received, as the only evolutionist present in 1868, when on the Council of the Institute. Mr. Orchard gives a hint why evolution has failed in the Institute, if one may judge from the following sentence:"The several geological strata which, in Sedgwick's time, revealed distinct series of fossils, makes the same revelation to-day, and tells us that Sedgwick was right in believing in a succession of separate creative acts." This clearly shows that Mr. Orchard is not aware of the many gaps in palæontology and in living organisms being filled up, as in the mammalia, shells, and early plants, etc., all strongly corroborating evolution. Mr. Woods Smyth says, I "used to make much of 'Divine Directivity.'" I have no recollection of ever having referred directivity to any other source than life, for I have always treated it from a scientific, not philosophic or theological standpoint. I am not aware "that species have originated through one or two factors alone." The external conditions include all the factors, such as light, heat, moisture, drought, soils, etc. These act on the entirety of the plant-the total result is adaptation to these. "Selection" produces "Nothing"; neither artificial nor natural. Man only isolates a variety which Nature has produced. In Nature, a variety A lives, and B dies, because it dies a natural death or is killed. Natural selection did not produce A. My opinion is that Isolation not Selection is the important factor, because it saves the variety from the struggle for existence, which is detrimental to health and development, and leaves it to grow to maturity in peace, just as man endeavours to raise new varieties under cultivation. I may be wrong, but it gives me the impression that my critics generally have not acquired their knowledge first hand from Nature herself. Unless this is done, and the student does so on ecological lines, little progress can be expected. As Galileo said that the earth moved for all his "questioning,"* so I venture to add evolution is a long since proven fact, notwithstanding my opponents. "Tortures." 532ND ORDINARY GENERAL MEETING. MONDAY, MAY 6TH, 1912, 4.30 P.M. T. G. PINCHES, ESQ., LL.D., IN THE CHAIR. The Minutes of the preceding Meeting were read and signed. The CHAIRMAN introduced Mr. MARCUS N. ToD, M.A., Lecturer in Greek Epigraphy in Oxford University, and invited him to read his paper. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE GREEK WORLD. By MARCUS N. TOD, Esq., M.A., Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, and University Lecturer in Greek Epigraphy. WH HEN I was honoured with an invitation to address a meeting of the Victoria Institute, I felt that, not being qualified to speak upon any question of philosophy or natural science, I could not do better than ask your consideration of a subject which for some little time has claimed my special interest and attention, namely, the part played by arbitration in the settlement of disputes between state and state in the ancient Greek world. In spite of the difference, of which we are constantly reminded, between the Greek city-state and the nation-state of the modern world, I shall retain the phrase international arbitration," as more familiar than "interstatal arbitration," and as unlikely to lead to any misapprehension. I am emboldened to bring this subject before your notice, not only by the ever-increasing interest taken at the present day in the question of the settlement of national differences by peaceful and equitable means, not only by the growing conviction amongst thoughtful men that war, where it is not a necessity, is a crime, not only by the burden of huge armaments which presses more and more heavily each year upon many nations and by the greater destructiveness of modern weapons and appliances of war, but also by the fear that the facts of ancient experience, the records of ancient experiments, are in danger of being forgotten. Only five years ago, in the Romanes Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford, the Chancellor of the University, himself a great scholar and an administrator of wide experience, said : "The earliest instance of a frontier commission that I have come across is that of the Commission of six English and Scotch representatives, who were appointed in 1222 to mark the limits of the two kingdoms, and it is symptomatic of the contemporary attitude about frontiers that it broke down directly it set to work, leaving behind it what became a Debatable Land and a battleground of deadly strife for centuries." and again, referring to the settlement of boundary disputes by arbitration, he said: "This method is the exclusive creation of the last half-century or less, and its scope and potentialities are as yet in embryo."* How mistaken such conceptions are I hope to make clear to you in this paper. I shall not overstep the bounds of history and trespass on the sphere of philosophy by any discussion of the fundamental questions of the ethical significance or the moral justification of war. Whatever be our answers to those questions, we shall agree that war, one of the most striking facts of human history, deserves the most careful attention of the philosopher and the economist, it demands the thought of all who are interested in the moral and material well-being of the race, a class which includes, or at least should include, every Christian. But a purely philosophical and abstract presentation of a case is apt to leave the ordinary man unconvinced, not to say suspicious. Ideals are, no doubt, excellent things in their way, but he prides himself upon being a practical man; his appeal is not to logic, but to experience. For him, as for all of us, war