ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS.

DIALOGUE III.

In your last conversation, said EUGENIUS, you impressed me with a high idea of Metaphysics, when you pointed out their extensive application. But may it not be feared that the subject is too vast for the mind to grasp? According to you, a Treatise of Metaphysics must embrace every Science and every branch of knowledge imaginable; in this case, however concisely it may be written, it would be so voluminous as to fill an entire library. I see the force of your objection, replied LEANDER; a Treatise would be interminable, were it to attempt to explain in detail every thing to which Metaphysics

may be applied. And so would a Treatise on Eloquence or on Architecture, if it were to lay down particular rules for every individual work, constructed by the help of Eloquence or of Architecture; but in order to circumscribe a Treatise of Metaphysics within due bounds, how do we proceed? we dwell at first upon those objects of thought, which are most essential and may serve to conduct us to all the rest; such, for instance, are the conceptions of the Mind itself. Besides, as nothing is more important than to establish the truth and evidence of our knowledge, a Treatise of Metaphysics should make that its first and principal business. It should, moreover, aim at laying down the most precise notions of all that most generally engages our thoughts, when we contemplate the natures and properties of all Beings, and especially of Spiritual Beings, the most excellent of all; hence some have represented Metaphysics as the Science of Beings, or of Being in general. Thus, Metaphysics having taught us to make an exact analysis of our know

ledge and of the mind, which is its seat, as well as of the properties of those Beings which mostly attract its notice, enable us, also, to employ the same method on any particular subject, worth knowing with exactness. They accustom us, by such an exercise of our faculties, to think and judge, not as the vulgar, whose knowledge is confused and superficial, but with all the precision and correctness of which the human mind is capable.

Your exposition, said EUGENIUS, promises to be as interesting as the Treatises I have heard spoken of are uninviting; but allow me to observe, you lay no stress on Abstraction; which is, however, as you before told me, the principal object of Metaphysics.

You remind me, said LEANDER, that I have omitted the use of the word Abstraction, but I have not omitted to speak of what is signified by it; for it expresses that operation of the Mind, by which it thinks of one property or circumstance of a thing, without thinking of its other properties or circumstances. Now to

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think of each of their properties by itself, in order to obtain the most correct and precise idea of the thing, is the main business of Metaphysics. Thus its object is the use of Abstraction.

I see, said EUGENIUS, I put you to the trouble of repeating what you have already explained to me on other occasions; but excuse a novice in Metaphysics, who would have less difficulty in understanding what you are so kind as to explain to him, were he more familiarized with the terms of the art.

Say not with less difficulty, answered LEANDER, but with no difficulty whatever: a clear head like yours is naturally Metaphysical, and, to become so in the highest degree, nothing more is wanting than the habit (which, by a little practice, may be speedily acquired at pleasure) of using appropriate terms to express certain notions with which the mind should be conversant.

Since the comprehending of these terms, said EUGENIUS, is so useful, will you see whether I take in your meaning in respect of these, the corresponding notions