with, a superior centre. The sensorial ganglia can undoubtedly act alone in a reflex manner, but they almost invariably consult the cerebrum before dealing with the impressions which they receive; so it may be that the spinal cord, though capable of spontaneous reaction, may yet commonly refer to some higher seat of compound coordination before sending forth an answer to any message brought to it." What is here stated as a possible and occasional process, I consider to be a necessary and universal process. Dr. Browne acutely remarks that if "what may be termed the encephalic loop were an integral part of every reflex act, then the influence of an intracranial lesion in checking reflex action would not be difficult to understand" and we may add the notorious influence of the brain in arresting reflex actions, and modifying them by the will, which is only explicable on the supposition that the cerebral and spinal centres are functionally associated. Dr. Browne further remarks: "In experimenting upon myself I have sometimes thought that when the toe is pricked the sensation of pain actually precedes the movement of withdrawal; and in experimenting upon patients with sluggish nervous systems I have certainly noticed that after the pricking of the toe the little cry of pain has anticipated the muscular contractions of the leg. Now this cry of pain is a secondary reflex act through the sensorial centre; it is the result of a discharge from efferent nerves from the summit of what we have spoken of as the encephalic loop line; and we should certainly not expect that it would be developed earlier than the primary reflexion upon the motor apparatus, unless indeed what'we have regarded as the primary reflexion really itself took place by way of the loop line."

41. The difference between a voluntary and involuntary act is not, I conceive, that in the one case the brain co-operates and in the other is inactive, but that while in

both the brain co-operates, the state of the sensorium known as mental prevision or ideal stimulation, is present in the one, and absent or less conspicuous in the other. So likewise the difference between a normal reflex action accompanied, and the same action unaccompanied by consciousness, is not that the brain co-operates in the one and is inactive in the other, but that the state of the sensorium is somewhat different in the two cases. Movements which originally were voluntary and difficult of execution accompanied therefore by brain co-operation

become by frequent repetition automatic, easy of execution, and unconscious - they are then said to depend on the direct action of the established mechanism. Granted. But what are the components of this mechanism? Are they not just those centres and organs which at first effected the movements? In becoming easy and automatic, the movements do not change their mechanism -the moving organs and the motor conditions remain. what they were; all that is changed is the degree of consciousness, i. e. the state of the sensorium which precedes and succeeds the movement. It is this which constitutes the difficulty of the question. Some readers may consider that all is conceded when unconsciousness is admitted. But this is not so. My present argument is the physiological one that the brain co-operates in reflex actions whenever the brain is structurally united with the reflex centres; the psychological question as to whether consciousness is also involved in this brain co-operation must be debated on other grounds; and we have already seen that consciousness operates in gradations of infinite delicacy.

Observe a man performing some automatic action, such as planing a deal board, or cutting out a pattern, which he has done so often that he is now able to do it "mechanically." It is certain that his brain co-operates, and

that he could not act thus with an injured brain; yet he is said to act unconsciously, his brain occupied elsewhere as he whistles, talks to bystanders, or thinks of his wife and children. Yet the brain is acting as an overseer of his work, attentive to every stroke of the plane, every snip of the scissors; and this becomes evident directly his attention is otherwise absorbed by an interesting question addressed to him, or an interesting object meeting his eye: then the work pauses, his hands are arrested, and the automatic action will only be resumed when his attention is released when he has answered your question, or satisfied himself about the object.

42. This is a step towards understanding the co-operation of the brain even in those connate reflexes which were not originally voluntary acts, but were from the first organized tendencies, and are capable of being realized in the absence of the brain. I admit that it is difficult to find proof of brain co-operation here, though I think the anatomical and physiological evidence render it highly probable. But distinct proof to the contrary would not suffice for the Reflex Theory-would not prove that reflex actions were insentient unless there had previously been proved that which seems to me contradicted by the clearest and most massive evidence, namely, that the brain is the sole seat of sentience. This contradictory evidence we will now furnish.

CHAPTER III.

INDUCTIONS FROM PARTICULAR OBSERVATIONS.

43. In the last chapter we surveyed the deductive evidence, from which the conclusion was that Reflexion necessarily involves Sensibility, but not necessarily any one particular mode of Sensibility, such as Consciousness, Pain, Discomfort, Attention, or the reaction of any one. of the special Senses. Although each or all of these modes may be involved in the sensorial process which determines a reflex act, each or all may be absent. Such is the fact of observation. This fact is interpreted on the hypothesis that Reflexion is the exclusive property of the spinal cord, as Sensation is of the brain. When we come to examine the evidence for this hypothesis, we find it to move in a circle: the brain is said to be the exclusive seat of sensation, because reflex actions can be effected after its removal; and reflex actions are said to be insentient because they take place in the absence of the brain.

A gentleman was one day stoutly asserting that there were no gold-fields except in Mexico and Peru. A nugget, dug up in California, was presented to him, as evidence against his positive assertion. He was not in the least disconcerted. "This metal, sir, is, I own, extremely like gold; and you tell me that it passes as such in the market, having been declared by the assayers to be undistinguishable from the precious metal. All this I will not dispute. Nevertheless, the metal is not gold, but

auruminium; it cannot be gold, because gold comes only from Mexico and Peru." In vain was he informed that the geological formation was similar in California and Peru, and the metals similar; he had fixed in his mind the conclusion that gold existed only in Mexico and Peru: this was a law of nature; he had no reasons to give why it should be so; but such had been the admitted fact for many years, and from it he would not swerve. He was not fond of new-fangled notions, which, after all, would only lead us back to the exploded errors of the past. To accept the statement that gold was to be found. elsewhere than in Mexico and Peru, would be to return to the opinion of the ancients, who thought there was gold in the upper regions of Tartary!

Sensation is not tangible, assayable, like gold. We can understand, therefore, that the very men who would make merry with the auruminium, would accept easily such a phrase as "reflex action." The decapitated animal defends itself against injury, gets out of the way of annoyances, cleans itself, performs many of its ordinary actions, but is said to do these things without that Sensibility which, if its head were on, would guide them. Even before the Reflex Theory was invented this line of argument was used. Gall, referring to the experiments of Sue, previously noticed, says that "Sue confounds the effects of Irritability with those of Sensibility."* Not gold, dear sir, but auruminium!

44. On investigating the phenomena we soon come upon two classes which must cause hesitation. We find that the brain has its reflex processes, of the same order as those of the cord; we find that these processes may be conscious or unconscious, voluntary or involuntary; so that we can no longer separate brain from cord on the ground of Reflexion. In this respect, at least, the two

*GALL et SPURZHEIM, Anat. et Physiol. du Système Nerveux, I. 83.