is a thing inconceivable in the ideal world; to him, and indeed to every Christian, the full realization of the Kingdom of God involves not only righteousness but peace-peace in the individual, peace between man and man, peace in the relations of nation to nation. But how is this ideal to be made real? what does the history of the past tell us of efforts made with that end more or less consciously in view? how far have they succeeded, and where have they failed? * Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Frontiers, pp. 50, 52. International arbitration was not, as is sometimes asserted, a creation of the Greeks. The extensive discoveries, made within recent years, of documents relating to the domestic and foreign history of Egypt, the Hittite empire and the states of the Euphrates and Tigris valleys, reveal to us remarkably advanced civilizations, with developed laws and a strikingly active system of diplomatic negotiation, existing before the beginnings of heroic, we might almost say of legendary Greece. Amongst these documents, incised upon stone or imprinted upon clay, I would call your attention to one, which relates the story of a feud between the two Sumerian cities of Shirpurla and Gishkhu about 4,000 years before Christ*: it tells how, when war had failed to bring about any settlement of the frontier dispute, arbitration was tried, and Mesilim, King of Kish, was appointed to determine the frontier-line and set up a pillar between the two states to commemorate the fact. It is worth noting how prominent a part is played by religion in this early case of the arbitral settlement of a disputed boundary: the chief god of Shirpurla and the god of Gishkhu are spoken of as deciding upon this method, they do so at the command of Enlil," the king of the countries," and the arbitrator acts under the direction of his own god Kadi. That this was an isolated instance of appeal to arbitration we cannot believe, but probably such appeals grew rarer with the rise of great empires such as those of Assyria, Media, and Persia, which swallowed up the smaller states of western Asia and based their claims upon force rather than upon equity. Yet we hear in Herodotust how, in the early years of the sixth century B.C., a long and indecisive struggle between Alyattes of Lydia and Cyaxares of Media was concluded by the intervention of Syennesis of Cilicia and Labynetus of Babylon, who "reconciled" the two warring monarchs. Whether the Greeks consciously adopted the expedient from their eastern neighbours or discovered independently of them this mode of settling quarrels, we cannot determine. The importance of what they did in this field lies in their recognition of the possibilities involved in arbitration, their frequent application of it to heal the differences existing between individuals or states, and their introduction of it into the political life of the western world. From primitive times we can trace in the Greek world attempts to settle disputes by means of negotiation, * L. W. King and H. R. Hall, Egypt and Western Asia, p. 171. and it must be remembered that throughout the course of its history this was the normal and natural mode of settling differences between state and state. If diplomacy failed, recourse was had to force, either in the form of armed reprisals, usually of the nature of border raids, or in that of open war. But at an early period the Greeks saw that the appeal from negotiation directly to force was not inevitable, that if each state based its claim upon justice and equity they might agree to accept the decision of some neutral tribunal, whether composed of an individual or of a body of men. If the disputants in this way bound themselves beforehand to abide by the verdict of the arbitrator, we have an instance of arbitration in the proper sense of the term; if, however, there was no such agreement, but the intervention of the neutral person or power took the form of a suggestion, which the two states engaged in the dispute were free to accept or reject as they thought fit, we have an instance of mediation, which lacks the judicial character and the binding force of arbitration. We are told that, as early as the eighth century before our era, the Messenians sought to avoid an impending war with Sparta by offering to abide by the award of an unprejudiced court, such as the Argive Amphictiony or the Athenian Areopagus. We have grave reasons for questioning the historical truth of this statement, but there are two well-authenticated examples of international arbitration in the seventh century, and another probably falls very early in the sixth. From these early days down to the time when the Greeks lost their independence and were swallowed up in the irresistible advance of the Roman power, we have an ever-increasing volume of evidence, culminating in the second century before Christ, in which we know from inscriptions alone of some forty-four cases; if we add to these the numerous instances referred to by Polybius and other historians, and remember that in all probability not one-half of the arbitrations which actually took place have left any trace in our extant sources, we shall be in a better position to realize how important was the part played, in later Greek history at least, by this method of settling international disputes. Again, not only is the appeal to arbitration common throughout Greek history, but it is found in all parts of the Hellenic world, from Sicily to Western Asia Minor, from Crete to the shores of the Black Sea. Where it first found a home on Greek soil we cannot say we should have expected to find it practised amongst the Ionians earlier than elsewhere, for not only were |