than an Ortelius's universal map is to direct the way between London and York. The better sort of rules have been not unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished, where you may see the images of things, but first they must be filed: so the rules will help, if they be laboured and polished by practice. But how crystaline they may be made at the first, and how far forth they may be polished aforehand, is the question; the inquiry whereof seemeth to me deficient.

There hath been also laboured and put in practice a method, which is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture; which is, to deliver knowledges in such manner as men may speedily come to make a show of

? A proposition existing by itself, such as an axiom or definition, and incapable of being decomposed like hypothetic, exceptive, comparative, and desitive propositions.

For

cerneth the illustration of tradition, comprehended in that science which we call Rhetoric, or art of eloquence; a science excellent, and excellently well laboured. although in true value it is inferior to wisdom, (as it is said by God to Moses, when he disabled himself for want of this faculty, "Aaron shall be thy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as God,") yet with people it is the more mighty: for so Solomon saith, "Sapiens corde appellabitur prudens, sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet; signifying that profoundness of wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active life. And as to the labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time,

and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of rhetoric exceed themselves. Again the excellency of examples of eloquence in the orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this art; and therefore the deficiences which I shall note will rather be in some collections, which may as handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or use of the art itself.

Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots of this science, as we have done of the rest; the duty and office of Rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will. For we see reason is disturbed in the administration thereof by three means; by illaqueation or sophism, which pertains to logic; by imagination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; and by passion or affection, which pertains to